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2011 ANNUAL SURVEY: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN SPORTS LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
This survey covers sports-related cases that were decided between January 
1 and December 31, 2011.  It does not include every sports-related decision.  
Instead, it includes brief summaries of a wide range of cases that impact the 
industry so as to provide insight into the growth of the field thus far and to 
highlight recent sports law developments.  To help the reader navigate, the 
survey is divided into sections based on specific areas of sports law addressed 
in each case.   
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Administrative law concerns the various activities engaged in by federal, 
state, and local government agencies.  These actions include everything from 
rulemaking to the enforcement of various regulatory schemes.  Although 
administrative law touches on relatively few sports law cases, the following 
case illustrates administrative law concerns that result directly from the 
increased media coverage of major sports events. 
CBS Corp. v. FCC1 
The petitioner television broadcasting company sought review of orders of 
the respondent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposing a 
monetary forfeiture under 47 U.S.C.S. § 503(b) for the broadcast of indecent 
material in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 1464 and 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999.  The 
sanctions stemmed from the petitioner’s live broadcast of a Super Bowl 
Halftime Show, which resulted in the exposure of a bare female breast on 
camera, an act that lasted nine-sixteenths of one second.  The petitioner 
transmitted the image over public airwaves, resulting in punitive action by the 
FCC.  The petitioner challenged the FCC orders on constitutional, statutory, 
and public policy grounds.  
 
1. 663 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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At the time of the incident, the FCC’s policy was to exempt fleeting or 
isolated material from the scope of actionable indecency.  However, the FCC 
sanctioned the petitioner under its new policy, which was implemented after 
the Super Bowl incident.  The court noted that the FCC, like any agency, could 
change its policies without judicial second-guessing; however, it could not 
change a well-established course of action without supplying notice of and a 
reasoned explanation for its policy departure.  Because the FCC failed to 
satisfy this requirement, its new policy was arbitrary and capricious as applied 
to the petitioner.  Therefore, the court vacated the FCC’s orders. 
ANTITRUST LAW 
Antitrust laws serve to protect consumers from conduct deemed to be 
anticompetitive and play a significant role in regulating the sports industry.  At 
the federal level, such conduct is controlled through the Sherman Antitrust 
Act, which prohibits monopolistic behavior and conspiracies to restrain trade.  
Courts have recognized that the sports context presents unique antitrust issues 
that are not present in any other industry.  That is, sports leagues and related 
organizations need a certain degree of cooperation in order to function; thus, to 
balance the unique context with the need to protect consumers, antitrust issues 
in the sports context are typically analyzed under a rule of reason analysis, 
where the courts will consider certain procompetitive justifications for alleged 
anticompetitive conduct. 
Agnew v. NCAA2 
The defendant National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) filed a 
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint.  The plaintiffs, former college 
athletes, challenged two NCAA bylaws as being anticompetitive and a form of 
price fixing.  The plaintiffs argued that the restriction to one-year scholarships 
and the cap on the number of athletic-based discounts a school can offer a 
sport each year were anticompetitive.  On their motion to dismiss, the NCAA 
argued that the plaintiffs failed to plead that the restrictions had any effect on a 
relevant market.  The court determined the NCAA was subject to the rule of 
reason analysis, as opposed to per se violations of the Sherman Act, and 
therefore, the plaintiffs had to allege anticompetitive effects on a discernible 
market.  The plaintiffs argued that they alleged sufficient geographic and 
product markets that are affected by the restraints on trade.  The court found 
the pleading to be insufficient.  Furthermore, the plaintiffs submitted two 
 
2. No. 1:11-cv-0293, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011). 
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previous complaints, and the NCAA requested that the immediate complaint 
be dismissed with prejudice, as the plaintiffs made repeated attempts to 
properly plead, and had previously failed.  Therefore, the court dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice. 
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.3 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ suit.  The plaintiffs 
brought suit against EA Sports, as well as the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA), alleging that EA Sports participated in price fixing, and 
that EA Sports participated in a group boycott against the plaintiffs for failing 
to compensate for use of the athletes’ images, names, or likenesses.  The 
plaintiffs alleged that EA Sports agreed to abide by NCAA rules, which 
included not offering any compensation to current or former student-athletes.  
The court found that refusing to compensate former student-athletes, who no 
longer need to retain amateur status, could constitute price-fixing under the 
pleadings.  Further, the court found that the NCAA rules contained no 
provision that prohibited compensation former student-athletes, and EA Sports 
refusal to do so could constitute a group boycott.  For these reasons, the court 
found that the allegations were well plead, and denied defendant EA Sports 
motion to dismiss. 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Bankruptcy law has been at the forefront of many major sports issues this 
past year.  Generally, these laws serve to aid debtors struggling to pay their 
creditors, through business reorganization plans and liquidation.  As the 
following cases illustrate, bankruptcy laws have recently played a large role in 
the sports context, affecting even some of the most well-known sports teams in 
the country. 
Fox Sports Net West 2, LLC v. L.A. Dodgers LLC  
(In re L.A. Dodgers LLC)4 
The appellants Fox Sports Net West filed an Emergency Motion for Stay.  
The appellees, the Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, filed for bankruptcy protection 
under Chapter 11.  The appellees have a licensing agreement with the 
appellants that extends through the end of the 2013 Major League Baseball 
 
3. No. C 09-01967, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82682 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2011). 
4. 465 B.R. 18 (D. Del. 2011). 
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season.  Pursuant to their bankruptcy filings, the appellees filed a Motion for 
an Order Approving Market Procedures for the License of Telecast Rights, 
which seeks to end its current contract with appellants.  The bankruptcy court 
granted the appellees’ motion.  The appellants opposed the motion and filed an 
Emergency Motion for Stay in the district court, appealing the bankruptcy 
court’s grant of the appellees’ motion.  The court found that the appellants are 
likely to succeed on the merits because there is a substantial chance the 
appellants can prove the bankruptcy court’s findings were clearly erroneous.  
The court further found that the appellants would likely suffer irreparable 
harm and that all other parties will likely be unaffected if the court grants the 
stay.  Finally, the court found that was in the public’s interest to grant the stay.  
Therefore, the court granted the appellants’ Emergency Motion for Stay 
pending the appeal of the bankruptcy court’s findings. 
Adelphia Recovery Trust v. HSBC Bank USA  
(In re Adelphia Recovery Trust)5 
This case arises out of various bankruptcy proceedings involving the 
National Hockey League’s (NHL) Buffalo Sabres (Sabres), and other various 
ownership entities, regarding certain fraudulent conveyance claims brought 
against the appellees, three banks.  The central issues in this case was  
“whether a debtor-in-possession is barred from bringing 
fraudulent conveyance claims against three banks because it 
actively participated in and facilitated a sale of the assets of a 
different debtor-in-possession, to which it was a creditor, 
while remaining silent about the possibility that it would bring 
fraudulent conveyance claims with respect to its prior take-
outs of loans secured by those assets.”6   
The three banks had granted loans related to the Sabres and their stadium, 
the HSBC Arena.  Adelphia Recovery Trust, a trust created pursuant to 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, appealed the district court’s decision 
barring its fraudulent conveyance claims against the banks.  The Second 
Circuit affirmed. 
 
5. 634 F.3d 678 (2d Cir. 2011). 
6. Id. at 682. 
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In re Dallas Stars, L.P.7 
The debtors, a professional ice hockey club, sought to have the bankruptcy 
court approve its reorganization plan after it declared bankruptcy.  The debtors 
filed petitions under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and were allowed to 
operate their businesses as debtors in possession pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 
1107(a) and 1108.  The debtors filed a disclosure statement and a joint 
prepackaged plan of reorganization and asked the court to approve their 
disclosure statement and confirm their plan.  The court confirmed the debtors’ 
plan.  The court stated that the plan met all requirements imposed by 11 
U.S.C.S. §§ 1123 and 1129 and was in the best interests of the debtors and 
their bankruptcy estates.  The debtors and the Stalking Horse Bidder had 
negotiated the asset purchase agreement in good faith and had acted in good 
faith in connection with the development of the debtor’s prepackaged plan.  
The debtors gave creditors and other interested parties timely and adequate 
notice of their motion seeking confirmation of their plan and a reasonable 
opportunity to object.  Finally, the debtors had addressed and resolved all 
objections to the plan. 
In re L.A. Dodgers LLC8 
The debtors, Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, filed a motion to obtain post-
petition financing.  The debtors wanted to work with Highbridge Senior Loan 
Fund II (Highbridge), whom the debtors previously entered into a Credit and 
Security Agreement with.  Major League Baseball (MLB) objected to this 
financing, and offered an unsecured loan on more favorable terms.  The 
debtors disputed that MLB’s loan offer was an unsecured loan.  Further, MLB 
alleged that the debtors refused to negotiate terms in good faith.  The debtors 
argued that the court should defer to the debtors’ business judgment and allow 
them to obtain the Highbridge financing.  The court rejected this argument and 
further found that MLB’s loan offer was more favorable and constituted an 
alternative.  The court held that as long as MLB could prove that the loan offer 
was unsecured and independent of MLB’s oversight and governance of the 
debtors, the loan offer was sufficient.  Further, the court ordered the debtors to 
negotiate with MLB in good faith.  Therefore, the court denied the debtors’ 
emergency motion to obtain post-petition financing. 
 
7. 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4444 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 18, 2011). 
8. 457 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).  
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In re Tex. Rangers Baseball Partners9 
At issue in this proceeding was the Application of Perella Weinberg 
Partners, LP (Perella) for “Allowance of Compensation and Reimbursement of 
Expenses” in connection with its financial advising services related to the 
Texas Rangers’ Chapter 11 Bankruptcy case.  Perella argued that it was 
entitled to certain fees for performing its financial advising services in the 
case.  The court, although agreeing to a certain extent, concluded that the facts 
of the case warranted an award of fees less than those sought by Perella.  
Specifically, regarding the higher transaction fee sought by Perella, the court 
stated that this case differed from a normal financial advising situation, as the 
risk “that the Rangers would not be bought . . . was so small as to be 
insignificant.”10  This fact, in addition to other circumstances regarding 
Perella’s involvement in the Rangers’ sale, resulted in the court granting the 
Application in the amount of $912,450 with provisions related to further 
expenses and reductions.  Additionally, the court declined to decide whether 
Perella was entitled to any reimbursement for legal fees. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Both the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions protect individuals from 
certain acts of the government.  Constitutional claims are prevalent in the 
sports context because the state action requirement is likely met in many 
sports-related situations, such as issues involving public schools, cities and 
government agencies, and some athletic associations that are intertwined with 
the government.  Longstanding judicial precedent has established that 
participation in sports is not a constitutionally protected right.  This concept is 
addressed in some of the following cases—cases that range in coverage from 
the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and other 
related claims. 
Apilado v. N. Am. Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance11 
During the championship game of the 2008 Gay Softball World Series in 
which the plaintiffs’ team lost, a protest was filed under Rule 7.05 of the North 
American Gay Amateur Athletic Alliance (NAGAAA) Softball Code against 
six players on the plaintiffs’ team.  The rule limited the number of 
 
9. No. 10-43400, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1247 (Bankr. N. D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2011). 
10. Id. at *12. 
11. 792 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2011).   
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heterosexual players that a team could carry.  Following a hearing, the protest 
committee determined that the plaintiffs were not gay, and as a result, the 
committee disqualified their team from the tournament, annulled its victories 
and second-place finish, and recommended the one-year suspension of the 
plaintiffs from NAGAAA softball.  Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that 
NAGAAA is a public accommodation under Washington law and it 
unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiffs based on sexual orientation.  At 
issue before this court was the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment 
as to the unlawful discrimination claim and the defendant’s motion for partial 
summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.  Although 
the court concluded that the defendant is a public accommodation under 
Washington law, it determined that issues of material fact remained regarding 
whether the NAGAAA rule is protected by the First Amendment’s freedom of 
association.  Similarly, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate clear harm and imminent danger.  As such, the defendant’s 
motion for partial summary judgment regarding the plaintiff’s requested 
injunctive relief was granted, and the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 
judgment was denied.   
Awrey v. Gilbertson12 
The plaintiff Anthony Awrey sued defendants Saginaw Valley State 
University (SVSU) and the university’s president and athletic director in their 
official capacities, alleging violations of his right to Due Process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment when he was informed he would no longer be eligible 
to play football at SVSU as a result of the defendants’ determination that the 
plaintiff had violated National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) rules.  
Specifically, the plaintiff argued that SVSU deprived him of his property 
interest in continued eligibility to play college football and his liberty interest 
in his good name and reputation.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.  
The court noted that the plaintiff did not have a constitutionally protected 
property interest in his continued eligibility to play football and concluded that 
even if the plaintiff had a protected property or liberty interest, the claim 
would still fail due to the applicable statute of limitations, Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, and qualified immunity.  Thus, the court granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
 
12. No. 10-14738-BC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70613 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2011). 
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Blasi v. Pen Argyl Area Sch. Dist.13 
The plaintiff’s children participated in basketball for their respective 7th 
and 8th grade teams.  The plaintiff alleged that his children were discriminated 
against because they are one-half Chinese.  The plaintiff claimed that the 
coaches encouraged discrimination against his sons, and furthermore, that his 
sons received lesser playing time, despite being more skilled.  The plaintiff 
confronted the coaches via email and other means, which was a violation of 
the Athletic Code Guidelines.  As a result, the plaintiff’s sons were suspended 
for one game for violating the guidelines.  The plaintiff subsequently filed suit 
against the defendant, challenging the Athletic Code Guidelines, as well as the 
Parental/Spectator guidelines, and challenging the suspensions as retaliation 
for exercising his constitutional rights.  The court found that both guidelines 
were narrowly tailored, and served a legitimate purpose, such that they did not 
interfere with the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.  The court also found that the 
plaintiff and his sons were properly sanctioned pursuant to the guidelines, after 
agreeing to uphold the rules.  Therefore, court found that the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights were not violated, and accordingly dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice. 
Clayton v. Walton14 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s action for 
violations of her constitutional rights.  The plaintiff attempted to enter a 
Georgia Tech football game at Georgia Tech’s Bobby Dodd Stadium and was 
turned away because she had food in her purse.  The plaintiff threw the food 
away; however, when she attempted to re-enter, stadium workers asked to 
search her because they said they observed her putting something in the crotch 
of her pants.  The defendants, two Georgia Tech police officers, were called to 
the scene.  The plaintiff was searched and nothing was found.  The plaintiff 
filed suit against multiple parties, alleging her civil rights under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments were violated as a result of an unlawful arrest, 
imprisonment, strip search, and conspiracy to cover up the conduct by an 
inadequate investigation and seeking money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments when the defendants held her for the purposes of a 
search because there was no probable cause that she violated the law.   
The court stated that the plaintiff did not state a claim under the 
 
13. No. 10-6814, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112412 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 30, 2011).  
14. No. 1: 11-CV-2437-TWT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145387 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2011). 
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Fourteenth Amendment because based on the facts, the Due Process Clause 
does not provide a remedy for the plaintiff.  The court also stated that the 
plaintiff did not sufficiently state a claim under the Fourth Amendment, noting 
that a search did not occur because a reasonable person would realize she was 
free to decline the officers’ requests to be searched so long as she did not 
attempt to enter the stadium.  The court also stated that a reasonable person 
would know that smuggling food into a stadium was in violation only of 
stadium rules, and not state or federal law, and thus at worst could result in 
expulsion from the stadium.  Finally, the court stated that the defendants were 
protected from all of the plaintiff’s claims under qualified immunity.  For 
these reasons, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.   
Doe v. Silsbee Indep. Sch. Dist.15 
The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees 
to the defendants.  The plaintiff, who was a member of the cheerleading squad, 
alleged that two basketball players sexually assaulted her.  After a grand jury 
declined to indict the two players, they were permitted to return to classes, and 
one was permitted to rejoin the basketball team.  During a basketball game, the 
plaintiff refused to cheer for the player when he performed alone.  As a result, 
the plaintiff was removed from the cheerleading squad.  The plaintiff then 
filed this civil rights action against the defendant school district and other 
school officials.  She alleged that the defendants violated her equal protection 
rights; deprived her of her liberty interests in freedom from psychological 
harm and stigmatization without due process; deprived her of her property 
right in participating in the cheerleading squad without due process; and 
violated her First Amendment rights.  The defendants subsequently filed a 
motion to dismiss.  The district court granted the motion and awarded the 
defendants attorney’s fees and costs.  The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the 
district court erred in awarding the defendants the attorney’s fees.  On appeal, 
the court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the 
plaintiff’s equal protection claim and due process claims were frivolous.  
However, the court held that the plaintiff’s First Amendment argument had 
some arguable merit and that the district court clearly erred in finding that the 
plaintiff’s First Amendment claim frivolous.  Therefore, the court reversed the 
district court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and remanded the order for 
further proceedings.  
 
15. 440 Fed. Appx. 421 (5th Cir. Tex. 2011). 
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Florida State University Bd. of Trustees v. Monk16 
Florida State University (FSU) petitioned for writ of certiorari.  FSU 
conducted an investigation after learning about possible academic violations 
within FSU’s Office of Athletic Academic Support Services.  The 
investigation revealed substantial evidence purporting that Brenda Monk 
(Monk) perpetuated academic dishonesty.  FSU issued a public report on the 
investigation, although Monk’s name was not included.  However, it was 
easily discoverable from the report that Monk was the person referenced.  As a 
result, Monk resigned from her position and filed a defamation suit against 
FSU.  FSU filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that it enjoys absolute immunity 
from defamation suits.  The trial court denied the motion, and FSU asked for 
writ of certiorari.   
The court of appeals granted the writ of certiorari because the trial court 
departed from essential requirements of law by refusing to dismiss the case on 
FSU’s absolute immunity grounds.  The court noted that FSU acted within its 
official duties when it conducted the investigation and released the report to 
the public, as required by the NCAA.  Therefore, the court of appeals granted 
FSU’s writ of certiorari and quashed the trial court’s order that denied FSU’s 
motion to dismiss.   
Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp.17 
The plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction on behalf of their minor 
son to prevent enforcement of the defendant school district’s haircut policy for 
male, middle-school athletes.  The plaintiff’s son played middle-school 
basketball and was subject to the haircut policy.  Upon suing the defendant, 
the plaintiffs argued that the defendant’s policy violated their son’s equal 
protection rights and his rights to procedural and substantive due process.  The 
court found that it did not have jurisdiction to enjoin the defendant because the 
case was moot, as the basketball season was over, and any case brought for the 
upcoming season was not yet ripe.  Therefore, the court denied the plaintiff’s 
request for a preliminary injunction.  
 
16. 68 So. 3d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
17. No. 1:10-cv-1709-RLY-DML, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78799 (S.D. Ind. July 19, 2011). 
SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2012  10:31 AM 
2012] 2011 SURVEY  705 
 
Immaculate Heart Cent. Sch. v.  
N.Y. State Pub. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n18 
The plaintiff brought this declaratory action against the defendants, 
seeking to enjoin them from classifying private and public schools differently.  
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, and § 1983 
of the United States Code after the defendants’ reclassified Plaintiff’s private 
school from Class D to Class C based on their overall winning record.  
Reclassification determinations for private schools were made based on 
analysis of various factors such as win and loss records, championships, and 
postseason appearances; public schools were reclassified based purely on 
enrollment figures.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.  Although 
noting that the defendants have a legitimate interest in maintaining 
competitive balance—their asserted interest—the court denied the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause claim.  However, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
the remaining claims. 
J.K. v. Minneapolis Public Schs.19 
J.K. filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant 
school district from transferring him to another school in the same district.  
J.K. attended Southwest High School (Southwest) in Minneapolis for three 
years until the defendant Minneapolis Public Schools (the District) barred him 
from further attending Southwest because of misconduct that he allegedly 
committed near the end of his junior year.  The District tried to transfer J.K. to 
another high school within the District.  As a result, J.K. filed a motion for 
preliminary injunction, ordering the District to permit him to attend Southwest 
for the upcoming year.  J.K. alleged that the District’s actions violated his 
right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.  Specifically, J.K. asserted that the proposed 
transfer would deprive him of three distinct interests: (1) his property interest 
in his education; (2) his property interest in participating in interscholastic 
sports; and (3) his liberty interest in his reputation.  The court, however, did 
not agree.  First, the court held that J.K.’s transfer to a different high school 
would not impair his state-created property interest in a public education.  
Therefore, the court held J.K was not likely to prevail on the merits of this 
 
18. 797 F. Supp. 2d 204 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). 
19. No. 11-CV-1322, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84195 (D. Minn. July 29, 2011). 
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claim.  Second, the court held that J.K. was unlikely to show that the District, 
by transferring him, would impair his property interest in participating in 
interscholastic sports as part of his education.  As such, the court would not 
enjoin the transfer on this basis.  Finally, the court held that J.K. was unlikely 
to prove that his transfer deprived him of due process interest in his reputation.  
Because J.K. was not likely to prevail on the merits of any of his due process 
claims, the court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction.   
Kirby v. Loyalsock Twp. Sch. Dist.20 
The plaintiff was bullied by her high school basketball teammates, which 
led to the plaintiff quitting the basketball team during her senior year.  After a 
rumor went around school that the plaintiff was pregnant, she made a formal 
complaint with the school against one of her teammates.  The high school’s 
assistant principal, Dr. Reitz, investigated the rumor, but could not find 
conclusive evidence as to who started it.  Another complaint was filed after an 
incident occurred between the plaintiff and other students at school.  The 
plaintiff filed this action and alleged that defendants violated her constitutional 
rights to freedom of association, substantive and procedural due process, and 
equal protection.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.  The court 
dismissed all claims against two defendants, the high school principal and 
District superintendent in their official capacity, because they were protected 
by the qualified immunity statute.   
First, the court addressed her freedom of association claim.  Intimate 
association and expressive association are the only types of protected 
association.  The court ruled that even if the defendants’ conduct was the 
cause of the plaintiff quitting the basketball team, the plaintiff failed to prove 
that the Constitution recognizes a right of social association.  Therefore, the 
court granted the defendants’ motion as to this claim.   
Next, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on 
the plaintiff’s equal protection claim. The court found that the plaintiff failed 
to identify any similarly situated student who had their complaint investigated 
by Dr. Reitz as opposed to the principal.   
Lastly, the plaintiff argued that both her rights to procedural due process 
and substantive due process were violated.  As endless case law suggests, a 
student has a legitimate claim only to public education, but no protected 
property interest in participating in extracurricular activities.  Therefore, 
because she was not prohibited from receiving a public education, the court 
 
20. No. 4:09-cv-01695, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99669 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2011). 
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granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to procedural due 
process.  Similarly, for the substantive due process claim, the defendants 
argued that the plaintiff failed to establish that any fundamental right existed 
as to which she was being deprived of by the defendants.  Because the United 
States Constitution does not grant a fundamental right to public education, the 
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.   
Lanier v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist.21 
The plaintiff, James Lanier (Lanier), brought a civil action lawsuit against 
the Fresno Unified School District (FUSD) for alleged discrimination in 
relation to Lanier’s bid on a sports officiating services contract.  Evidence was 
presented that Lanier, an African-American, bid against others who were both 
black and white.  In preparing his bid, Lanier inquired about the independent 
contractor status of the sports officials’ pool, and whether he could use the 
entire pool.  Lanier was informed by the purchasing department that only the 
current roster of officials could be used by Lanier.  However, numerous white 
contractors bidding for the same job were permitted to use the entire pool of 
officials in his bid proposal and in performance of the contract.  One of the 
white contractors was granted the contract.  
First, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
sections 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 because FUSD was an arm of the state, 
and therefore, is protected from such claims due to sovereign immunity 
granted by the Eleventh Amendment.   
Next, the court denied FUSD’s motion to dismiss Lanier’s Title VI claim, 
because the alleged discrimination was conducted by those “high enough in 
FUSD’s managerial hierarchy to constitute an allegation of discrimination 
against the entity receiving federal funds.”22  Lanier met his burden for 
establishing a Title VI claim by offering enough evidence to overcome the 
motion to dismiss, showing that FUSD may have engaged in racial 
discrimination and that FUSD did receive federal financial assistance.  FUSD 
argued that the court should dismiss the claim because Lanier failed to offer 
proof that FUSD itself was discriminatory, and offered evidence showing that 
only individual employees were discriminatory.  This led the court to 
determine whether Lanier’s discriminatory conduct allegation was completed 
by managers high enough to institute corrective measures on Lanier’s behalf.  
 
21. No. CIV F 09-1779, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111736 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 29, 2011). 
22. Lanier v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111736, 15–16 (D.C.E.D. Cal., 
Sept. 29, 2011).   
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Lanier offered evidence that FUSD’s athletic director told the African-
American contract bidders that they would not be considered for the opening 
unless they partnered with the white contractor who had no staff or 
certification to officiate (both of which Lanier did have).  There was also proof 
that Lanier sent a letter notifying FUSD’s board, which had necessary 
decision-making power, of the discriminatory conduct.  Therefore, the court 
ruled that the alleged facts directly stated that FUSD was aware of Lanier’s 
racial bias allegations, but failed to remedy the situation.  The court also held 
that Lanier adequately alleged discriminatory conduct as required under Title 
VI. 
Luzzi v. ATP Tour, Inc.23 
ESPN filed a motion to unseal certain documents.  The Association of 
Tennis Professionals (ATP) charged the plaintiffs, professional tennis players, 
with violating the ATP Official Rulebook for wagering on tennis matches.  
Following arbitration proceedings, each plaintiff was fined and suspended.  
The plaintiffs later filed suit in Florida District Court, alleging that they were 
not bound by the ATP Rulebook’s antiwagering provisions, their arbitration 
proceedings were not binding, and ATP’s targeting of the plaintiffs violated a 
fiduciary duty.  During discovery in this suit, the parties entered into a 
Confidentiality Agreement and Stipulated Order in which the parties could 
designate certain documents as confidential and thus seal them as confidential.  
On Intervenor, ESPN filed a motion to unseal certain documents, arguing (1) 
that a right of public access attaches to documents submitted with a dispositive 
motion because they form the basis of a formal act of the court; and (2) ATP 
did not show an interest in the continued sealing of the documents sufficient to 
outweigh the public’s and media’s right of access.  Without deciding the issue, 
the court first assumed that at least a limited presumption of public access 
applied to the sealed documents.  Second, the court noted that legitimate 
privacy interests are an important factor to be considered, particularly the 
privacy interests of tennis players not involved in this dispute.  As such, the 
court held that good cause existed for the records to remain sealed and denied 
ESPN’s motion to unseal the documents.   
Marcavage v. City of Chicago24 
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s decision to grant summary 
 
23. No. 3:09-cv-1155-J-32MCR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74796 (M.D. Fla. July 12, 2011). 
24. 659 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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judgment in favor of the defendants in the plaintiffs’ action asserting 
violations of their constitutional rights.  The plaintiffs, members of a religious 
organization, were demonstrating at two stadiums during outreach activities 
during homosexual athletic and cultural events.  Police officers ordered the 
demonstrators to change the locations of their activities and the plaintiffs 
refused to comply.  As a result, two demonstrators were arrested.  The 
plaintiffs subsequently sued the defendants, the city, police officers, and a 
municipal corporation, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
city and the police officers, and granted a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings in favor of the municipal corporation.  The plaintiffs appealed.   
On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the city 
and the police officers with respect to the claims involving the stadiums 
because they were not permitted to use the main pedestrian thoroughfares at 
each of the venues because (1) under the First Amendment the restrictions 
were content-neutral, not overly broad, and sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
the significant goal of avoiding congestion and maintaining an orderly flow of 
traffic; (2) regarding equal protection, a reasonable fact-finder could not in 
good conscience find that the demonstrators were similarly-situated to other 
users of the sidewalks; and (3) officers had probable cause to arrest a 
demonstrator for disorderly conduct.  However, the court remanded the First 
Amendment claim dealing with the park.   
McGee v. Va. High Sch. League25 
The plaintiffs filed a motion to preliminarily enjoin defendant from 
applying one of its athletic eligibility rules.  Six public high schools were 
consolidated into three schools, which resulted in the end of the St. Paul 
Fighting Deacons (St. Paul).  St. Paul served students residing in two counties, 
and the students, regardless of their county, were able to choose between the 
two remaining high schools in the two counties.  The defendant’s transfer rules 
applied whenever a student enrolled in one school then transferred to another 
school without a corresponding change in parental residence.  Under the rule, 
if a student transferred to another high school and did not fall under one of the 
exceptions, the student was ineligible from participating in interscholastic 
competitions for one year.  One of the exceptions addressed school closure and 
stated that the rule did not apply if the student transferred to the school serving 
the district in which the parent resided.  The Mayor of the City of St. Paul 
 
25. 801 F. Supp. 2d 526 (W.D. Va. 2011). 
SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2012  10:31 AM 
710 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2 
 
requested that St. Paul students be granted an eligibility exception should they 
choose to transfer to a high school not in their county.  The request was 
denied.  The plaintiffs, parents of the students that went to noncounty schools, 
sought a permanent injunction against the defendant’s application of the 
transfer rule and sought a preliminary injunction allowing the students 
temporary eligibility while the lawsuit pended.  The trial court addressed the 
preliminary injunction and held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on the merits of their lawsuit and failed to show 
irreparable harm.  Therefore, the court denied the motion for a preliminary 
injunction. 
Quintero v. Mariposa Cnty. Sch. Dist.26 
The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant school district, alleging that 
school officials’ racially discriminatory attitudes and conduct prevented him 
from equal access to sports officiating contracts.  However, the court held that 
the plaintiff’s complaint could not succeed because the Eleventh Amendment 
prohibits actions for damages against the state.  As a public school district in 
the state of California, the defendant is an arm of the state, and is therefore 
shielded from suit in federal court.  The court also held that the plaintiff’s state 
law claims were barred for similar reasons.  However, the court did grant the 
plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to name the school board 
members in their individual capacities. 
Seger v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n27   
The plaintiffs, parents of nonpublic school students, appealed a district 
court decision to dismiss their claims against the Kentucky High School 
Athletic Association (KHSAA), alleging that a KHSAA rule violated their 
constitutional rights.  The contested bylaw concerned the eligibility of student 
athletes at nonpublic schools who received financial aid.  The KHSAA 
enacted the bylaw to prevent and deter member schools from recruiting 
student athletes by restricting the amount and form of financial aid nonpublic 
school students can accept and remain eligible to play KHSAA-sanctioned 
sports.  After the plaintiffs’ children lost their eligibility through the 
application of this bylaw, the plaintiffs filed this action against the KHSAA, 
arguing that the bylaw was unfair, discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious, 
and violated their constitutional rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
 
26. No. 1: 11-cv-00839, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124532 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011). 
27. 453 Fed. Appx. 630 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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Amendment.  The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.   
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the bylaw 
was not discriminatory on its face because it did not discriminate against on a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class; therefore, the bylaw was subject to review 
under the rational basis standard.  Furthermore, the court found the bylaw was 
rationally related to furthering the KHSAA’s interest in deterring the use of 
financial aid as an improper athletic recruitment tool, an the bylaw did not 
violate any of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.  As such, the court affirmed 
the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims.  The court noted, 
however, that this decision did not affect any claims that the plaintiffs might 
wish to pursue under state law. 
Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co.28 
Gannett Company newspaper appealed the district court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association 
(WIAA), holding that the WIAA had the right to grant exclusive licenses to 
broadcast WIAA games.  In 2005, the WIAA contracted with the video 
production company, American-HiFi, giving American-HiFi exclusive rights 
to broadcast WIAA tournament events.  The agreement did not prohibit media 
coverage, photography, or interviews before or after games.  Believing that the 
exclusive license agreement violated the media’s First Amendment right to 
report on events, Gannett streamed four WIAA tournament games without 
WIAA consent and without paying the required licensing fees.  In response, 
the WIAA filed a declaratory judgment action against Gannet, asserting its 
right to grant exclusive licenses.  The district court entered summary judgment 
in favor of the WIAA.  Gannett appealed arguing that the WIAA’s contract 
granting American-HiFi the exclusive right to stream tournament games and 
requiring consent and payment for third-party broadcasts of entire games 
violated the First Amendment.  On appeal, the court determined that an 
exclusive contract for the transmission of an event does not interfere with the 
media’s right to report or comment on events.  Instead, the agreement 
prohibits the media only from appropriating the product without paying for it.  
Furthermore, because nothing in the First Amendment grants the media 
affirmative rights to broadcast entire performances, the WIAA had the right to 
package and distribute its performances.  For these reasons, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the WIAA. 
 
28. 658 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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CONTRACT LAW 
Whether a contract involves certain product and sponsorship agreements, 
employment issues, major league, minor league, or collegiate sports, there is 
no doubt that contractual agreements touch on nearly every aspect of the 
sports industry.  The following cases represent some of the plethora of 
contractual issues that arose in 2011 and highlight the significance of this 
particular area of sports law. 
Action Grp. Int’l, LLC v. AboutGolf, Ltd.29 
The plaintiff, Action Group International (AGI), entered into a series of 
three, one-year distribution agreements with the defendant, AboutGolf, 
whereby the plaintiff was entitled to serve as AboutGolf’s sole distributor for 
AboutGolf’s 3Trak golf products in South Korea.  The third contract was the 
same as the previous two in most material terms; however, the third contract 
contained a new liability clause that served to limit the defendant’s liability 
regarding a host of issues such as defective products.  Although the agreement 
required the defendant to provide the plaintiff with future product 
development information, among other things, most of these supposed 
developments never materialized.  Additionally, the plaintiff allegedly 
repaired numerous defects following complaints regarding the defendant’s 
products, and the defendant allegedly violated the exclusivity portion of the 
agreement by communicating with other potential distributors in South Korea.  
Eventually, the defendant notified the plaintiff it was terminating the 
agreement.   
This suit followed, with the plaintiff asserting eight separate causes of 
action seeking damages and injunctive relief for the defendant’s alleged 
breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, and other related claims.  At issue 
before the court was the defendant’s motion to dismiss.  Analyzing each claim 
in turn, the court granted the defendant’s motion as to the plaintiff’s claims for 
improper termination, breach of territorial exclusivity, unjust enrichment, and 
tortious interference with business relations.  However, the defendant’s motion 
was denied as to the plaintiff’s claims for breach of warranty, fraud, 
promissory estoppel, and for violations of Ohio’s Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act. 
 
29. No. 3:10CV2132, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46133 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 29. 2011). 
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Advanced Fluid Solutions, LLC v. Nat’l Assoc. for  
Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc.30 
The plaintiff Advanced Fluid Solutions (AFS) and NASCAR entered into 
an agreement in July 2009 where NASCAR granted AFS the license to 
manufacture the official NASCAR high-performance additive.  The agreement 
granted NASCAR the ability to terminate for AFS’s failure to make a payment 
if, after proper written notice, AFS failed to cure such a default within thirty 
days.  NASCAR delivered notice improperly by email in late October 2009.  
On December 1, 2009, NASCAR terminated the agreement with AFS.  
However, after sending the email in October, NASCAR assured AFS that it 
would perform the contract upon receiving the funding from AFS.  After the 
termination letter was sent, NASCAR continued to deal with AFS, and later 
that month, AFS notified NASCAR that it obtained alternative financing and 
was able to perform the contract.  However, NASCAR had already entered 
into an agreement with a different manufacturer.   
NASCAR’s conduct led to AFS filing its three claims, which NASCAR 
responded with a motion to dismiss. The district court held that specific 
performance is an inappropriate remedy because AFS is not clearly entitled to 
it and monetary damages would be an adequate remedy.  Therefore, the 
district court dismissed AFS’s claim for specific performance.  The district 
court also dismissed AFS’s claim for breach of contract.  The court ignored 
AFS’s argument that NASCAR continued discussions that gave the impression 
that AFS could continue the agreement upon payment.  The court also found it 
unpersuasive that AFS suffered any damages because of NASCAR’s improper 
notice.  Finally, the district court dismissed AFS’s declaratory judgment 
action.  AFS argued that latent or patent ambiguities in the agreement led to 
doubting its rights under the contract.  However, AFS failed to cite any 
specific provisions in the agreement that would demand declaratory relief.  
Therefore, because AFS failed to allege plausible facts that indicated some 
actual doubt as to a specific right under the agreement, the district court 
dismissed AFS’s claim for declaratory judgment.   
Bell v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc.31 
The plaintiff, a professional horse racing jockey, sued the defendants for 
tortious interference after being accused of fixing races and being banned from 
racing at a certain race.  The plaintiff also claimed that the defendants violated 
 
30. No. 6:11-cv-16-Orl-22KRS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98165 (M.D. Fla. July 26, 2011). 
31. No. 8:10-cv-2835-T-30TBM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146931 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2011). 
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the ban was issued without a hearing or any due 
process.  In the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the defendants first claimed 
that the plaintiff could not bring a tortious interference claim because the 
plaintiff had no existing contractual right to employment, or the hope of future 
employment.  The court rejected this claim and held that the plaintiff had 
existing and prospective contractual rights.  The court also noted that although 
the defendants have a qualified privilege to interfere with the business 
relationship of jockeys, a plaintiff can recover if malice is shown.  The court 
found that the plaintiff alleged malice because the defendants issued the ban 
without reason.  With respect to the plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the 
court held that the plaintiff did not state a claim because § 1983 does not cover 
private conduct, and thus as a private enterprise, the defendants had the right 
to exclude anyone they chose from their property.  
Big East Conference v. W. Va. Univ.32 
The defendant, West Virginia University, filed a motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff, Big East Conference’s, complaint.  The defendant announced that it 
planned to leave the plaintiff’s conference for another conference and then 
sued the plaintiff for breach of contractual and fiduciary duties for allegedly 
failing to maintain the Big East as a viable collegiate football conference.  The 
defendant sued the plaintiff in West Virginia.  The plaintiff claimed the 
defendant breached bylaws of the conference and sued the defendant for 
breach of contract.  The defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss.   
First, after interpreting the state’s long arm statute, the Rhode Island 
Superior Court held that the court did have personal jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff.  Second, the court held that there was sufficient service of process 
because the defendant served the plaintiff in compliance with the rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Third, the court refused to apply West Virginia’s sovereign 
immunity law on the basis of comity because it would deprive the plaintiff of 
its ability to fully pursue a claim.  Fourth, the court refused to dismiss the 
action under the first-to-file rule because the facts indicated that the 
defendant’s first-filed lawsuit qualified as an anticipatory action.  Finally, the 
court refused to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds because 
the plaintiff would not get adequate relief in the defendant’s suit because the 
defendant could claim sovereign immunity and the plaintiff may have no 
judicial remedy in West Virginia.  Additionally, the court noted that private 
and public interest factors did not warrant dismissal.  Therefore, the 
 
32. No. PB 11-6391, 2011 R.I. Super. LEXIS 164 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2011). 
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defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied.   
Can. Am. Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball, Ltd. v. Ottawa Rapidz33 
The Ottawa Rapidz (Rapidz) appealed from the trial court’s judgment 
granting a motion filed by the Canadian American Association of Professional 
Baseball (the League) to confirm an arbitration award.  Rapidz had entered 
into a “League Affiliation Agreement” with the League, which entitled Rapidz 
to operate a professional baseball team for play in the League during the 2008 
and 2009 seasons.  Rapidz did not actually field a team for the 2009 season.  A 
hearing was held before the League’s Board of Directors, acting as an 
arbitration panel, to determine if grounds existed for the involuntary automatic 
termination of Rapidz’ membership.  The board determined that Rapidz had 
committed an unsanctioned withdrawal from its membership, subjecting it to 
automatic and immediate termination as a League member.  The arbitration 
panel also decided that the League was entitled to draw down in full the 
$200,000 (Canadian) letter of credit Rapidz had posted with the League to be 
eligible for membership, and to the extent that Rapidz’s stadium lease was 
assignable, also to assign the lease to the League.   
Rapidz contested the arbitration and filed a motion to dismiss at the trial 
level, but the trial court confirmed the arbitration.  Rapidz appealed, 
contending that the motion to dismiss should have been granted because there 
was no arbitration to confirm in the first place, the arbitrator did not sign the 
arbitration, and personal jurisdiction was lacking.  However, the various 
documents comprising the League agreements are replete with evidence that 
the Board is authorized to arbitrate disputes involving the League members 
and that Rapidz agreed to submit any membership disputes to arbitration.  
Rapidz voluntarily and willingly agreed to have the Board act as arbitrator 
when it joined the League.  Rapidz did not move to vacate or modify the 
award based on the alleged irregularity in the form of the award.  The court of 
appeals affirmed.   
Estate of Haselwood v. Chi. Title Ins. Co.34 
The defendant, Chicago Title Insurance Company (CTIC), filed a motion 
to dismiss plaintiff Haselwood’s claim for insurance coverage.  The plaintiffs 
loaned money to an ice arena for construction.  This loan was secured by a 
deed of trust.  The plaintiffs financed the loan by purchasing title insurance 
 
33. 711 S.E.2d 834 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
34. No. 10-5464-RBL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77648 (W.D. Wash. July 18, 2011). 
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from CTIC.  A year later, the ice arena stopped paying its lenders back.  
Haselwood filed a lawsuit against the ice arena to foreclose its deed of trust.  
Four years later, Haselwood sent CTIC a letter related to the foreclosure.  
However, CTIC responded two years later by denying it had any duty to 
defend Haselwood.   
Haselwood brought this suit against CTIC, claiming it had wrongfully 
denied them coverage.  CTIC’s only argument was that Haselwood’s claims 
accrued in 2003, and therefore, was barred by the six-year statute of 
limitations for contract disputes.  However, Haselwood argued that the claim 
did not accrue until 2009, when CTIC refused coverage.  Previous case law 
supported the plaintiffs’ argument because an insurance claim accrues only 
once the insurer breaches the insurance policy contract.  Therefore, because 
CTIC breached the contract in 2009 when it refused coverage to Haselwood, 
the claims did not expire, and the court denied CTIC’s motion to dismiss.   
Estate of Oshinsky v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc.35 
The issue before the court was a joint motion for summary judgment on 
behalf of the defendants, representing the New York Giants’ and New York 
Jets’ collective interests arising out of a dispute regarding season tickets.  The 
defendants announced that season ticket holders would be required to enter 
into a personal seat license contract requiring a designated payment for each 
seat assigned to the season ticket holder in order to retain their season tickets.  
The plaintiff challenged this policy, arguing that it constituted a breach of the 
parties’ longstanding contract that allegedly entitled him to automatic renewal 
rights.  However, the defendants maintained that season tickets are revocable 
licenses.  Finding that no automatic renewal rights to season ticket holders 
existed, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 
Fan Action, Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc.36 
The plaintiff created a website dedicated to coverage of the University of 
Notre Dame sports teams.  After the website was created, the defendant 
offered to enter into a partnership agreement with the plaintiff.  During the 
term of the second partnership agreement, the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant created a similar website and hired the plaintiff’s employees and 
directed subscribers to the new website.  The plaintiff subsequently sued the 
defendant for breach of contract, breach of implied duty of good faith, and 
 
35. No. 09-cv-01186, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11331 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2011). 
36. No. 3:10CV75-PPS/CAN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134355 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 18, 2011).  
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unfair competition.  The defendant moved to dismiss, stating that the plaintiff 
did not allege sufficient facts to be granted relief.  The court found that the 
complaint was well plead under the facts, and therefore denied the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss. 
Gilbert v. Tulane Univ. of La.37 
The plaintiff entered into an employment agreement with the defendants to 
serve as the Defensive Line Coach for the Tulane University football team.  
The plaintiff was subsequently fired for routinely engaging in unprofessional 
behavior and divisive conduct.  As a result of these allegations, the plaintiff 
was not able to get another job with the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA).  The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants, alleging 
six claims; however, the plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed all but two of his 
claims—his breach of contract and abuse of rights claims.  The defendants 
filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s abuse of rights claim.  The defendants 
also urged the court to award attorney’s fees incurred in connection with their 
motion to dismiss, contending that the plaintiff’s voluntarily dismissed claims 
had no evidentiary support or were not warranted by existing law, and that the 
plaintiff did not dismiss the claims until after the defendants filed their motion 
to dismiss.  The defendants also asked the court to order that the plaintiff’s 
voluntarily dismissed claims be dismissed “with prejudice” so that the plaintiff 
could not later attempt to litigate them.   
The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s abuse 
of rights claim because the plaintiff did not file this claim in time.  However, 
the court denied the defendants’ request for attorney’s fees, because the 
defendants did not satisfy the “separate motion” requirement established by 
Rule 11(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the plaintiff’s 
amendment and dismissal appeared to be in compliance with Rules 15(a) and 
41(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relative to 
voluntary dismissals being without prejudice; and the defendants did not 
describe any less costly or time consuming efforts that they had undertaken in 
an attempt to bring about a voluntary dismissal of certain claims without the 
necessity of filing a formal adversarial motion. 
Harmon v. Gordon38 
The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contact.  Ben Gordon 
 
37. No. 10-2920, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111801 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2011). 
38. No. 10 C 1823, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95320 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2011). 
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(Gordon) was drafted by the Chicago Bulls in 2004 and signed a three-year 
contract with the option to extend for a fourth year.  Larry Harmon (Harmon) 
and Gordon entered into a consulting agreement after Gordon was drafted, the 
term of which was to cover the duration of Gordon’s playing career.  Gordon 
terminated the contract after his third year with the Chicago Bulls.   
After Harmon sued Gordon for breach of contract, both parties moved for 
summary judgment.  Harmon argued that the contract was valid to extend for 
the entirety of Gordon’s playing career, whereas Gordon argued it could 
extend only for the length of his initial contract.  The court found that the 
contract must have a term that was definite and certain, which Harmon’s 
interpretation would not provide.  Gordon also argued that he was entitled to 
terminate the contract for dissatisfaction in services.  The court found that 
Gordon was entitled to terminate his contract after his playing contract with 
the Chicago Bulls expired, which he did, and therefore, the court granted 
Gordon summary judgment and accordingly denied Harmon’s motion for 
summary judgment. 
Haught v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.39 
Haught appealed the trial court’s decision to enter summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant insurance company after the insurance company denied 
coverage under his policy.  Haught was an amateur youth baseball coach.  
During a team meeting following a game, a dispute over how much the 
school’s booster club was charging for parking became physical.  Haught left 
the meeting in an attempt to diffuse the fight.  However, during the fight, one 
of the booster members, Mr. Abrams, was fatally injured.  In connection with 
his death, Haught was found guilty of assaulting Mr. Abrams, and the 
executrix of his estate filed a wrongful death action against multiple parties, 
including Haught.  Haught filed a motion seeking declaratory judgment, 
claiming that the defendants, his insurers, owed him a defense with respect to 
an incident leading to Mr. Abrams’s death and indemnification with respect to 
the same incident.  The insurer filed a motion for summary judgment.  The 
trial court granted summary judgment, and Haught appealed.   
Haught asserted that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to 
the insurer because he was entitled to coverage under the policy, that the 
incident that led to Mr. Abrams’s death occurred within the scope of the 
policy, and that no exclusions were applicable.  Because the fight occurred 
approximately eighty feet from where Haught was conducting a team meeting, 
 
39. 2011 Ohio 4994 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
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and because the argument grew heated and became violent causing the coach 
to leave the team meeting and run towards the fight, the court held that Haught 
was acting within his capacity as a coach when he ran into the crowd.  Thus, 
the court held that trial court erred in its interpretation of the insurance policy.  
However, the court remanded the issue because the trial court denied coverage 
solely upon this basis, and had not yet considered the remaining issues.  
HBCU Pro Football, LLC v.  
New Vision Sports Props., LLC40 
The plaintiff, HBCU Pro Football, LLC (HBCU), produces television 
broadcasts of athletic contests involving historically black colleges and 
universities.  In this capacity, the plaintiff met with the defendant Victor Pelt 
(Pelt) and executed an agreement whereby the plaintiff would provide 
broadcasts of three football games to the defendant New Vision Sports 
Properties (NVSP), an official broadcast agent of College Sports Television 
(CSTV), to be aired on CSTV and pay NVSP a broadcast fee for each game.  
In return, the plaintiff was guaranteed a certain minimum gross revenue 
payment for each game.  A similar deal was reached regarding three other 
college football games.  Although the plaintiff followed through with its 
portion of the agreement by providing the games and the broadcast fees, no 
revenue was received and none of the games aired on CSTV.  Eventually, 
HSBC was notified that Pelt was making false representations and that NVSP 
was not an authorized agent of CSTV.  After settling with CSTV, HBCU filed 
a motion for default judgment against the defendants NVSP and Pelt regarding 
its breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment 
claims.  In this report and recommendation, U.S. Magistrate Judge Beth P. 
Gesner recommended that the court grant the plaintiff’s motion for default 
judgment against these remaining defendants.  The report also included 
recommendations regarding the amount of damages to be awarded. 
Kan. City Brigade, Inc. v. DTG Operations, Inc.41 
Kansas City Brigade, Inc., an arena football team, appealed from the trial 
court’s denial of its contract claims against the defendant rental car company, 
DTG Operations, Inc. (Dollar).  Kansas City Brigade alleged that two valid 
sponsorship agreements existed between the two parties.  However, the trial 
court held that Dollar was not liable under either contract, and the Kansas 
 
40. No. WDQ-10-0467, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55976 (D. Md. May 24, 2011). 
41. 251 P.3d 112 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).   
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Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.  Regarding the first 
contract, the court held that the Dollar counter agent who signed the agreement 
did not have actual or apparent authority to do so and that the Kansas City 
Brigade director of corporate sponsorships should have known this fact.  The 
court stated that “[a]n $80,000 marketing contract with a professional sports 
team would probably be an unusual or extraordinary transaction for the branch 
manager of a car rental company,”42 and given this fact and other 
circumstances such as the sponsorship director’s experience, it was not 
reasonable for the director to believe the counter agent had such authority.  As 
to the second contract, the court held that Dollar could not be liable because 
the signature was forged. 
Laffin v. NFL43 
This decision arises out of the highly publicized Super Bowl XLV ticket 
incident in which the defendants allegedly “denied, relocated, or delayed the 
seating of over 2000 ticket holders.”44  The plaintiffs, ticket holders on behalf 
of themselves and other similarly situated people, sued the defendants, 
alleging fraud; breach of contract; fraudulent inducement; negligence; and 
negligent misrepresentation, in addition to seeking attorney’s fees.  Although 
the plaintiffs brought suit in the District Court of Dallas County, Texas, the 
defendants successfully removed the class action to this court, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, on the ground that the 
amount in controversy exceeded $5 million.  At issue here is the plaintiffs’ 
motion to remand the case back to the original court.  To establish that the 
amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, the defendants relied on such 
information as the face value for a Super Bowl ticket and the approximate 
number of plaintiffs.  Finding that the defendants established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy would be over 
$5 million and that the plaintiffs arguments to the contrary were purely 
speculative, the court denied the plaintiffs motion to remand.  
N.H. Speedway, Inc. v. Motor Racing Network, Inc.45 
New Hampshire Speedway, Inc. (NHS) filed a motion for summary 
judgment on a claim for promissory estoppel.  NHS operated an auto 
 
42. Id. at *15. 
43. No. 3:11-CV-0345-M, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39688 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2011). 
44. Id. at *2. 
45. No. 217-2008-EQ-099, 2011 N.H. Super. LEXIS 43 (N.H. Super. Ct. July 19, 2011). 
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speedway track.  Motor Racing Network, Inc. (MRN) was engaged in the 
business of radio broadcasting NASCAR events and racing-related programs.  
NHS and MRN executed a document entitled “Agreement Between Network 
and Promoter” in which NHS granted to MRN exclusive worldwide radio 
rights to broadcast and rebroadcast by AM, FM, shortwave radio or other 
nonvisual technology, all events that took place at the speedway.  Speedway 
Motor Sports, Inc. (SMI) purchased NHS’s stock and subsequently owned the 
Speedway.  Consequently, SMI owned its own radio network, Speedway 
Properties Company, LLC d/b/a Performance Racing Network (PRN).  After 
the purchase, NHS declared the agreement between it and MRN void and 
unenforceable and NHS refused to allow MRN to broadcast events from the 
Speedway.  As a result, NHS and PRN brought a declaratory judgment claim 
against MRN.  MRN filed a counterclaim, alleging, among other claims, 
promissory estoppel against NHS.  NHS moved for summary judgment on the 
promissory estoppel counterclaim.  The court held that MRN’s promissory 
estoppel counterclaim raised genuine issues of material fact with respect to the 
issues of whether it acted on reasonable reliance on NHS’s representations to 
its detriment.  Therefore, the court denied NHS’s motion for summary 
judgment.   
Original Pizza Pan v. CWC Sports Grp., Inc.46 
Original Pizza Pan, an Ohio corporation, entered into an endorsement 
agreement with The Sports Link, Inc., a California corporation, for the 
exclusive right to use Cleveland Browns’ Brian Robinskie’s name and likeness 
for advertising purposes.  Four months after it entered into the agreement, 
another pizza company began offering a collector’s cup with Robinskie’s 
photo on it. Pizza Pan sued Sports Link and Robinskie’s agent for fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation. The defendants moved to dismiss, stating that the 
endorsement agreement contained a valid forum selection clause, prohibiting 
suit against the defendants in Ohio. The trial court granted the defendants’ 
motion and dismissed the complaints with prejudice because it found the 
forum selection clause to be valid.  The appellate court affirmed stating that 
there was nothing in the record to establish that California would be so gravely 
difficult and inconvenient for Pizza Pan.  
 
46. 194 Ohio App. 3d 50 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
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Rosen v. Univ. of S.C.47 
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s order granting summary for the 
University of South Carolina (the University) on claims of breach of contract 
and constitutional taking.  The Rosens became Lifetime Silver Spur 
Scholarship members in the Gamecock Club after donating about $140,000 in 
money and property to the school.  They executed contracts to memorialize the 
terms.  After twenty years of receiving free parking benefits, the University 
initiated a fee for the assigned reserved parking at the football stadium for the 
Gamecock Club donors.  The Rosens filed suit, alleging breach of contract, 
conversion, and constitutional taking.  The trial court found the contract was 
not ambiguous and contained no language that the benefits would be free; 
lifetime donors only received the benefit of maintaining their donor level in 
the Gamecock Club.  On appeal, the Rosens argued that the trial court erred in 
finding the language of the contracts to be unambiguous.  The appellate court 
found that the contract made no distinction in the language used describing the 
tickets and parking spaces; it neither stated additional charges would apply or 
that the benefits would be free.  This created ambiguity.  The court also found 
that the contracts did not specifically prohibit or allow a change of the 
designated beneficiary and made it impossible from the language of the 
contract to determine if the parties intended to allow a change.  Finding the 
contract to be ambiguous, the court reversed and remanded.  
Ruffu v. Haney48 
The appellant Ruffu, a horse trainer, brought an action against the 
respondents for breach of a contract regarding a racehorse named Urgent 
Envoy.  In 2003, Ruffu entered an agreement with the respondents regarding 
the purchase and training of Urgent Envoy, whereby Ruffu and the four other 
respondents each held a 20% ownership interest in the horse.  In December 
2004, the California Horse Racing Board filed a complaint against Ruffu, 
alleging that she had improperly taken the horse from another trainer, and the 
Board of Stewards ordered Ruffu to return the horse to the trainer.  In 
November 2005, the California Horse Racing Board adopted the Board of 
Stewards’ findings, but Ruffu never returned the horse.  In July 2008, Ruffu 
initiated the action against the respondents; she filed a second amended 
complaint in December 2008 asserting claims for breach of the agreement.  
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss Ruffu’s action on the basis of 
 
47. No. 2011-UP-331, 2011 S.C. App. Unpub. LEXIS 401 (S.C. Ct. App. June 27, 2011). 
48. No. B218864, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 933 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2011). 
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collateral estoppel. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a final decision in 
an administrative adjudication may be given collateral estoppel effect in a 
subsequent judicial proceeding if the agency was acting in a judicial capacity 
and the threshold requirements are satisfied.  The trial court dismissed the 
action, stating that an administrative proceeding before the California Horse 
Racing Board collaterally estopped Ruffu’s claims.  The appellate court 
affirmed.  
Simms v. Jones49 
The defendants—Jerry Jones, owner of the Dallas Cowboys football club 
and stadium, and the National Football League (NFL)—filed a motion to 
dismiss the plaintiff ticketholders’ breach of contract claims, which the 
plaintiffs filed after the defendants failed to ensure that there was proper 
seating for each ticketholder to Super Bowl XLV.  Cowboys Stadium hosted 
Super Bowl XLV.  To accommodate more spectators for the event, the 
defendants planned to add 13,000 additional temporary seats to the stadium.  
However, the NFL did not completely install the seats prior to the game.  As a 
result, some ticketholders were placed in seats that had an obstructed view of 
the field, some were delayed in gaining access to their seats, and some never 
got a seat and were able to watch the game only on television monitors in the 
Miller Lite Club.  Shortly after the game, the plaintiff ticketholders whom the 
failure to ensure proper seating affected filed this consolidated class action, 
alleging breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.  The defendants moved to 
dismiss all of these claims.  The Super Bowl game ticket is a contract between 
the NFL and the ticket purchaser because the game in question was the Super 
Bowl.  Therefore, the Texas district court held that Jerry Jones and the Dallas 
Cowboys were not parties to that contract, and therefore, were not liable for 
breach of contract and the court dismissed the breach of contract claims 
against Jerry Jones, the Dallas Cowboys, and Cowboys Stadium.  However, 
the court did not dismiss the breach of contract claims against the NFL 
because taking the facts pleaded in plaintiffs’ complaint as true, the NFL could 
be liable for breach of contract.  The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ remaining 
claims for failure to plead sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. 
 
49. No. 3:11-CV-0248-M, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137783 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2011). 
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Travelers Indem. Co. v. Crown Corr, Inc.50 
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s contract and 
negligence claims to recover damages following a rainstorm, which caused 
significant damage to the University of Phoenix Stadium (Stadium).  At the 
time of this incident, the plaintiff had an insurance contract with Tourism and 
Sports Authority (the insured), the owner of the Stadium.  Following a 
rainstorm in 2010, the Stadium suffered significant damage to its facade, roof, 
and sound system.  The plaintiff alleged that the damage was a direct result of 
the defendant’s negligent design of the Stadium’s exterior enclosure system, 
which the defendant promised would be able to withstand wind speeds in 
excess of those that occurred during the storm.  Consequently, the plaintiff 
brought this action on behalf of the insured owner of the Stadium to recover 
the damages that it had incurred as a result of the defendant’s negligent 
performance under its contract to design the Stadium’s exterior enclosure 
system.  In its action, the plaintiff alleged breach of contract, breach of 
contractual indemnity, and negligence.  However, because the insured had 
waived its subrogation rights in the design and build agreement, the waiver 
bound the plaintiff, and it could not recover any contract or indemnity 
damages.  As for the plaintiff’s negligence claim, the court determined that the 
economic loss doctrine barred the claim.  As a result, the court granted 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims. 
Wasserman Media Group, LLC v. Bender51 
Wasserman Media Group, LLC (WMG) petitioned the court pursuant to 
the Federal Arbitration Act to confirm an arbitration award issued against 
Jonathan Bender, a former NBA player, and to be awarded attorneys’ fees 
incurred in this action.  WMG and Bender entered into an NBPA Standard 
Player Contract pursuant to NBPA Regulations; the parties signed an 
agreement whereby WMG would represent Bender throughout his NBA 
career, and Bender would pay WMG $396,766.60 at scheduled intervals.  
Bender failed to meet the payment schedule, and WMG filed for arbitration 
pursuant to the NBPA Regulations. Bender was notified of the arbitration 
hearing, but he failed to respond or appear.  The arbitrator found in favor of 
WMG and ordered payment of the scheduled amount within ten days; Bender 
did not pay any portion. The court confirmed the arbitration award for multiple 
reasons: (1) the Regulations’ arbitration agreement expressly stated that any 
 
50. No. CV 11-0965-PHX-JAT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148529 (D. Ariz. Dec. 27, 2011). 
51. No. 10 Civ. 8783 (SAS), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52825 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2011). 
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award would be final and binding upon the parties; (2) the arbitrator’s decision 
was justified given that Bender and WMG both signed an agreement 
acknowledging the payment and Bender failed to adhere to the agreement or 
even show up to the arbitration hearing; and (3) Bender’s right to vacate the 
award was waived by virtue of his failure to challenge the award within three 
months of its issuance. The court also awarded WMG attorney’s fees of 
$2,500 due to Bender’s bad faith throughout the proceedings. 
White v. NFL52 
The NFL Players’ Association (the Players) alleged that the National 
Football League (NFL) violated the White Stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement (SSA)—Article X  § 1(a)(i) and XIX § 6 specifically—by ignoring 
the obligation to act in good faith and use best efforts to maximize total 
revenues for both the NFL and the players for each SSA playing season.  In 
May 2008, the NFL opted out of the final two years of the CBA and SSA, 
leaving the CBA and SSA to expire in March 2011.   
After opting out of the CBA, the NFL began negotiating extensions to its 
broadcast contracts.  The NFL had contracts with DirecTV, CBS, FOX, NBC, 
and ESPN; it also had contracts with Verizon Wireless and Comcast.  The 
NFL negotiated access to over $4 billion in rights fees in 2011 if it locked out 
the players and had no obligation to repay $421 million of that sum to the 
broadcasters.  The Players argued that the NFL violated the SSA when it 
extended and renegotiated its broadcast contracts without satisfying its duty to 
maximize total revenues in 2009 and 2010.   
On February 1, 2011, the special master proceeding over a trial found that 
the NFL violated Article X § 1 (a)(i), but that the NFL did not otherwise 
breach the SSA.  The Players objected, arguing that the special master erred by 
concluding that the NFL did not breach the SSA by finding that the good faith 
requirement added nothing to the SSA, by erroneously interpreting “sound 
business judgment” and total revenues, and by declining to issue an injunction.   
The court first considered the meaning of the words in Article X and 
agreed with the special master that “consistent with sound business judgment” 
qualified the duties to act in good faith and use best efforts.  However, the 
court found that the special master erred in his application and analysis of the 
language.  The court also explained that the special master erred in not 
analyzing the SSA’s good faith obligation, which would have shown that the 
NFL did not act in good faith when it renegotiated its broadcast contracts.  
 
52. 766 F. Supp. 2d 941 (D. Minn. 2011). 
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Similarly, the NFL also did not act in its best effort when it did not seek 
revenue modifications to the 2009–2010 broadcast contracts.  Therefore, the 
court found that the NFL breached Article X § 1(a)(i) in extending or 
renegotiating its broadcast contracts, and ordered that a hearing be held 
concerning relief to be granted to the Players.  
COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is an international arbitration 
body headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland.  Through agreement, many 
disputes involving the Olympic Movement are submitted first to the CAS; as 
such, the CAS represents a forum for various national and international sports 
organizations to resolve disputes in a consistent manner, which has allowed 
for the CAS decisions to develop a type of precedent known as lex sportiva.  
The following CAS decisions represent just some of the many areas that the 
CAS is involved in, including anti-doping violations, contractual disputes, and 
various disputes surrounding disqualifications and suspensions.   
Blanco v. USADA53 
This arbitration arose from a decision made by the United States Anti-
Doping Agency (USADA), the national anti-doping body in the United States, 
to suspend Blanco, an American cyclist, for an anti-doping rule violation.  
While competing in the Tour of the South China Sea competition, Blanco 
provided two urine samples that tested positive for exogenous testosterone, a 
prohibited substance.  As a result, USADA charged him with an anti-doping 
rule violation and sanctioned him with a two-year suspension.  On appeal to 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), Blanco argued that he should be 
exonerated because the laboratory departed from the International Standards 
for Laboratories (ISL), and as a result, the laboratory findings were unreliable.  
However, the laboratory benefitted from the presumption that World Anti-
Doping Agency-accredited laboratories comply with the ISL, and the CAS 
Panel upheld Blanco’s anti-doping rule violation and suspension. 
Bulgarian Boxing Fed’n v. European Boxing Confederation54 
In January 2011, the Bulgarian Boxing Federation (BBF), the national 
governing body for the sport of boxing in Bulgaria, was awarded the right to 
 
53. CAS 2010/A/2185 (Apr. 1, 2011). 
54. CAS 2010/A/2401 (June 7, 2011). 
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host the 2011 European Men Championships.  However, at that time, there 
was a pending International Boxing Association (AIBA) disciplinary 
investigation, which could have resulted in the BBF being suspended.  As a 
result of this uncertainty, the European Boxing Confederation (EUBC) 
revoked Bulgaria’s hosting rights and awarded the rights to host the 2011 
Championships to Turkey.  BBF appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS), arguing that the outcome of the investigation was unknown, and 
therefore, EUBC had no legal basis to revoke Bulgaria’s hosting rights.  The 
sole arbitrator for CAS agreed with BBF.  However, because Turkey, the 
athletes, spectators, and sponsors had all incurred significant costs in preparing 
for the event in Turkey, which was to be held two months from the time this 
appeal was filed, reinstating Bulgaria’s hosting rights would have been a 
disproportionate remedy.  Therefore, Turkey was still allowed to host the 2011 
European Men Championships. 
Finnish Ski Ass’n & Saarinen v. Int’l Ski Fed’n55 
This arbitration arose from a decision made by the International Ski 
Federation (FIS), the international governing body for skiing, to disqualify 
Saarinen, a Finnish cross-country skier, during a World Cup race.  During the 
race, Saarinen moved in front of another competitor, causing the other 
competitor to fall.  As a result, Saarinen was disqualified from the race for 
intentionally obstructing the other competitor’s path.  After the FIS Court 
upheld her disqualification, Saarinen appealed to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS), arguing that the FIS Court was wrong to find her guilty of 
intentional obstruction.  However, because of the field-of-play doctrine, which 
prohibits CAS from reviewing an official’s field-of-play decision except in 
exceptional circumstances, the CAS Panel’s review under this appeal was 
limited to whether the FIS Court properly followed its own procedures in 
rendering its decision.  The Panel held that the FIS Court made no procedural 
error; therefore, Saarinen’s disqualification was upheld. 
General Taweep Jantararoj & Amateur Boxing Fed’n of Thailand v.  
Int’l Boxing Ass’n56 
General Taweep Jantararoj appealed the International Boxing Association 
(AIBA) decision to suspend him as president of the Amateur Boxing 
 
55. CAS 2010/A/2090 (Feb. 7, 2011). 
56. CAS 2010/A/2243, CAS 2011/A/2358, CAS 2011/A/2385; CAS 2011/A/2411 (Aug. 3, 
2011). 
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Association of Thailand (ABAT) after Jantararoj tried to manipulate the AIBA 
Congress election procedure.  On September 26, 2010, Jantararoj sent an email 
to several Asian national boxing associations encouraging the associations to 
fill out certain forms for an upcoming election.  Jantararoj attached forged 
forms to the email.  Moreover, some of the associations that received this 
email were not qualified to participate in the election based on AIBA criteria.  
Determining that this conduct violated the AIBA Ethics and Disciplinary 
Codes, AIBA suspended Jantararoj from any AIBA activity for a period of two 
years.  Jantararoj appealed the suspension to the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS), arguing that he did not violate any AIBA rules.  On appeal, CAS 
reversed the disciplinary action taken against Jantararoj because he could not 
be held responsible for the disciplinary infringements for which he was 
sanctioned—failure to respect AIBA decisions; disparagement of AIBA’s 
reputation and interests; failure to respect AIBA statutes, bylaws and 
regulations; and failure to respect the principles of honesty, integrity, and 
sportsmanship.  The only conduct for which the AIBA could discipline 
Jantararoj—failure to behave with respect—was never cited by the AIBA 
disciplinary bodies; therefore, the AIBA could not use it to discipline 
Jantararoj.  
Oriekhov v. Union des Ass’ns Européennes de Football57 
The Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), the 
governing body for soccer in Europe, decided to ban Oreikhov, a UEFA 
referee, for participating in illegal betting and match fixing.  In November 
2009, German police intercepted multiple phone conversations that indicated 
that Oriekhov had been paid to manipulate the results of a soccer match.  As a 
result, the UEFA Control and Disciplinary Body sanctioned Oriekhov with a 
lifetime ban for engaging in illegal betting and match-fixing.  On appeal to the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), Oriekhov argued that he did have 
contact with the criminal organization that was involved in the match-fixing, 
but that he did not accept the offer to fix the outcome of any matches.  The 
CAS Panel, however, was sufficiently convinced that Oriekhov was involved 
in the match-fixing scandal and upheld his lifetime ban from the soccer. 
 
57. CAS 2010/A/2172 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
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Sevilla FC SAD v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A.58 
This arbitration arose from a dispute regarding the correct compensation 
for a soccer player’s breach of contract.  Morgan de Sanctis is a professional 
soccer player who had three years remaining on his contract with the soccer 
club Udinese Calcio S.p.A. (Udinese) for three more years when he signed a 
new contract to play for Sevilla FC SAD.  Because de Sanctis prematurely 
terminated his contract, Udinese filed a complaint with the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association’s (FIFA) Dispute Resolution Chamber 
(DRC), requesting compensation for the de Sanctis’ breach.  The DRC granted 
the request and ordered de Sanctis to pay €3,933,134.  All parties appealed to 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), contesting the method the DRC used 
to calculate damages.  The CAS Panel recalculated the damages and ordered 
de Sanctis to pay €2,250,055 as compensation.  This figure was based on 
replacement costs that were incurred as a result of the player’s breach of 
contract. 
Subirats v. Fed’n Int’l de Natation59 
Venezuelan swimmer, Albert Subirats, appealed his sanction for an anti-
doping rule violation after the Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA) 
failed to receive his whereabouts form.  Pursuant to FINA anti-doping rules, 
an athlete must keep FINA informed about where he or she can be located for 
unannounced anti-doping testing.  Since 2006, Subirats has always submitted 
his whereabouts forms to the Venezuelan Swimming Federation (VSF).  The 
VSF would then forward the whereabouts forms to FINA.  However, in 2010 
and 2011, the VSF failed to file Subirats’s forms three times.  Each time, 
FINA attempted to notify Subirats of the filing failure by sending a letter to 
the VSF.  However, the VSF did not forward the letters to Subirats until after 
the third filing failure.  Shortly after the third failure, FINA charged Subirats 
with an anti-doping rule violation and imposed a one-year suspension.  
Subirats appealed the anti-doping violation and the suspension to the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS), arguing that he did not commit any rule 
violations.  On appeal, CAS determined that an athlete bears the responsibility 
to inform FINA of his whereabouts regardless of whether he delegates such 
responsibility to a third party.  Therefore, he remains ultimately responsible if 
the third party fails to provide FINA with the athlete’s whereabouts.  
 
58. CAS 2010/A/2145; see also Sanctis v. Udinese Calcio S.p.A., CAS 2010/A/2146; Udinese 
Calcio S.p.A. v. de Sanctis & Sevilla FC SAD, CAS 2010A/2147 (Feb. 28, 2011).   
59. CAS 2011/A/2499 (Aug. 24, 2011). 
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However, because FINA never sent a notice of the filing failures directly to 
Subirats, Subirats did not have knowledge of the filing failures; therefore, 
there could be no anti-doping rule violation and Subirats’s sanction was 
overturned. 
Tong v. Int’l Judo Fed’n60 
The International Judo Federation (IJF), the international federation 
governing Judo, suspended Wen Tong, a Chinese judo athlete, for an anti-
doping rule violation.  In August 2009, while competing at the IJF World Judo 
Championships, Tong provided two urine samples for an anti-doping control.  
The A-sample tested positive for a prohibited substance.  Tong requested that 
her B-sample be tested to confirm the presence of the prohibited substance in 
her system.  The IJF tested the B-sample, but never told Tong.  Therefore, 
Tong never had an opportunity to be present during the testing, which is 
required under IJF rules.  Nevertheless, because the B-sample confirmed the 
presence of a prohibited substance, the IJF suspended Tong two years for an 
anti-doping rule violation.  On appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS), the CAS Panel annulled Tong’s suspension because the IJF’s failure to 
afford Tong the essential right to be present rendered the B-sample analytical 
results invalid.  As those results could not be used to confirm the A-sample 
analytical results, no doping violation could be established. 
United States Olympic Committee (USOC) v.  
International Olympic Committee (IOC)61 
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) agreed to submit to ordinary arbitration a dispute 
regarding the enforceability of the IOC Regulation known as the “Osaka rule.”  
The Osaka rule, which the IOC enacted in 2008, bans any athlete who has 
been sanctioned with a suspension of more than six months for an anti-doping 
rule violation from competing in the next edition of the Olympic Games, even 
if the suspension is set to expire before the start of the Olympics.  Following 
the enactment of this rule, several American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
panel decisions suggested that the IOC should not enforce the Osaka Rule in 
certain cases because such enforcement would be manifestly unfair and 
grossly disproportionate.  However, because these AAA decisions had no 
binding effect on the IOC, there was still a question concerning the validity 
 
60. CAS 2010/A/2161 (Feb. 23, 2011). 
61. CAS 2011/O/2422 (Oct. 6, 2011). 
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and enforceability of this rule.  As such, the USOC requested the IOC to 
submit to ordinary arbitration in the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) to 
resolve this issue prior to when the National Olympic Committees needed to 
submit their nominations for athletes to participate in the 2012 Olympic 
Games.  The IOC voluntarily agreed to submit the matter to ordinary CAS 
arbitration.  In the end, the CAS Panel determined that the Osaka Rule was 
invalid and unenforceable because it was a disciplinary sanction, rather than a 
mere condition of eligibility, since its nature was to punish prior undesirable 
behavior.  Moreover, because the IOC’s anti-doping rules do not permit the 
IOC to impose disciplinary sanctions additional to those already listed in the 
WADA Code, the Osaka Rule did not comply with the IOC’s rules, and was 
therefore, invalid and unenforceable. 
WADA v. Int’l Gymnastics Fed’n & Melnychenko62 
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) appealed the International 
Gymnastics Federation (FIG) decision to impose a two-month suspension on 
the fifteen-year-old gymnast, Anastasiya Melnychenko, after she tested 
positive for a prohibited substance.  While competing at the European Team 
Championships, Melnychenko was selected to provide a sample for an anti-
doping test.  Analysis of her sample revealed the presence of Furosemide, a 
prohibited substance.  In a hearing before the FIG Disciplinary Commission, 
Melnychenko argued that the substance was in her system because she was 
taking a prescription medicine.  Determining that her degree of fault was 
minimal, the FIG Disciplinary Commission imposed a two-month suspension 
and invalidated Melnychenko’s results from the competition where she tested 
positive.  WADA then appealed the sanction to the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS), arguing that the FIG Disciplinary Commission should impose 
the mandatory two-year period of ineligibility.  On appeal, the CAS Panel 
acknowledged that an athlete is strictly responsible for the presence of 
prohibited substances in her system.  However, the sanction for such an 
offense should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense.  Given 
Melnychenko’s age and lack of experience, the Panel determined that a 
suspension of four months was appropriate for her particular offense. 
 
62. CAS 2011/A/2403 (Aug. 25, 2011). 
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WADA v. Jobson Leandro Pereira de Oliveira,  
Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (CBF) &  
Superior Tribunal de Justiça Desportiva de Futebol (STJD)63 
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) appealed the Superior Tribunal 
de Justiça Desportiva de Futebol (STJD) decision to suspend the football 
player Jobson Leandro Pereira de Oliveira for six months despite the fact that 
he tested positive for a prohibited substance.  After competing in a football 
match, the player was selected to provide a urine sample for an anti-doping 
control test.  Analysis of the sample revealed the presence of cocaine, which is 
a prohibited substance.  Because of this anti-doping rule violation, the player 
was suspended for two years pursuant to anti-doping rules, namely the WADA 
Code.  The player appealed his suspension to the STJD, the highest sports 
court in Brazil, arguing that the two-year suspension was disproportional to his 
degree of fault in committing the anti-doping rule violation because he 
ingested the cocaine because of peer pressure and he never intended for it to 
enhance his performance.  Accordingly, the STJD reduced his suspension to 
six months because it believed that the reduced sanction was more 
proportional to the player’s degree of fault in committing the anti-doping rule 
violation.  WADA then appealed the player’s reduced suspension to the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), arguing that the WADA Code mandates a two-
year period of ineligibility for a first anti-doping rule violation and that no 
circumstances existed in this case that would justify a reduction in the 
suspension.  On appeal, the CAS Panel set aside the STJD decision reducing 
the player’s suspension, holding that the player’s degree of fault in committing 
the anti-doping rule violation was significant because the player voluntarily 
and knowingly ingested the prohibited substance, and the circumstances did 
not justify a reduction of his suspension. 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Although amateur and professional sports often appear to operate separate 
from the rest of society, athletes and others involved in the sports industry are 
subject to criminal laws just like the rest of society.  As the following cases 
indicate, criminal laws can touch on issues both on and off the field of play, 
and recently, have reached some of Major League Baseball’s most famous 
athletes surrounding the ongoing saga involving performance-enhancing 
drugs. 
 
63. CAS 2010/A/2307 (Sept. 14, 2011).   
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In re Andrew D.64 
A minor was playing flag football during high school physical education 
class when he collided with another student, physically injuring the student.  
The minor was questioned by a police officer and subsequently charged with 
assault after the minor told the officer that he tackled the other student on 
purpose.  On appeal, the minor asserted two arguments: (1) that there was 
insufficient evidence to convict him of assault; and (2) that the juvenile court 
improperly admitted incriminating statements he made to the officer.  The 
court held that, based upon the minor’s statements to the officer, enough 
evidence existed to convict him of assault.  The court also held that the 
incriminating statements the minor was referring to were said to parties other 
than the officer, including during the minor’s testimony, so they were not 
improperly admitted.  Therefore, the court affirmed the conviction. 
United States v. Bonds65 
Following a jury verdict convicting the defendant, Barry Bonds, on the 
count of obstruction of justice, Bonds moved for a directed verdict of 
acquittal, and in the alternative, moved for a new trial.  The charges in this 
case arose from Bonds’s testimony before a California grand jury that was 
investigating the distribution of anabolic steroids and other performance 
enhancing drugs by the Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO).  As part 
of the investigation into the possession and distribution of illegal substances, it 
was necessary to interview several professional athletes about their 
involvement with BALCO, including Bonds, who was a professional baseball 
player.  While testifying under oath before the grand jury, Bonds allegedly 
gave testimony that was intentionally evasive, false and misleading.  As a 
result, Bonds was charged with three counts of perjury and one count of 
obstruction of justice for impeding the investigation.  The jury disagreed on 
the three counts of perjury, but unanimously agreed that Bonds was guilty of 
obstruction of justice.  Bonds immediately moved for a directed verdict of 
acquittal, and in the alternative, moved for a new trial, arguing that the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction.  In the end, the court 
determined that the verdict should stand because after viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements for the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Furthermore, the court held that literally true but evasive answers are 
 
64. No. 1 CA-JV 11-0101, 2011 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1365 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2011).   
65. No. CR 07-00732 SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96051 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011). 
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sufficient to uphold a conviction for obstruction of justice.  For these reasons, 
the court denied Bonds’s motions for acquittal and a new trial. 
United States v. Clemens66 
This decision arose out of the criminal case against the defendant Roger 
Clemens, a former Major League Baseball (MLB) pitcher, relating to 
testimony he provided to the House Committee on oversight and Government 
Reform as part of the MLB steroid investigation.  Specifically at issue in this 
decision was DLA Piper US LLP’s (DLA Piper) motion to quash the 
defendant’s subpoena seeking various interview summaries and notes relating 
to the steroid investigation.  Of note is that Senator Mitchell, who was in 
charge of the steroid investigation that culminated with the Mitchell Report, 
was a partner at DLA Piper at the time of the investigation and retained DLA 
Piper to represent him.  Following the defendant’s subpoena and DLA Piper’s 
subsequent motion, this court ordered the motion granted in part and denied in 
part, finding that some information was barred by the work product doctrine 
while the defendant demonstrated a substantial need for other portions of the 
requested information. 
United States v. Dominguez67 
The defendant sports agent Dominguez appealed his conviction for 
smuggling five Cuban baseball players into the United States, transporting the 
players from Miami to Los Angeles, and harboring them there until they 
applied for asylum in violation of immigration laws.  Following the trial, 
Dominguez moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not 
support a conviction; however, the court denied this motion, and a jury 
convicted Dominguez on all twenty-one counts and sentenced him to a five-
year prison term.  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
Dominguez’s convictions for conspiring to, aiding and abetting the attempt to, 
and aiding and abetting the bringing of aliens to the United States for the 
purpose of commercial advantage and private financial gain.  However, the 
court reversed the remaining convictions, holding that a reasonable jury could 
not have found that the evidence supported those convictions. 
 
66. 793 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2011). 
67. 661 F.3d 10510 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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DISABILITY LAW 
Disability laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, protect those 
with certain disabilities and impose various compliance requirements on 
various sports organizations and facility owners.  These laws protect not only 
qualifying disabled athletes, but also disabled spectators at various sporting 
events.  In 2011, one major issue in this area of law—particularly in cases 
involving the National Football League—concerned retirement fund eligibility 
requirements based on differing degrees of the former athletes’ disabilities.  
The following cases illustrate these fund issues and disability laws as applied 
to spectators.   
Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan68 
The plaintiff Brent Boyd, a former National Football League (NFL) 
offensive lineman qualified as a Vested Inactive Player under the Bert 
Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Retirement Plan, filed suit seeking judicial review of 
the defendant’s refusal to reclassify his disability benefits from “Inactive” total 
and permanent benefits to “Football Degenerative” total and permanent 
benefits.  The former is available to any Vested Inactive Player who suffers a 
total and permanent disability, whereas the latter is limited to Vested Inactive 
Players who suffer from a total and permanent disability arising out of NFL 
activities.  The plaintiff was eventually approved for the “Inactive” plan, and 
both a district court and the Ninth Circuit held that the Retirement Board did 
not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiff the more comprehensive 
“Football Degenerative” plan.  Subsequently, the plaintiff requested 
reclassification to the “Football Degenerative” plan and was again denied, the 
denial of which is at issue before this court.  After determining that the 
Retirement Board did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to reclassify the 
plaintiff due to a lack of changed circumstances, the court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant. 
Daubert v. City of Lindsay69 
The plaintiff, Timothy Daubert (Daubert), used a wheelchair for mobility 
and resided in the defendant City of Lindsay (the City).  The City owns a local 
sports facility, which houses basketball courts, laser tag arenas, and indoor 
soccer fields, among other amenities.  Daubert alleged that the facility violated 
 
68. 796 F. Supp. 2d 682 (D. Md. 2011). 
69. No. 1:10-cv-0016 GSA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99949 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011). 
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several sections of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), namely for not 
providing wide enough wheelchair ramps and forcing wheelchair users to take 
excessively long routes to the second level.  The City responded to Daubert’s 
complaint and argued that it was in compliance with the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG).  The ADAAG provides 
notice to the public that compliance with the ADAAG will satisfy the 
requirements of the ADA.  Daubert conceded that the City technically 
complied with the ADAAG, but he argued that the City still violated the ADA.  
The court found that technical compliance with the ADAAG shielded the City 
from liability.  Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
City and dismissed Daubert’s complaint with prejudice.   
Feldman v. Pro Football, Inc.70 
The plaintiffs, deaf or hearing-impaired individuals who regularly attend 
Washington Redskins games at FedEx Field, sued the defendants, urging that 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires them “to provide 
auxiliary access to the content of broadcasts from FedEx Field’s public 
address system.”71  The district court agreed, holding that music lyrics are also 
included in the content requiring auxiliary access, and granted summary 
judgment for the plaintiffs.  The defendants appealed.  After concluding that 
the defendants provide football games as well as a general entertainment 
experience, the court noted that game-related information, emergency 
information, advertisements, and music lyrics are all included in those 
experiences.  As such, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, 
holding that the ADA requires Defendants to provide auxiliary access to that 
aforementioned information. 
Grant v. Bell72 
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff 
appealed a denial of line-of-duty disability benefits.  The plaintiff, former 
National Football League (NFL) player Willie Grant, applied for disability 
benefits under the NFL Player Retirement Plan (the Plan).  The plaintiff 
sought benefits for multiple injuries sustained during his playing career.  After 
being evaluated by a physician, his test results revealed that he did not meet 
the minimum requirements to be eligible for benefits under the Plan.  Thus, the 
 
70. 419 Fed. Appx. 381 (4th Cir. 2011). 
71. Id. at 383. 
72. No. 1:09-CV-1848-RWS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146401 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2011). 
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plaintiff was denied coverage and subsequently appealed.  The plaintiff was 
then seen by a second physician, and those test results revealed that he did 
meet the minimum requirements to be eligible for benefits under the Plan.  
However, the defendant denied the plaintiff’s appeal for benefits.  The plaintiff 
then filed an action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA).  The court noted that the defendant had discretion in applying the 
benefits, and remanded the case to the defendant for further consideration.  
The plaintiff appealed again to the court, citing that the initial physician’s 
analysis was incorrect, and thus, denial of benefits was improper.  The 
defendant moved for summary judgment, based on the court’s initial finding 
that defendant had discretion in applying the benefits.  The court granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion 
for judgment. 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 
Many state and federal laws work together to protect individuals from 
discrimination based on race, gender, age, religion, and disability, to name a 
few.  Discrimination claims often center on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.  
In the sports context, discrimination issues can affect athletes, coaches, and 
referees, alike, as demonstrated by the following cases.  
Boyd v. Feather River Cmty. Coll. Dist.73 
The plaintiffs, several African-American football players, sued the 
defendants, citing that the defendant’s football program created a racially 
hostile environment.  The plaintiffs complained that the defendant’s coaches 
and athletic director cut them from the team, despite the plaintiffs’ eligibility, 
both athletically and academically.  The plaintiffs also stated that they were 
subject to name-calling, harassment, and physical attacks.  The plaintiffs 
alleged six counts of a racially hostile environment, racial discrimination, and 
a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
court found that each of the six counts against the defendants were well plead 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and subsequently 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on all six counts. 
 
73. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121683 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 20, 2011).  
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Bull v. Bd. of Trs. of Ball State Univ.74 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s action for multiple 
claims.  The plaintiff, a former women’s tennis coach at Ball State University 
(BSU) and vocal gender equity advocate, self-reported a possible National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) violation to one of BSU’s athletic 
directors.  The plaintiff was subsequently terminated, and BSU, through its 
athletic director and others in the athletic department, made public statements 
that the plaintiff was fired for committing multiple NCAA violations.   
As a result, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendants, two BSU athletic 
directors, the BSU President, and the Board of Trustees.  First, the plaintiff 
brought official-capacity claims under § 1983 against all of the defendants.  
The court held that these § 1983 claims were barred by sovereign immunity 
because these are essentially claims against BSU, and for purposes of § 1983, 
BSU is equivalent to the State of Indiana.  Second, the plaintiff brought 
individual Title IX claims against the defendant athletic directors and BSU 
President.  The court dismissed these claims because under Title IX, only the 
actual recipient of federal fund can be held liable, not individual employees.  
Third, the plaintiff brought official-capacity defamation and breach of contract 
claims under state law against all the defendants.  The court dismissed these 
claims, holding that they were barred by the Eleventh Amendment because 
such official-capacity claims are essentially claims against BSU, and the 
Eleventh Amendment prohibits a court from adjudicating state-law claims 
where, as here, the state agency objects.  Finally, the plaintiff brought 
individual-capacity breach of contract claims under state law against the 
defendant athletic directors and BSU President.  The court dismissed these 
claims without explanation.   
Dent v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, Inc.75 
The plaintiff Marvin Dent, an African-American tennis instructor in his 
mid-60s employed by the defendants, filed suit alleging various age and race 
discrimination claims after he did not receive a coveted promotion to the 
National Tennis Center’s Director of Tennis position; a Caucasian man in his 
40s was selected instead.  In the search to fill the position, the defendants 
received approximately ninety applicants for the managerial position, of which 
they identified ten top candidates.  The defendants claimed that the plaintiff 
was not identified as one of these top managerial candidates, but he was still 
 
74. No. 1:10-cv-00878-JMS-TAB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147774 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 22, 2011). 
75. No. 08 CV 1533, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8341 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2011). 
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given a chance to interview allegedly out of respect for his experience as a 
senior tennis instructor.  In response to the plaintiff’s suit, the defendants 
moved for summary judgment, urging that there was no evidence from which 
a reasonable juror could conclude that the decision not to promote the plaintiff 
was at all motivated by his age or race.  The court granted the defendants 
motion.   
Fuhr v. Sch. Dist. of Hazel Park76 
The plaintiff was a teacher and athletic coach at the defendant Hazel Park 
School District.  In October 1999, the plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging it 
had discriminated against her because of her gender, in violation of Title VII 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, 
for failure to hire her as the head coach of the high school boys’ varsity 
basketball team.  In August 2001, a jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and 
in October 2001, the court ordered that she be instated into this position.  For 
the next five years, the plaintiff worked as the coach for both the boys’ and the 
girls’ varsity basketball teams.  Then, on June 1, 2006, the defendant removed 
the plaintiff as the coach of the girls’ varsity basketball team.  Following her 
removal, the plaintiff filed several discrimination and retaliation claims under 
Title VII, ELCRA, and Title IX.  The essence of the plaintiff’s discrimination 
claims was that the defendant treated her differently because of her sex.  The 
essence of the plaintiff’s retaliation claims was that the defendant’s 
mistreatment of her was in retaliation for her current and prior lawsuits and 
complaints.  The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to the 
plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims.   
The court held that held that the defendants were entitled to summary 
judgment on the plaintiff’s gender discrimination and hostile environment 
claims because the plaintiff did not provide any evidence suggesting that her 
gender had anything to do with the defendant’s decision to remove her as the 
girls’ varsity basketball coach or with any of the harassment she allegedly 
suffered.  Essentially, the plaintiff did not state a prima facie case of gender 
discrimination, and thus, she could not sustain her hostile environment claim 
because it was based on the gender discrimination claim.  For the same 
reasons, the court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment 
on the plaintiff’s retaliation claims because the plaintiff failed to state a prima 
facie case of retaliation. 
 
76. No. 08-CV-11652, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105820 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2011). 
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Heike v. Cent. Mich. Univ. Bd. of Trs.77 
Brooke Heike (Heike) and Beth Brown (Brown) filed a complaint against 
the Central Michigan University Board of Trustees (the Board) and Central 
Michigan University (CMU) claiming that they were discriminated against 
based on their race and sexual preferences when their scholarships were not 
renewed.  Heike is of Caucasian and Native American descent, and Brown is 
of Caucasian descent.  The plaintiffs were both members of the CMU 
women’s basketball team.  They claim they were harassed by the coach while 
on the team, and claimed they were not given reasons as to why their 
scholarships were not renewed.  Heike participated in a hearing before the 
appeals committee to have her scholarship reinstated, which was unsuccessful.  
Heike also sued in state court regarding the same issue, and the defendants 
were granted a motion to dismiss.  The defendants argued that Heike’s claims 
were barred by res judicata, and further, that the defendants had sovereign 
immunity against the claims.  The court found that the defendants could not be 
considered “persons” for the plaintiffs’ civil rights claims.  Therefore, the 
court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.  
However, the court denied dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims under the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
Smith v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ.78 
The defendant school district moved for summary judgment after softball 
coach Smith sued the school district alleging that the defendant had initiated 
disciplinary proceedings against him in retaliation for his complaints that there 
was a disparity in funding between girls’ and boys’ sports programs at DeWitt 
Clinton High School.  In 2007, a female student reported to the school that 
Smith, who was a coach at DeWitt, told her to sit on his lap and winked at her 
several times.  Around the same time, two local newspaper articles quoted 
Smith complaining that the women’s softball program at DeWitt received 
disproportionately less money than the boys’ sports programs.  Subsequently, 
the school initiated disciplinary proceedings against Smith for his reported 
sexual misconduct.   
Smith then filed this action against the school district, alleging that the 
school retaliated against him in violation of Title IX, the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and other state statutes.  Following discovery, the defendant 
filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims.  The district court granted 
 
77. No. 10-11373-BC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71456 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2011). 
78. No. 09 Civ. 9256, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125069 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2011). 
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the defendant’s motion, holding that the statute of limitations barred all of 
Smith’s claims except one, which had already run.  Smith’s First Amendment 
claim of retaliation, which was not barred, also could not survive the motion 
for summary judgment because Smith did not provide any evidence to 
establish that his complaints constituted protected speech.  Moreover, the court 
held that even if Smith’s complaints were protected speech, he could not 
demonstrate a causal connection between any protected activity and the 
disciplinary proceeding initiated against him. 
Wilson v. Lock Haven Univ.79 
The plaintiff, the former men’s head basketball coach at Lock Haven 
University, filed this action against the defendants, alleging a hostile work 
environment and racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA).  At a hearing, 
a magistrate judge filed a recommendation that the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment be granted in its entirety; in this subsequent decision, the 
court adopted the earlier recommendation.   
The plaintiff alleged that he suffered adverse employment actions, such as 
unsatisfactory performance reviews, that made him ineligible for a pay raise 
and ineligible for an employment contract renewal at the hands of the 
defendants based on his race.  The plaintiff, however, did not dispute that he 
received numerous subpar performance reviews based on the team’s win-loss 
record, documented National Collegiate Athletic Association rules violations, 
and low grade-point-averages of his team members.  The Magistrate Judge 
found that the defendants adequately rebutted the presumption of 
discrimination with legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, whereas the plaintiff 
made only conclusory arguments that he was treated differently than non-
African-American coaches; this was the basis for the Magistrate Judge’s 
recommendation regarding summary judgment for the racial discrimination 
claims.  The Magistrate Judge also found that there was absolutely no 
evidence of racially-charged conduct that rose to the level of a hostile work 
environment and recommended that summary judgment be granted with 
respect to the hostile work environment claim.  This court adopted the 
recommendation in its entirety.  
 
79. No. 4:09-cv-2566, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39639 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2011); see also Wilson 
v. Lock Haven Univ., No. 4:09-CV-02566, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41569 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2011). 
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Yonan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc.80 
Plaintiff Yonan is a lawyer and a soccer referee registered with the 
defendant, the governing body for soccer in the United States, who sued, 
alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) and retaliation after he was informed he would not 
be assigned to work Major League Soccer games.  The defendant moved for 
summary judgment, urging that the ADEA claim could not stand because the 
plaintiff is an independent contractor not protected by the ADEA.  The court 
employed a five-factor test to determine whether the plaintiff qualifies as an 
employee or independent contractor.  Specifically, the court considered the (1) 
control and supervision of Plaintiff’s duties as a referee, (2) occupation and 
skill, (3) responsibility for cost of operation, (4) method and form of payment 
and benefits, and (5) the length of job commitment.  Finding that all of these 
factors indicated the plaintiff is an independent contractor, the court granted 
the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.   
EDUCATION LAW 
Education law, like sports law as a whole, encompasses a wide variety of 
issues.  In the sports context, the focus is mostly either on challenges to the 
various rules and regulations that govern student-athletes or challenges 
surrounding a coach’s termination.  Schools, athletic associations and 
conferences, and the NCAA all impose various rules and regulations that 
govern student-athletes.  Although these rules and regulations may sometimes 
be challenged on constitutional or other grounds, those laws may not apply in 
a given situation.  Under those circumstances, athletes challenge either the 
application of a particular rule in a given situation, or the rule itself, as 
arbitrary and capricious.  Additionally, public and private schools may face 
legal challenges after a decision to remove a particular coach from his or her 
coaching duties.  The following cases illustrate these and other issues in the 
education law context. 
Arendas v. N.C. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n81 
The plaintiffs, members and coaches of a basketball team, won their state 
basketball championship.  After their victory, the defendant, a high school 
athletic association, conducted an investigation into residency issues and 
 
80. No. 09 C 4280, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66383 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2011). 
81. 718 S.E.2d 198 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
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determined that at least two players on the championship team did not reside 
in the district during the time they participated on the team.  As a result, the 
defendant vacated the plaintiffs as champions.  The plaintiffs filed a 
complaint, alleging negligence and seeking a declaratory judgment to reinstate 
the championship.  The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing.  The trial court granted the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss.   
On appeal, the court held that the plaintiffs’ complaint was properly 
dismissed because the members and the coaches lacked standing.  The court 
stated that the plaintiffs had no justification for judicial intervention because 
the plaintiffs had neither a legally protected interest nor a right in the 
championship.  Rather, the defendant had granted the championship to the 
plaintiffs’ school; therefore, when the championship was revoked, it was the 
school that sustained the loss rather than the plaintiffs.  Therefore, the 
judgment of the lower court was affirmed. 
Bd. of Dirs. of Jesup Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Wall82 
Bruce Wall, head varsity football coach at the Jesup Community School 
District, was contacted by the principal in 2006 regarding the football team’s 
success or perceived lack thereof.  In response to the principal’s concerns, 
Wall provided him with proposed changes to increase weightlifting incentives 
and improve the football program as a whole.  Following the 2008 season, 
Wall was again contacted regarding the football program and was asked to 
resign as football coach; he refused and was then terminated as football coach.  
The school board found that the superintendent satisfied her burden to show 
cause for termination.   
Pursuing his administrative remedies, Wall sought adjudicatory review, 
and the arbitrator found that neither of the reasons cited by the school board as 
justifying the termination—alleged ineffective program leadership and alleged 
failure to maintain participation in the football program—were supported by 
the evidence.  As such, the arbitrator ordered that Wall be reinstated and 
receive back pay for any time lost.   
On judicial review, the district court reversed the adjudicator.  Wall 
appealed.  The Iowa Court of Appeals agreed with the arbitrator’s decision, 
noting Wall’s response to the 2006 discussion regarding the football 
program’s perceived lack of success.  Finding that the real reason for Wall’s 
termination was his apparently unacceptable win-loss record, the court 
 
82. 801 N.W.2d 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). 
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concluded that the board’s decision to terminate Wall was unsupported by the 
preponderance of the evidence.  Thus, the court vacated the district court’s 
decision and remanded for an order affirming the arbitrator’s decision.   
H.W. v. E. Sierra Unified Sch. Dist.83 
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action against the 
school, which was filed after the defendant high school’s assistant football 
coach allegedly sexually molested them.  The plaintiffs, two minor females, 
alleged that the inappropriate sexual conduct occurred because of the 
defendant’s failure to train and supervise the assistant football coach.  As a 
result, the plaintiffs first alleged that the defendant violated Title IX by 
subjecting the plaintiffs to discrimination on the basis of sex.  The court noted 
that under Title IX, an employer can be held liable for a teacher’s misconduct 
only if they had actual knowledge of the misconduct and acted with deliberate 
indifference.  The court dismissed the claim because the plaintiffs failed to 
sufficiently allege that an employee had actual knowledge of coach’s 
misconduct and acted with deliberate indifference.  Next, the plaintiffs brought 
equal protection and substantive due process claims.  The court also dismissed 
these claims because the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the necessary 
elements.  Finally, the plaintiffs brought state tort law claims against the 
defendants.  The court also dismissed these claims as well because they were 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment immunity exception. 
Neily v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist.84 
Neily, a high school baseball coach, received notice of termination after 
the last day of classes and claimed his classification as a “temporary” 
employee was incorrect and that the notice of termination was untimely under 
the Education Code.  The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s decision, holding that an athletic coach is expressly defined as a 
temporary position, and as such, the notice requirement did not apply to Neily.  
The court also explained that the school year did not end on the last day of 
classes, but rather on statute-specified June 30th.  Because of this specific date, 
the notice of termination was timely. 
 
83. No. 2:11-cv-0531-GEB-GGH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117709 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011). 
84. 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
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Or. Sch. Activities Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ.85 
The Oregon School Activities Association (OSAA) appealed the State 
Board of Education’s (the Board) decision to waive an OSAA eligibility rule.  
C. enrolled at Reynolds High School in Portland as a sixteen-year-old 
freshman.  As a result, when C. started his senior year, he was nineteen.  
OSAA, a private organization that exercises authority by delegation from the 
Board, had an age requirement rule, barring students who are nineteen or older 
at the start of a school year from participating in interscholastic activities.  C. 
asked for a waiver of the age requirement, and OSAA denied the request.  C. 
appealed to the Board, which concluded that OSAA’s application of its age 
rule, as applied to C., violated the McKinney–Vento Act.  OSAA appealed the 
Board’s decision, arguing that the Board misapplied the McKinney–Vento 
Act.  The Board responded that the appeal was moot because C. had already 
graduated from high school, and alternatively, that it did not misapply the 
McKinney–Vento Act.  On appeal, the court held that the appeal was moot, 
because OSAA was precluded from imposing any sanctions on Reynolds or C. 
for participation in interscholastic activities while ineligible, and because the 
Board’s reversal of OSAA’s decision did not have a preclusive effect on 
OSAA’s future authority, as required to avoid mootness.  Therefore, the court 
dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. 
S.B. v. Ballard Cnty. Bd. of Educ.86 
The plaintiff, a minor and a junior in high school, brought an action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and KRS § 158.150 petitioning for a preliminary injunction 
compelling her immediate reinstatement at Ballard Memorial High School, 
after being placed in the Ballard County Alternative School (Alternative 
School).  The plaintiff was placed in the Alternative School for ninety days 
due to the plaintiff’s purchase of a prescription medication from another 
student.  During her assignment to the Alternative School, the plaintiff could 
not participate in extracurricular activities; she argued that her hope of 
receiving a softball scholarship following her senior year will be greatly 
hindered by this punishment.  The court concluded that the plaintiff’s motion 
should be denied because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate three of the four 
requirements necessary for a preliminary injunction.  The court, in its analysis, 
also noted that playing softball is a privilege; the plaintiff does not have a 
general constitutional right to participate in extracurricular athletics.  
 
85. 260 P.3d 735 (Or. Ct. App. 2011). 
86. 780 F. Supp. 2d 560 (W.D. Ky. 2011).   
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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Employment law is concerned with many aspects of the employment 
relationship, such as job security, compensation, benefits, and privacy issues, 
to name a few.  These laws apply specifically outside the realm of unionized 
workplaces, where no collective bargaining agreement governs the 
employment relationship.  Federal laws such as the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FSLA) provide the basis for many employment-related claims.  A threshold 
issue under the FSLA and most other employment-related claims is the 
appropriate status classification of a particular coach.  That is, courts must 
often decide whether a coach in any given situation qualifies as an “employee” 
to bring a claim under a particular employment-related statute and whether a 
coach is more properly classified as terminable “at will” or only with just 
cause.  The following cases demonstrate these classification challenges, as 
well as claims under the FSLA, whistleblowing issues, and other employment 
law areas. 
Clark v. Univ. of Bridgeport87 
The University of Bridgeport (UB) appealed a trial court decision to deny 
the UB’s motion for summary judgment as to Clark’s claim that her 
termination as UB’s head volleyball and softball coach amounted to a breach 
of her employment contract.  UB employed Clark as its head volleyball and 
softball coach.  Her contract was renewed in July 2008, but Clark was 
terminated in April 2009.  UB argued that the renewal letter sent to Clark in 
2008 created an “at will” employment.  Connecticut is an “at-will” state, 
which permits the employer and the employee to end the employment 
relationship at any time for any reason, without cause, unless otherwise 
agreed.  Clark argued that the letter provided a definite term from July 1, 2008 
to June 30, 2013.  Alternatively, Clark argued that the letter was ambiguous on 
the “at-will” issue, and therefore, should be a question for the trier of fact to 
decide.  The letter was ambiguous because it provided grounds for termination 
instituted by both the school and the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 
which suggested an intention by the university to create a contract for a 
definite term.  However, the same letter also stated that the position was “at-
will.”  Therefore, the court denied UB’s motion for summary judgment 
because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether it was the 
contract’s intent to create an “at-will” employment or employment for a 
definite term.  
 
87. No. CV106010582S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1977 (Conn. Super. July 29, 2011). 
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Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jaco88 
The plaintiff, Brent Jaco, while serving as the defendant’s director of 
athletics, reported a University Interscholastic League (UIL) parent-residency 
rule violation committed by a certain high school football player and his 
school.  Shortly after he reported the incident, the plaintiff was removed from 
his position as director of athletics.  Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the 
Galveston Independent School District alleging violations of the Texas 
Whistleblower Act, a law preventing a governmental entity from terminating 
an employee who reports violations of law.  The plaintiff urged that the UIL’s 
rules are “laws” such that the Whistleblower Act would apply.  Although the 
trial court agreed with the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals of Texas reversed, 
concluding that a UIL rule is not a “law” as used in the Whistleblower Act. 
Garcia v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n89  
Jose Garcia (Garcia) worked as a seasonal employee for the New York 
Racing Association (NYRA) and claimed he was terminated in violation of his 
First Amendment rights after filing a report that implicated his supervisors for 
a rules violation.  Garcia was terminated shortly after the report was filed with 
the NYRA integrity counsel.  The NYRA filed a motion to dismiss Garcia’s 
claim against it on the basis that Garcia did not plead a violation of his 
constitutional right to freedom of speech and because he did not plead that the 
NYRA was a state actor.  The court assessed whether Garcia made any 
demonstrations in his complaint that the NYRA was a state actor under the 
“nexus” and “symbiotic relationship” tests.  The court concluded that the 
NYRA did not meet the nexus test, but was a state actor under the symbiotic 
relationship test.  However, the court found that the report Garcia filed was in 
the scope of his duties and did not raise a matter of public concern, and 
therefore, he was not entitled to relief based on a First Amendment retaliation 
claim.  The court allowed Garcia to proceed with his remaining claims against 
the NYRA. 
Purdham v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd.90 
The plaintiff, a safety and security assistant employed by the Fairfax 
County School Board, filed this action, asserting a violation of the Fair Labor 
 
88. 331 S.W.3d 182 (Tex. App. 2011). 
89. No. 1:10-cv-01092, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96614 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 29, 2011). 
90. 637 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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Standards Act (FLSA) when the school board failed to pay him overtime 
wages for his services as the coach of a high school golf team.  The district 
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The appellate 
court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff was properly classified as a volunteer, 
rather than an employee, with respect to his services as a golf coach.  The 
court explained that Congress created an exemption to the FLSA’s coverage, 
applicable in the public employment context, stating that where an public 
employee engages in services different from those he is normally employed, 
i.e., safety and security assistant as compared to golf coach, and receives “no 
compensation,” or only a “nominal fee,” such as the stipend that the plaintiff 
received for coaching, such work is exempt from the FLSA, and the public 
employee is deemed a volunteer.91  
Sprochi v. Cleveland State Univ.92 
The plaintiff, an assistant men’s baseball coach at Cleveland State 
University (CSU), filed an action against the defendant CSU, alleging that 
CSU committed a breach of his employment contract and violated the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  The plaintiff was appointed to the part-time 
position as assistant coach in 1993, and his appointment was thereafter 
renewed annually through 2006.  In May 2006, the plaintiff was notified that 
the director of athletics had recommended that the plaintiff’s appointment not 
be renewed; the plaintiff’s employment contract expired on June 30, 2006.   
The plaintiff contends that the defendant’s nonrenewal of his appointment 
violated the terms of his contract and the terms and conditions of the 
defendant’s policies.  After looking at the relevant policies and the actual 
language of his employment contract, the court concluded that the defendant’s 
nonrenewal of the plaintiff’s appointment was not a violation of either and that 
the plaintiff failed to prove his breach of contract claim.  In regards to the 
FLSA claim, the defendant admitted liability as to the claimed FLSA 
violations, and the plaintiff sought compensation for certain unpaid wages.  
The plaintiff estimated that he worked at least 1,210.03 hours for which he 
was not paid by CSU during a certain time period, as supported by certain 
records; the defendant stipulated that the information reflected in those records 
had been accurately summarized.  Judgment was entered in favor of the 
defendant on the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, but in favor of the 
plaintiff on the FLSA claim in the amount of $70,369.58.  
 
91. See id. at 427. 
92. No. 2007-05016, 2011 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 41 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Mar. 15, 2011). 
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Stewart v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan93 
All parties to this case filed motions for summary judgment on Andrew 
Stewart’s claim for denial of benefits under the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL 
Retirement Plan (the Plan).  Stewart alleged the denial of benefits violated the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  The Plan provides 
retirement, disability, and related benefits to eligible National Football League 
(NFL) players.  The amount of benefits received under the Plan is contingent 
upon what causes the player to sustain the pertinent injuries, specifically 
whether the injuries arise out of NFL activities or non-NFL activities.  Stewart 
is a former NFL player, who played in only sixteen NFL games because of 
injuries he sustained.  After missing the entire 1993 season, Stewart joined the 
Canadian Football League (CFL) in 1994, where he stayed until 2000 when he 
retired.  Stewart also suffered several injuries during his time in the CFL.  
After retiring, Stewart tried to find work, but was unsuccessful because his 
collective football injuries prevented him from being able to stand for long 
periods.  In October 2008, Stewart applied to receive benefits from the Plan.  
The Plan’s committee awarded Stewart “inactive” benefits because it 
determined that Stewart’s disabling conditions did not arise out of NFL 
activities.  This amount was less than if the committee determined that his 
injuries directly arose out of his NFL activities.  Stewart appealed the 
committee’s decision to the Plan’s Retirement Board (Board), arguing that he 
qualified for greater benefits.  However, the Board affirmed the decision that 
Stewart was eligible only for inactive benefits.  Stewart then brought this suit 
alleging that the Plan violated ERISA because the committee abused its 
discretion in determining that Stewart’s disability did not arise directly from 
his NFL football activities.  The court denied the parties’ motions for summary 
judgment on Stewart’s denial of benefits claim because the issue of whether 
the committee abused its discretion presented material issues of fact that could 
not be determined on summary judgment. 
Williams v. NFL94 
This is an appeal stemming from the district court’s denial of permanent 
injunctive relief regarding claims under the Drug and Alcohol Testing in the 
Workplace Act (DATWA).  In 2008, Kevin Williams and Pat Williams, NFL 
players playing for the Minnesota Vikings, each gave urine samples for drug 
testing as part of their annual physicals and tested positive for bumetanide, a 
 
93. No. WDQ-09-2612, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78973 (D. Md. July 20, 2011).  
94. 794 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).  
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banned substance.  The NFL notified the players that they would be suspended 
for four regular-season games.  The plaintiffs challenged the decision through 
arbitration, but the decision was upheld.  The plaintiffs then filed suit in state 
district court, which granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the NFL 
from enforcing the suspensions.  For the next two years, the case was litigated 
in state and federal court.   
In May 2010, the district court found that the NFL was a joint employer 
with the Vikings and had violated the notice requirements of DATWA when it 
did not notify the plaintiffs of their positive test results within three days.  The 
district court, however, did not find sufficient evidence to prove that the 
confidentiality provisions of the DATWA were violated and found that the 
Williams’ could not show that the DATWA violations caused them any injury; 
the district court declined to enter permanent injunctive relief.  The plaintiffs 
challenged the district court’s failure to grant the permanent injunctive relief, 
arguing that the DATWA mandates injunctive relief for any violation.  The 
DATWA places limitations on an employer’s ability to require employees to 
undergo drug and alcohol testing.  Bumetanide is not identified in any of the 
schedules.  For this reason, the DATWA did not govern the Williams’ positive 
test results and there was no basis to grant permanent injunctive relief.  
Accordingly, the court did not reach the plaintiffs’ assertion that injunctive 
relief be mandatory.  
Williams v. Smith95 
Defendants University of Minnesota (Minnesota) and coach Orlando 
Henry “Tubby” Smith appealed a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff James Williams’ (Williams) 
negligent misrepresentation action.  In 2007, several people affiliated with 
Minnesota contacted Williams about coming to Minnesota to serve as an 
assistant coach.  Following a conversation with the athletic director, Smith 
offered Williams an assistant coach position at Minnesota, which Williams 
accepted.  Smith and Williams discussed Williams’ salary and his first 
recruiting assignment.  However, shortly after Williams tendered his letter of 
resignation from his former position, Smith informed Williams that Minnesota 
refused to hire Williams because Williams had previously committed several 
major violations of NCAA bylaws.  Following these events, Williams was 
unable to find a new position in coaching college basketball.   
 
95. No. A10-1802, A11-567, 2011 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 947 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 
2011). 
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As a result, Williams brought this action against Minnesota and Smith, 
asserting claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, equitable 
estoppel, intentional interference with contract, negligent misrepresentation, 
negligence, defamation, vicarious liability, and due process violations of his 
property and liberty interests.  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  The district 
court granted this motion on all claims except the negligent misrepresentation 
claim.  That claim was tried before a jury, which found that Smith negligently 
misrepresented to Williams that he had final authority to hire assistant 
basketball coaches at Minnesota and that Williams’ reasonable reliance on this 
misrepresentation caused him harm for $1,237,293.  Minnesota and Smith 
moved for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, for a new trial.  The 
trial court denied both motions.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the 
trial court appropriately denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law 
because there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that there 
had been a negligent misrepresentation.  Moreover, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Although they do not comprise a major portion of sports law cases, 
environmental laws do play a role in the field.  Specifically as they relate to 
sports facility management, with increasing environmental awareness, these 
issues may become more prevalent in the future.  The following two cases 
illustrate some of the unique challenges that environmental laws pose for those 
in charge of running a particular facility or planning a new sports facility.   
Citizens for Cmtys. Pres., Inc. v. City of Indus.96 
The plaintiffs opposed a redevelopment plan for a 592-acre piece of land.  
Originally, the city approved the site for a variety of office and retail uses—an 
approval process that included a water supply assessment (WSA) complying 
with the Water Code (the Code).  However, the newly approved plan, “the 
stadium project,” called for development of a National Football League 
stadium and related facilities, yet did not include an updated WSA.  The 
plaintiffs filed an action seeking a writ of mandate, alleging various violations 
of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) as well as a Code 
violation.  Subsequently, the California Assembly passed a special bill 
exempting the stadium project from complying with CEQA provisions, which 
 
96. No. B223648, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 738 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2011).  
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resulted in the plaintiffs dismissing the CEQA claims, leaving only the Code 
violation as a cause of action.  The defendants argued that the claim should be 
dismissed given that the Code requires a WSA only when a project is subject 
to the CEQA and that the special bill explicitly exempted the project from the 
CEQA provisions.  The trial court agreed and granted the defendants’ motion 
for judgment on the pleadings.  On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the trial 
court, asserting that the CEQA exemption was to take effect only after 
preliminary findings were made, findings the plaintiffs allege were never 
made, and that the trial court erred in finding a CEQA claim was necessary to 
bring an action for a Code violation.  After thoroughly analyzing the language 
and intent of the special bill, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision. 
Wild Equity Inst. v. City & Cnty. of S.F.97 
The plaintiffs filed a motion requesting a preliminary injunction to stop 
the operation of a golf course to protect the wildlife that was allegedly harmed 
by golf course activities.  Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the operation 
and management of the golf course threatened two endangered species, the 
California red-legged frog and the San Francisco garter snake.  As a result, the 
plaintiffs filed this action seeking a declaration that the defendants were 
violating the Endangered Species Act by illegally taking the frog and the 
snake without an Incidental Take Permit.  The plaintiffs also requested that the 
court enjoin the defendants from operating the golf course while this matter 
was pending.  However, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing 
that absent the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the frog and snake species 
would suffer irreparable harm.  Therefore, the court denied the plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction. 
GENDER EQUITY LAW 
Title IX has played a significant role in shaping the face of athletics for 
women, particularly at the high school and college levels, since its enactment 
in 1972.  The 1979 Title IX Policy Interpretation and various subsequent 
clarifications provide entities that receive federal funding with guidance as far 
as how to comply with Title IX’s provisions.  Specifically, the 1979 Policy 
Interpretation addressed compliance in the sports context in three distinct 
areas: financial assistance, program benefits and facilities, and compliance in 
meeting the interests and abilities of male and female students.  Although 
enacted nearly forty years before, these 2011 decisions indicate that Title IX 
 
97. No. C 11-00958 SI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137355 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2011). 
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compliance continues to be an issue. 
Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t. of Educ.98 
In 2006, James Madison University announced that it planned to cut ten of 
its athletic programs to comply with the proportionality prong of the Title IX 
three-part test.  The plaintiff, Equity in Athletics, Inc. (EIA), was comprised of 
opponents to these cuts, including student-athletes on the eliminated teams as 
well as female athletes on noneliminated teams at James Madison University.  
It sued a number of parties, including the Department of Education and James 
Madison University, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief through a direct 
challenge to the Title IX guidelines.  Alternatively, the plaintiff sought to 
require James Madison University to equalize scholarship payments to those 
student-athletes affected by the decision.  The district court denied the 
plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and granted the defendants’ 
motions to dismiss.  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit first held that the plaintiff 
had standing to bring suit given those that comprised the entity.  After 
conducting an in-depth analysis of each of the plaintiff’s challenges to the 
Title IX three-part test, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision. 
Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Cal.99 
The plaintiffs sued the defendants, seeking money damages and 
declaratory relief, for alleged failure to expand athletic opportunities for 
women.  The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants deprived them of the equal 
opportunity to participate in varsity athletics while they were students at UC 
Davis, in violation of both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution.  Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted they were wrongly deprived 
of their opportunity to participate in intercollegiate wrestling.  The defendants 
asserted that at all relevant times, the UC Davis athletic program and each 
individual defendant complied with constitutional and federal mandates 
regarding gender equity. 
Under the Title IX claim, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants 
violated Title IX’s mandate to effectively accommodate the interests and 
abilities of members of both sexes.  The defendants stipulated that during the 
time period relevant to the Title IX claim, the ratio of male and female 
participants in intercollegiate athletics was not always substantially 
 
98. 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011).   
99. 816 F. Supp. 2d 869 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
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proportionate to the ratio of male and female undergraduate enrollment at the 
university.  UC Davis further stipulated that during that time period, there was 
at least one sport for women that was not offered at the intercollegiate level for 
which there was (1) an expressed interest in competing at the intercollegiate 
level; (2) sufficient ability among interested students to compete at the 
intercollegiate level; and (3) arguably sufficient intercollegiate competition for 
that sport in the geographic area in which UC Davis usually competes.  Thus, 
the parties agreed that the defendants bore the burden of proving that the 
university was in compliance under the second prong during the relevant time 
period.  The court held that the defendants failed to demonstrate a continued 
practice of program expansion that was demonstrably responsive to the 
developing interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex.  Rather, 
evidence demonstrated that while the plaintiffs were students, the defendants 
eliminated more than sixty actual participation opportunities for women.  This 
indicated program contraction, not expansion.  As a result, the court concluded 
that the defendants did not have a continued practice of program expansion, 
and thus were not Title IX compliant.  Thus, the court concluded that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to damages under their Title IX claim for the actual 
harm they suffered as female students because the defendants failed to 
demonstrate a continuing practice of program expansion under Title IX.   
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Intellectual property rights are of significant value in the sports industry.  
Trademarks, copyrights, patents, and publicity rights claims all play a 
significant role in shaping sports law as we know it today.  Primarily through 
merchandising and licensing, sports entities are increasingly seeking to exploit 
the value of their intellectual property rights and simultaneously protect such 
value through adjudicatory processes, if necessary.  For trademark disputes 
involving Internet domain names, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation Center serves as an 
alternative forum to challenge an alleged trademark infringer.  The following 
decisions illustrate this wide array of sports-related intellectual property 
disputes that challenge courts today and include court and WIPO decisions. 
Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC100 
Sergio Aguirre (Aguirre), the plaintiff, developed a concept for a golf 
swing training product.  In September 2005, he applied for a patent with the 
 
100. No. SA-10-CV-702-XR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86207 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2011). 
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United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for a “Physical 
Conditioning Aid for Golfers.”  The USPTO published the application in April 
2006 and the patent was issued in June 2008.  After spending time marketing 
the product online, Aguirre marketed his product, the Zswinger, at a PGA 
Merchandise Show, where James Sowerwine, president of Powerchute Sports, 
visited the booth.  Powerchute was formed to manufacture and market the 
Powerchute, a product similar to the Zswinger, while TC Trust was formed to 
manufacture the same.  Furthermore, Powerchute and Octagon entered into an 
agreement for Octagon to assist with the product’s sales and marketing efforts.  
Aguirre sued Powerchute, Sowerwine, TC Trust, and Octagon for patent 
infringement, violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, common law fraud, 
tortious interference with prospective business relations, and unjust 
enrichment.  All of the defendants moved to dismiss.   
In relation to the defendant Octagon, the court granted in part and denied 
in part its motion to dismiss count one of the complaint.  First, the court denied 
Octagon’s motion to dismiss the direct infringement claim because Aguirre 
plead all requirements for direct infringement.  Alternatively, the court granted 
Octagon’s motion to dismiss the indirect infringement claim because Aguirre 
failed to allege that Octagon had knowledge that the Powerchute’s purpose 
was adapted for use in infringement of Aguirre’s patent.  As to the violations 
of the Sherman Act, Aguirre argued that the defendants attempted “to 
monopolize the market for portable, resistance-based training aids for 
golfers”101 by attempting to enforce a patent unenforceable due to fraud.  The 
court granted the defendants’ motion because Aguirre failed to meet his 
burden.  Furthermore, Aguirre failed to allege that the defendants engaged in 
anti-competitive conduct that had a dangerous probability of achieving 
monopoly power.  The court also dismissed Aguirre’s claim for common law 
fraud because he failed to allege any reasonable misrepresentation that 
intended to influence Aguirre’s conduct in addition to any proof of reliance 
upon the nonexistent fraudulent misrepresentation.  Next, the court dismissed 
Aguirre’s claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations 
and economic advantage because he failed to claim that, but for the 
defendants’ conduct, he would have entered into a business relationship.  
Lastly, Aguirre’s claim for unjust enrichment was also dismissed because he 
failed to allege that the defendants benefited from Aguirre in such a way that 
would warrant the existence of an implied contract.   
 
101. Id. at *17. 
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All Star Championship Racing, Inc. v. O’Reilly Auto. Stores, Inc.102 
O’Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc.’s (O’Reilly) filed a request for a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin All Star Championship Racing, Inc. (All Star) 
from using or creating any materials containing O’Reilly trademarks or service 
marks.  O’Reilly and All Star entered into a contract in which O’Reilly 
sponsored All Star’s racing events for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 seasons.  The 
parties continued their agreement under the contract for the 2010 season.  
O’Reilly decided to terminate the agreement for the 2011 season, and All Star 
argued that the contract was to continue under the same three-year term of the 
previous contract, and therefore, O’Reilly could not terminate.  O’Reilly 
argued that the parties never made a written renewal of the contract, and 
therefore, it was free to cancel at anytime.  O’Reilly also requested a 
preliminary injunction to stop All Star from using its marks in any future 
racing events, citing trademark infringement.  The court found that because a 
new agreement was not entered into, O’Reilly would likely succeed on the 
merits of its claim for trademark infringement.  The court also found that All 
Star would be unharmed should the court grant the injunction, and further that 
the public has an interest in protecting against trademark infringement.  
Therefore, the court granted the preliminary injunction in favor of O’Reilly.  
Aqua Gear, Inc. v. RareNames, WebReg103 
The complainant Aqua Gear filed this trademark infringement action 
against the respondent RareNames for registering the domain name 
“aquagear.com.”  The complainant owns the trademark registration for 
“AQUAGEAR,” and argued that the respondent’s domain name was 
confusingly similar to its registered trademark.  As a result, the complainant 
filed a complaint with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
alleging that the respondent was infringing on its trademark.  The WIPO Panel 
determined that because the domain name was identical to the complainant’s 
trademark, it was confusingly similar.  Moreover, the respondent had no rights 
to or legitimate interests in the AQUAGEAR mark.  Finally, because the 
respondent registered the domain name to divert Internet users from 
complainant’s website, the Panel found that the domain name was registered 
in bad faith.  For these reasons, the Panel ordered that the respondent transfer 
the domain name to the complainant. 
 
102. No. 11-2160, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112349 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2011). 
103. WIPO Case No. D2011-1366 (2011) (Partridge, Arb.). 
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Arenas v. Shed Media US Inc.104 
The plaintiff Gilbert Arenas (Arenas), an NBA player, and his ex-fiance 
(and codefendant), Laura Govan (Govan), entered into an agreement with 
Shed Media (Shed) to appear on the reality television show, Basketball Wives: 
Los Angeles.  Govan was described on the show’s press releases as the sister 
of Gloria Govan (fiancée of Los Angeles Lakers’ Matt Barnes).  The press 
releases did not mention Arenas.  California’s Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation (Anti-SLAPP) statute is a method to be used for 
dismissing “meritless lawsuits aimed at chilling expression through costly, 
time-consuming litigation.”105  Arenas sought injunctive relief for his 
misappropriation of likeness claim and his claim for trademark infringement.  
California common law grants a right of publicity that protects the 
appropriation of one’s identity.  The district court ruled that Arenas would 
likely succeed on the merits.   
However, the district court also found that Shed had two valid defenses 
stemming from the First Amendment.  First, the transformative use defense 
was successful because Shed offered proof that the show’s value does not 
primarily derive from Arenas’ celebrity status.  The court was not persuaded 
by Arenas’ argument that the show “uses his identity ‘solely to attract 
attention to the show’ because the show ‘is not actually related to him’”106 
because the fact that Govan appears on the show creates an automatic 
connection.  Shed also offered a public interest defense.  The district court 
found this defense persuasive because a cause of action cannot be established 
when the public has a right to know certain published matters and the press 
has the freedom to tell it.  Arenas argued that any discussion of his family life 
on the show would not be sufficiently related to his celebrity status to permit 
Shed’s use of his identity a matter of public concern.  The court also found this 
argument unpersuasive because of Arenas’ use of his Twitter account to let his 
followers know about his personal life.  Arenas also argued that the defense 
should fail because Shed acted with actual malice.  The court was unconvinced 
by this argument because Arenas failed to identify any defamatory or false 
statements Govan was likely to make about him on the show, and therefore, 
Arenas failed to meet his burden of showing present actual malice.  Lastly, 
Arenas argued that there was likelihood for irreparable harm if the court did 
not grant an injunction because he would suffer harm to his reputation.  Shed 
 
104. No. CV 11-05279, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101915 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011). 
105. Id. at *4.  
106. Id. at *15.   
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defended itself by arguing that Arenas caused his own disrepute when he drew 
a gun on a teammate in his team’s locker room over a gambling dispute.  
Furthermore, Shed presented evidence that Arenas already tweeted about the 
show, which the court found to undermine any claim that he would be injured 
by an association with the show.  Therefore, because the record showed 
insubstantial evidence that Arenas’ reputation would be seriously affected by 
an association with the show, the court ruled that Arenas failed to show a 
likelihood of irreparable harm.  The court dismissed Arenas’ right of publicity 
claim and his motion for preliminary injunction and granted Shed’s Anti-
SLAPP motion to strike.   
AVS Found. v. Eugene Berry Enter., LLC107 
The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in their trademark 
infringement action.  The plaintiffs, a foundation and the Pittsburgh Steelers, 
filed suit for infringement of their “Terrible Towel” trademark after the 
defendant produced and sold black and gold tee shirts with the words “The 
Terrible T-Shirt A Pittsburgh Original.”  Prior to selling the tee shirts, the 
defendant brought the design to a tee shirt printing company where an 
employee questioned whether the defendant was connected to the plaintiffs.  
The defendant subsequently produced a false letter indicating that he was 
connected to the plaintiffs and that he had authority to produce and sell the tee 
shirts.  The tee shirts were printed and the defendant sold them.   
The court, in deciding whether the defendant violated the Lanham Act, 
addressed three elements for trademark infringement of competing goods: (1) 
whether the marks are valid and legally protectable; (2) whether the marks are 
owned by the plaintiff; and (3) whether the defendant’s use of the mark to 
identify goods or services is likely to create confusion concerning the origin of 
the goods or services.  The court held that the first two prongs were satisfied 
because the “Terrible Towel” trademark had been a registered trademark in 
continuous use for more than twenty consecutive years and is undisputedly 
owned by the plaintiffs.   
Under the third prong, the court looked at ten factors commonly 
considered when determining if a likelihood of confusion exists.  First, the 
court found that marks illustrated the characteristics of both a fanciful 
distinctive mark and of a famous mark because the “Terrible Towel” does not 
describe the popular towel and the “Terrible Towel” is widely recognized by 
the general consuming public.  The court also took judicial notice of the 
 
107. No. 11 CV 01084, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139827 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2011). 
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trademark’s fame because the “Terrible Towel” trademark could be readily 
and accurately determined.  Second, the court found that the tee shirt was very 
similar to the “Terrible Towel” trademark because it used the word “Terrible,” 
similar colors, and a reference to Pittsburgh, which amounted to an apparent 
attempt to create confusion as to the tee shirt’s source.  Third, the court found 
that actual confusion existed because the printing company’s employee saw 
the logo and design and immediately questioned whether the defendant was 
connected to the plaintiff.  Fourth, the court found that the defendant intended 
to use the success and reputation of the plaintiff’s product by creating the 
impression that the defendant’s tee shirts contained an authorized version of 
the plaintiff’s marks.  Fifth, the court found that the defendant’s use of black 
and gold, coupled with one of the plaintiff’s marks, would be assumed by the 
average consumer to be one of the plaintiffs’ products.  Finally, the court 
found that the defendant targeted the same customers at the start of the NFL 
season.  After considering all of the factors, the court held that defendant’s tee 
shirts created a likelihood of confusion and thus the third prong was also 
satisfied.  Therefore, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment.   
Barclays Bank, PLC v. Barclaysatpworldtourfinal.com108 
This arbitration decision concerned the respondent’s registration of the 
domain name, “barclaysatpworldtourfinal.com.”  The complainant is a major 
global financial services provider engaged in retail banking, credit cards, 
corporate and investment banking, wealth management, and investment 
management services that owns a number of United Kingdom and European 
Union registrations for the trademark “Barclays.”  Additionally, the 
complainant owns domain name registrations in conjunction with its official 
title sponsorship of the ATP World Tour Tennis Finals, such as 
“barclaysatpworldtourfinals.com.”  In a complaint filed with the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Arbitration and Mediation Center, 
the complainant alleged: (1) that the respondent’s domain name was identical 
and confusingly similar to the trademark Barclays, (2) that the respondent had 
no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name, and (3) that the 
respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith.  The arbitration 
panel agreed with the complainant on all counts.  As a result, the panel ordered 
the transfer of the respondent’s domain name to the complainant.   
 
108. WIPO Case No. D2010-2152 (2011) (Samuels, Jeffrey, Arb.). 
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Beachbody, LLC v. Hauangda109 
The complainant Beachbody filed this trademark infringement action 
against the respondent Huangda for registering the domain name 
“p90xschedule.net.”  The complainant is a U.S. company that produces and 
sells weight loss and fitness products and services.  The complainant owns 
several registered trademarks, including the internationally registered mark 
“P90X,” which it has owned since 2008.  In 2010, the respondent registered 
the disputed domain name to allegedly lead Internet users to an online 
marketplace where they could purchase counterfeit copies of the 
complainant’s products.  As a result, the complainant filed a complaint with 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), alleging that the 
respondent was infringing on its trademark.  The WIPO Panel determined that 
because the domain name was identical to the complainant’s trademark, it was 
confusingly similar.  Moreover, the respondent had no rights to or legitimate 
interests in the P90X mark.  Finally, because the respondent registered the 
domain name to sell counterfeit copies of the complainant’s products, the 
Panel found that the respondent registered the domain name in bad faith.  For 
these reasons, the Panel ordered that the respondent transfer the domain name 
to the complainant. 
Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens L.P.110 
The plaintiff, creator of the Flying B drawing used by the defendants 
Baltimore Ravens (Ravens) and the National Football League, filed a 
complaint to permanently enjoin the defendant from publicly displaying his 
logo, which infringed his copyright, in season highlight films, video clips 
during home games, and in the Ravens’ corporate lobby.  The trial court held 
that the defendants made fair use of the copyright and thus had not infringed.  
The plaintiff appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the finding of fair use 
as to displays in the Ravens’ corporate lobby but reversed with regard to the 
displays in films and video clips.  
On remand, this court decided whether an injunction was appropriate.  The 
court stated that although the defendants infringed the plaintiff’s copyright in a 
drawing, a permanent injunction should not be issued because providing the 
plaintiff with reasonable compensation for use of an infringing logo in football 
highlight films would provide an adequate remedy at law.  Additionally, the 
court held that enjoining the defendants’ use of the films would cause a 
 
109. WIPO Case No. D2011-1386 (2011) (Agmon, Arb.).   
110. No. MJG-08-397, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129530 (D. Md. Nov. 9, 2011). 
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hardship that exceeded the hardship that would be suffered by the plaintiff 
provided he received reasonable compensation.  Finally, the court held that the 
public interest in the historical aspect of the films outweighed the public 
interest in granting a monopoly to the plaintiff.  Therefore, the court denied the 
permanent injunction against future use of the plaintiff’s logo in the films at 
issue but conditioned this denial on the defendants’ payment of reasonable 
compensation to the plaintiff for such use. 
Bugoni v. Kappos111 
The plaintiff alleged that he had an idea for technology that would allow 
for a camera to be placed in a football, for a different game perspective.  The 
plaintiff filed paperwork with the United States Patent and Trade Office 
(USPTO), but was unable to pay the requisite filing fee.  He also registered a 
domain name known as “ballcam.com” to share a prototype of his invention.  
After the filing, an article was published, in which the defendant Kappos 
purportedly invented a device similar to the plaintiff’s invention.  Plaintiff 
sought to enjoin Kappos from using his intellectual property.  The court found 
that the plaintiff had a claim for relief only if his original application was 
accompanied by the requisite filing fee.  The court found that because the 
plaintiff did not pay the requisite filing fee, his USPTO application was 
incomplete, and he did not have grounds for relief. 
Cleveland Browns Football Co. LLC v. Dinoia112 
This arbitration decision concerned the respondent’s registration of the 
domain name, “browns.com.”  The complainant owns the Cleveland Browns, 
a professional football team, and owns the trademarks, “Cleveland Browns,” 
“Browns,” and various additional trademarks incorporating “Browns.”  In a 
complaint filed with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Arbitration and Mediation Center, the complainant alleged: (1) that the 
respondent’s domain name was identical to the trademark Browns and 
confusingly similar to the trademark Cleveland Browns, (2) that the 
respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name, and (3) 
that the respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith.  The 
arbitration panel agreed with the complainant on all counts.  As a result, the 
panel ordered the transfer of the respondent’s domain name to the 
complainant.   
 
111. No. 11 1957, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128419 (D.D. C. Nov. 7, 2011). 
112. WIPO Case No. D2011-0421 (2011) (Trotman, Clive, Arb.). 
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DirectTV, Inc. v. Cory113 
The plaintiff owned the exclusive rights to sublicense the broadcast of the 
2010 NFL Sunday Ticket Program.  The defendant did not purchase a 
commercial subscription to exhibit NFL Sunday Ticket at his bar.  Instead, he 
purchased a residential subscription to save money.  Despite not having the 
appropriate subscription, the defendant exhibited at least a portion of the 
broadcast of NFL Sunday Ticket on October 24, 2010.  The defendant 
admitted he advertised the exhibition of NFL Sunday Ticket and “willfully 
received and exhibited the broadcast” for “direct financial benefit.”114  The 
plaintiff filed a copyright infringement suit against the defendant, alleging that 
the defendant willfully violated the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 
605.  The plaintiff filed this motion seeking summary judgment, and the 
defendant did not file a response. 
The court stated that to state a claim for a § 605 violation, a plaintiff must 
allege that the defendant “intercepted or otherwise unlawfully appropriated 
[the plaintiff’s] transmission.”115  The court held that the defendant violated § 
605 because he did not respond to the motion and the request for admissions 
and was thus entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Additionally, the court 
noted that under a § 605 violation, if a plaintiff elects to collective statutory 
damages, the court has discretion to determine the specific amount of statutory 
damages and can increase those statutory damages if the court “finds that the 
violation was committed willfully and for purposes of direct or indirect 
commercial advantage or private financial gain.”116  Because the defendant 
admitted to willfully intercepting and displaying the broadcast for financial 
gain, the court held that the defendant violated § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii).  Therefore, 
the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.   
Fancaster, Inc. v. Comcast Corp.117 
The plaintiff, Fancaster, is a provider of online video content directed at 
sports fans.  Fancaster’s sole owner applied to register the trademark in 1989, 
and subsequently registered a domain name for a Fancaster website.  The 
defendant, Comcast, has a large broadcasting market, and started a website for 
sports fans called “Fancast.”  Comcast lost money on the “Fancast” venture, 
 
113. No. EP-11-CV-50-KC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136395 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2011). 
114. Id. at *3.  
115. Id. at *6.  
116. Id. 
117. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147373, 2011 WL 6426292 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2011). 
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and changed the name of its sports video content website.  Before Comcast 
changed the website name, Fancaster sued Comcast for trademark violations, 
among other charges.  Both parties filed for summary judgment.  The court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Comcast for all infringement-related 
claims, and also found that Fancaster was not entitled to corrective advertising 
for the money Comcast was paid by its advertisers.  The court denied 
summary judgment in favor of Comcast as to a cyber-piracy claim, because 
Comcast did not respond to the claim in its initial brief.  The court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Fancaster as to Comcast’s claim of fraud, 
finding there was no evidence Fancaster did not intend to use the mark.  The 
court denied Fancaster’s motion for summary judgment for the cyber-piracy 
claim, citing that a finding of bad faith was required.  Finally, the court 
granted Fancaster’s motions in limine in part, as well as granted Fancaster’s 
motion to strike Comcast’s affirmative defenses. 
Gilmour v. Parsa118 
The complainant Doug Gilmour filed this trademark infringement action 
against the respondent Matt Parsa for registering the domain name 
“douggilmour.com.”  The complainant is a professional hockey player who is 
well-known in Canada.  The complainant does not have a registered trademark 
in his name; however, he claims that he has common law trademark rights in 
his name because he is a well-known professional hockey player.  The 
respondent registered the disputed domain name in 2002 to allegedly attract 
the complainant’s fans and consumers who were seeking information about 
the complainant under the false impression that the site was sponsored by or 
affiliated with the complainant, and then refer them to sponsored links from 
which respondent collected a fee.  As a result, the complainant filed a 
complaint with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), alleging 
that the respondent was infringing on his common law trademark rights.  The 
WIPO Panel determined that the complainant has common law trademark 
rights in his name in relation to ice hockey entertainment.  Because the domain 
name was identical to the complainant’s common law trademark, it was 
confusingly similar.  Moreover, even though the respondent argued that that he 
registered the disputed domain name for use as a fan site to share his 
appreciation of the complainant’s talents, the WIPO Panel determined that he 
had no rights to or legitimate interests in the mark.  Finally, because the 
respondent registered the domain name to derive income, the Panel found that 
 
118. WIPO Case No. D2011-1712 (2011) (Carson, Arb.).  
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the respondent registered the domain name in bad faith.  For these reasons, the 
Panel ordered that the respondent transfer the domain name to the 
complainant.  
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc.119 
The plaintiff Ryan Hart, a former college football player, brought a 
putative class action lawsuit against Electronic Arts, the producer of an annual 
video game series called NCAA Football.  Hart alleged that Electronic Arts 
misappropriated his likeness and identity, as well as other college football 
players’ likenesses, for a commercial purpose in connection with four of the 
defendant’s NCAA Football video games.  Electronic Arts filed a motion for 
summary judgment, alleging that the First Amendment barred Hart’s claims 
under New Jersey law for misappropriation of his likeness.  In analyzing this 
motion, the court concluded that the NCAA Football video game does not 
constitute commercial speech.  Next, the court balanced the defendant’s First 
Amendment rights against Hart’s right of publicity.  Under both tests it 
employed, the court found that there were no disputed issues of material fact 
that the defendant’s First Amendment right to free expression outweighed 
Hart’s right of publicity.  Thus, the court held that the First Amendment was a 
defense to Hart’s right of publicity claim and granted Electronic Arts’ motion 
for summary judgment. 
In re L.A. Dodgers LLC120  
The debtors, the Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, filed for bankruptcy 
protection under Chapter 11.  The debtors have a licensing agreement with 
Fox Entertainment Group, Inc. (Fox Group) that extends through the end of 
the 2013 Major League Baseball season.  Pursuant to their bankruptcy filings, 
the debtors filed a Motion for an Order to Approve Market Procedures for the 
License of Telecast Rights, which seeks to end its current contract with Fox 
Group.  The debtors filed the motion to allow any telecast rights to also be 
sold with the team, which would improve the team’s market value and 
maximize the value of the estate.  Fox Group argued that the telecast rights 
were not necessary for the estate value, and that the estate could get out of 
bankruptcy without those rights.  However, the court found that allowing the 
estate to maximize its value was a top priority, and that granting Fox Group’s 
request to delay negotiations would further hamper the estate.  Therefore, the 
 
119. 808 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.N.J. 2011). 
120. 457 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
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court granted the debtors’ motion, and allowed the debtors to negotiate for 
better telecast terms. 
Internetshopsinc.com v. Six C Consulting, Inc.121 
Both parties are in the business of selling golf equipment over the Internet.  
At issue in this particular case is the sale and advertising of practice golf mats.  
The plaintiff used the trademark “Dura Pro” to advertise its golf mat since 
2002, while the defendant began using the same term for its own golf mats in 
2008.  The plaintiff notified the defendant of its rights, and the defendant took 
action to stop use of the term “Dura Pro.”  However, the defendant’s efforts 
failed, and the plaintiff filed suit alleging a federal trademark infringement 
claim under the Lanham Act and a state claim for unfair competition.  As the 
defendant conceded that it infringed on the plaintiff’s trademark rights by 
using “Dura Pro” in its Internet advertising campaign for practice golf mats, 
the issues in this case concerned cross-motions for summary judgment related 
to damages, costs, attorney’s fees, Defendant’s profits, and permanent 
injunctive relief.  The court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 
as to liability under the Lanham Act, its claim to recover the costs of this 
action, and permanent injunctive relief.  However, the court denied Plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment, and thus granted Defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment for the claim for damages and attorney’s fees. 
J & J Sports Prods., Inc.122 
The plaintiff, J&J Productions, Inc., is the exclusive commercial 
distributor of the broadcast of certain boxing matches and similar-type events.  
As the exclusive commercial distributor of these events, businesses were 
required to obtain a license from the plaintiff to transmit the events.  
Allegedly, many businesses failed to do so, and the plaintiff, seeking damages, 
filed lawsuits against these businesses based on these defendant businesses’ 
alleged interception and transmission of these events. 
Lane No. 1. v. Lane Masters Bowling Inc.123 
The plaintiff Lane No. 1 brought this action against the defendant Lane 
Masters Bowling Inc., claiming patent infringement after the defendant made 
 
121. No. 1:09-CV-00698-JEC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31222 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2011). 
122. See e.g., J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Allen, No. 1:10-cv-4258-WSD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25453 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2011). 
123. No. 5:06-CV-0508, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29231 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011). 
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two bowling balls with designs that are protected by a patent owned by the 
plaintiff.  The defendant moved for summary judgment claiming that the 
plaintiff’s patent was invalid for obviousness and that there is no infringement 
because the defendant’s balls are not covered by the plaintiff’s patent. The 
court rejected the obviousness argument because the defendant did not present 
clear and convincing evidence to overcome the validity presumption of a 
registered patent.  After examining prior art and looking into the patent claims, 
the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s infringement claim.   
Mine O’ Mine, Inc. v. Calmese124 
The plaintiff Mine O’ Mine, Inc. (MOM) filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment in its action for trademark infringement and other related 
claims.  Former professional basketball player Shaquille O’Neal (O’Neal), 
nicknamed “Shaq,” granted MOM the exclusive right to register and 
sublicense his name, image, and likeness.  In February 2008, after O’Neal was 
traded to the Phoenix Suns, he was dubbed “The Big Cactus” and “The Big 
Shaqtus.”  While playing for the Suns, O’Neal wore an orange jersey with the 
number thirty-two.  In March 2008, the defendant, Michael Calmese 
(Calmese), registered <Shaqtus.net> as a domain name, and registered 
“Shaqtus” as an Arizona trade name.  Calmese also created an image of the 
Shaqtus, which looked like a cactus with the facial expression of a man 
wearing an orange basketball jersey bearing the name “Phoenix Shaqtus” and 
the number 32 and bouncing a basketball (Shaqtus Character).  In 2009, 
counsel for MOM and O’Neal demanded that Calmese cease and desist from 
all use of the Shaqtus mark, transfer <Shaqtus.net> to MOM, and cancel his 
Arizona trade name registration for Shaqtus.  However, Calmese failed to 
cancel his “Shaqtus” trade name registration or transfer <Shaqtus.net>. 
As a result, MOM sued Calmese and True Fan Logo, asserting six claims: 
(1) federal trademark infringement; (2) unfair competition; (3) trademark 
dilution; (4) cybersquatting; (5) common law trademark infringement; and (6) 
violation of the right of publicity.  Calmese asserted three counterclaims: (1) 
common law trademark infringement; (2) unfair competition; and (3) 
defamation of character.  MOM filed a motion for summary judgment on its 
first, second, fifth, and sixth claims for trademark infringement, unfair 
competition, and violation of the right of publicity and on all of the 
counterclaims asserted by Calmese.  Calmese sought summary judgment in his 
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favor for all of his counterclaims and for all of MOM’s claims.  MOM also 
sought to strike Calmese’s opposition.  
For MOM’s federal trademark infringement claim, MOM claimed 
Calmese’s use of Shaqtus caused a likelihood of consumer confusion.  The 
court considered the eight factors to determine the likelihood of consumer 
confusion and determined that there was a high likelihood of confusion.  
Therefore, the court granted MOM’s motion for summary for its trademark 
infringement claim.  For MOM’s unfair competition claims, the court stated 
that the test for unfair competition under common and federal law is identical 
to the test for trademark infringement.  Because the court held that MOM was 
entitled to summary judgment on its trademark infringement claim, the court 
held that it was also entitled to summary judgment on its unfair competition 
claims.  For MOM’s violation of right of publicity claim, the court discussed 
the transformative use defense.  Under this defense, a right to publicity action 
is defeated when cartoons depicting real persons are distorted for the purpose 
of parody or caricature.  The court held that the Shaqtus character is 
sufficiently transformative to defeat a right to publicity action.  Therefore, the 
court denied MOM’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.   
Finally, the court addressed Calmese’s counterclaims.  The court held that 
MOM was entitled to summary judgment on both counterclaims.  First, the 
court held that Calmese could not prevail on his trademark infringement and 
unfair competition counter claims because Calmese’s use of the Shaqtus name 
violated MOM’s rights and he therefore had no rights in the Shaqtus name.  
Second, the court held that Calmese could not prevail on his defamation 
counterclaim because Calmese acted under a fictitious business name and True 
Fan Logo was no longer a valid or existing business entity.   
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.  
New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth.125 
The defendant, a state-owned sports and exposition center, responded to 
an Open Public Records Act (OPRA) request made by the plaintiff, a 
newspaper publisher.  The plaintiff sought copies of the defendant’s promoter 
licensing agreements.  The copies originally provided to plaintiff redacted the 
financial information in the agreements.  The defendant stated that the 
financial information was exempt from the OPRA.  The plaintiff filed suit to 
require the disclosure of all information related to the agreements.  The trial 
court found that the defendant did not give examples of how releasing the 
 
125. 31 A.3d 623 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). 
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unredacted copies of the agreements would cause any specific harm to the 
defendant.  Therefore, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion requiring 
defendant to release the unredacted agreements.  The defendant appealed, and 
the court held that the agreements in question constituted government records 
under the OPRA statute.  Therefore, the court found that the defendant could 
not deny access to the agreements as authorized by the law.  The court also 
held that the common law doctrine of nondisclosure did not apply because 
nondisclosure was not in the public’s interest, as the defendant claimed.  
Therefore, the court affirmed the order of the trial court requiring the 
defendant to release unredacted copies of the agreements. 
NFL v. EE Nation126 
The National Football League (NFL) sued EE Nation alleging trademark 
infringement after EE Nation registered the domain name 
“superbowlconcierge.com.”  The NFL owns several federally registered 
trademarks in the United States for the trademark “SUPER BOWL,” which is 
the name of the league’s championship game.  The NFL has registered the 
same trademark in over fifty jurisdictions outside of the United States.  
Finally, since 1995, the NFL’s official website for the Super Bowl game has 
been located at the registered domain name “www.superbowl.com.”  Long 
after the NFL had established its rights in the SUPER BOWL mark, EE Nation 
registered the domain name superbowlconcierge.com without the NFL’s 
authorization.  EE Nation’s website prominently displays NFL logos and 
pictures of NFL teams.  The website also provides links for users to book 
rooms at hotels near NFL stadiums and purchase tickets to NFL games.  The 
NFL sent several cease-and-desist letters to EE Nation, objecting to the 
unauthorized use of the NFL’s trademarks; however, EE Nation never 
responded to these letters and did not stop using the marks.  As a result, the 
NFL filed a complaint with the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), alleging that EE Nation was infringing on its trademarks.  
Particularly, the NFL argued that the superbowlconcierge.com domain name is 
confusingly similar to the NFL’s famous SUPER BOWL trademark, that EE 
Nation has no rights to or legitimate interests in the domain name, and that EE 
Nation registered the domain name in bad faith.  The WIPO Panel determined 
that because the domain name was identical to the NFL’s trademark, it was 
confusingly similar.  Moreover, EE Nation had no rights to or legitimate 
interests in the SUPER BOWL mark.  Finally, because EE Nation registered 
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the domain name even though it had no rights to the mark, the Panel found 
that EE Nation registered the domain name in bad faith.  For these reasons, the 
Panel ordered that EE Nation transfer the domain name 
“superbowlconcierge.com” to the NFL. 
Pac.-10 Conference v. Lee127 
This arbitration decision concerned the respondent’s registration of the 
domain names, “pac-12network.com,” “pac12network.com,” and “pac-
12network.org.”  The complainant is an unincorporated California business 
association that is among the preeminent collegiate athletic conferences in the 
United States.  Specifically, the complainant is the PAC-10 conference, and 
the PAC-10 conference commissioner had recently announced that the 
complainant was looking to expand the membership of the conference.  The 
complainant is the owner of registrations in the family of trademarks “PAC-
10” and the pending application of the “PAC-12” trademarks.  In a complaint 
filed with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Arbitration 
and Mediation Center, the complainant alleged: (1) that the respondent’s 
domain names were confusingly similar to the trademarks, (2) that the 
respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the domain names, and (3) 
that the respondent registered and used the domain names in bad faith.  The 
arbitration panel agreed with the complainant on all counts.  As a result, the 
panel ordered the transfer of the respondent’s domain names to the 
complainant.   
Rugby World Cup Limited v. Andreas Gyrre128 
The complainant Rugby World Cup Limited filed this trademark 
infringement action against the respondent Andreas Gyrre for registering the 
domain name “worldcup2011.com.”  The complainant is owned by the world 
governing body for the sport of rugby and has been assigned all rights in the 
Rugby World Cup tournament.  In 2009, the respondent registered the 
disputed domain name to sell tickets to sporting events.  Believing that the 
colors and fonts used on the respondent’s side were similar to the 
complainant’s site, the complainant filed a complaint with the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), alleging that the respondent’s 
website was confusing consumers.  However, the WIPO Panel determined that 
the domain name was not confusingly similar because many sports use the 
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phrase “world cup” to refer to their championship tournament.  Therefore, 
because the word “rugby” was absent in the domain name, there was not a 
sufficient connection between the disputed domain name and the Rugby 
World Cup to cause confusion.  For these reasons, the Panel denied the 
complaint. 
Russell Brands LLC v. Cognata129 
The complainant Russell Brands, LLC filed this trademark infringement 
action against the respondent Tony Cognata for registering the domain name 
“spalding.net.”  The complainant is a U.S. company that manufactures 
sporting goods.  The complainant owns several registered trademarks, 
including the internationally registered mark “SPALDING,” and the domain 
name “spalding.com,” which it has owned since 1994.  In 1998, the 
respondent registered the disputed domain name.  As a result, the complainant 
filed a complaint with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
alleging that the respondent was infringing on its trademark.  The WIPO Panel 
determined that because the domain name was identical to the complainant’s 
trademark, it was confusingly similar.  Moreover, the respondent had no rights 
to or legitimate interests in the SPALDING mark.  Finally, the respondent did 
not contest the fact that it registered the domain name in bad faith.  For these 
reasons, the Panel ordered that the respondent transfer the domain name to the 
complainant. 
Silver Dream, LLC v. Yousuf Int’l, Inc.130   
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s copyright 
infringement suit, arguing that the court lacks personal jurisdiction.  The 
plaintiff is a designer and marketer of jewelry.  In 2009, the plaintiff applied 
for and received a copyright for a pendant that it designed in the shape of a 
fleur de lis, which included the image of a football, a football stadium, and the 
words “WHO DAT,” “NOLA,” and “BELIEVE DAT.”  Upon learning that 
the defendant was selling similar jewelry pendants, which included the same 
shape, images, and words, the plaintiff filed a copyright infringement claim in 
Louisiana district court.  The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that 
the Louisiana district court did not have personal jurisdiction because the 
defendant had no contacts with Louisiana.  However, the court disagreed, 
holding that because the pendant’s design was particular to Louisiana, 
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specifically the New Orleans Saints football team, much of the defendant’s 
sales were in the Louisiana market; therefore, the defendant should have 
reasonably foreseen that it could be haled into court in Louisiana.  As such, the 
court denied the defendant’s motion to have the case dismissed. 
Steele v. Bongiovi131 
Samuel Bartley Steele (Steele) brought this action against numerous 
defendants from a prior action and their attorneys alleging that they unlawfully 
removed a copyright notice from an advertisement in violation of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act.  In the prior action, the court granted summary 
judgment to the defendants on Steele’s copyright infringement claim because 
there was no substantial similarity between Steele’s song about the Boston 
Red Sox and a song used in the defendants’ advertisements.   
In the case at hand, Steele alleged that the defendants intentionally 
concealed acts of copyright infringement, altered the TBS Promo logo by 
deleting the Major League Baseball Advanced Media copyright notice, and 
submitted false evidence to the federal courts in the form of that altered TBS 
Promo.  The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Steele lacks standing 
because he does not own the TBS Promo material, he fails to allege sufficient 
facts to support his claims, and his claims are precluded because they arise 
from the same facts as the prior pending action.  By accepting all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 
Steele’s favor, the court found that Steele was not injured by the alleged acts.  
As such, Steele did not have standing to bring an action.  Consequently, Steele 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the defendant’s 
motion was allowed.  The court also held that Steele’s lawsuit was frivolous 
and vexatious, as it was an attempt to circumvent the court’s holding in the 
prior case; the court will impose sanction if Steele files any future abusive, 
frivolous, or vexatious cases in the court.  
Syrus v. Bennett132   
The plaintiff, Charles Syrus (Syrus), appealed a district court decision to 
dismiss his copyright infringement action against the defendant basketball 
team, the Oklahoma City Thunder (the Thunder).  Syrus wrote a song for the 
Thunder and gave copies of the song to the one of the team’s coaches and the 
team’s head cheerleader.  Although the team never played his song during 
 
131. 784 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Mass. 2011). 
132. 455 Fed. Appx. 806 (10th Cir. 2011). 
SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2012  10:31 AM 
772 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2 
 
Thunder games, Syrus claimed that the Thunder violated the copyright in his 
song by having the cheerleaders, mascot, and the crowd chant phrases such as 
“Thunder Up,” “Go Thunder,” and “Let’s Go Thunder,” phrases that were 
allegedly taken from his song’s lyrics.  As a result, Syrus filed this copyright 
infringement action to recover compensatory damages.  The district court, 
however, dismissed Syrus’s claim because he had not established a plausible 
claim.  On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal of Syrus’s complaint.  The 
court held that the phrases did not reflect the minimal creativity required for a 
work to receive copyright protection since these phrases were merely 
predictable variations on cheers that are widely used in sports.  The fact that 
Syrus had obtained a copyright registration for his song did not automatically 
create protection for these phrases.  Copyright protection extends “only to 
those components of a work that are original to the author,” and the allegedly 
infringed phrases were not original enough for copyright protection.  Because 
Syrus did not have a valid copyright in these phrases, the court affirmed the 
dismissal of his copyright infringement claims. 
Unique Sports Prods. v. Ferrari Imp. Co.133 
The plaintiff, a sporting goods manufacturer, filed an action for trademark 
infringement against defendant, a sporting goods retailer, for marketing a 
similar looking grip tape for use on tennis rackets.  Since 1977, the plaintiff 
has manufactured and sold Tourna Grip, which is a light blue tape that 
provides additional cushioning and moisture absorption on tennis racket grips.  
In 2001, the plaintiff federally registered the color light blue used for “grip 
tape for sports rackets.”  Subsequently, the defendant began marketing and 
selling a gauze tape for tennis rackets, which was a light blue-green color.  As 
a result, the plaintiff filed this action against the defendant for trademark 
infringement.  The district court determined that the defendant’s light blue-
green gauze tape did not infringe the plaintiff’s trademark light blue grip tape.  
Even though both products were used on tennis rackets, there was little 
likelihood of confusion between the two products.  They were different 
products because one was absorbent while the other was not.  The packaging 
of each of the products was so distinguishable from the other that it made it 
virtually impossible to confuse the two products.  Finally, there was no 
evidence of actual consumer confusion.  For these reasons, the court entered 
judgment in favor of the defendant. 
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W. Brand Bobosky v. Adidas AG134 
The defendants, Adidas and National Basketball Association player Kevin 
Garnett, filed a motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff’s trademark 
infringement and unfair competition claims.  The plaintiff sued the defendants 
because of the defendants’ use of the plaintiff’s federally registered trademark: 
“We Not Me.”  In 2004, the plaintiffs registered its intent to use the phrase 
“We Not Me” in connection with men’s, women’s, and children’s clothing.  In 
2007, Adidas began using the phrase “We Not Me” in its own marketing 
campaign.  As a result, the plaintiff filed this trademark infringement action 
against the defendants.  The defendants moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that the plaintiff’s trademark registrations were void ab initio and 
because plaintiff procured them through fraud on the Patent and Trademark 
Office because the plaintiff failed to use the mark in a trademark manner.  The 
district court concluded that the plaintiff’s registrations were void ab initio 
because the plaintiff lacked a bona fide intention to use the mark in two of the 
three categories that it was registered.  Therefore, the court granted partial 
summary judgment on the issue of trademark validity.  However, because 
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff acquired 
valid and protectable rights in the mark through trademark use, the court could 
not grant summary judgment on the unfair competition claim. 
Who Dat Yat Chat, LLC v. Who Dat, Inc.135 
The defendants, NFL Properties and New Orleans Saints, filed a motion to 
compel discovery and for sanctions against the plaintiff, Who Dat Yat Chat, 
LLC, in a trademark infringement action.  While making plans to open a 
coffee shop in Louisiana named “Who Dat Yat Chat,” the plaintiff received a 
cease-and-desist letter from the defendants, stating that they were the sole 
owner of the trademark phrase “Who Dat.”  In response, the plaintiff filed a 
declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the phrase is a generic 
term in the New Orleans metropolitan area, and therefore, no one can own the 
phrase.  In preparation for a trial, the defendants sent the plaintiff 
interrogatories and requests for documents.  After receiving the plaintiff’s 
initial responses, the defendants requested more detailed information.  Over 
the next several months, the plaintiff and defendants exchanged discovery 
requests, and in the defendants’ opinion, all of the plaintiff’s responses were 
inadequate.  Eventually, the defendants filed this motion to compel the 
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plaintiff to provide information more responsive to the defendants’ requests.  
The defendants also requested that they be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs 
incurred for bringing this motion.  In the end, the court granted the defendants’ 
motion to compel discovery because the information they were seeking was 
non-privileged and relevant.  The plaintiff was ordered to immediately 
supplement its answers with more responsive information and documents or 
state specifically that the pertinent documents or information do not exist.  The 
court further awarded the defendants with attorneys’ fees and costs incurred 
for bringing this motion. 
Woltmann v. Arena Football One, LLC136 
The defendant, arena football team the Chicago Gridiron (the Gridiron), 
filed a motion to dismiss part of the plaintiff photographer’s copyright 
infringement action.  The plaintiff entered into a contract to be the exclusive 
photographer for the arena football team, the Chicago Rush (the Rush).  Under 
this contract, all ownership rights in the images would revert to the plaintiff if 
the Rush filed for bankruptcy or ceased operations.  The Rush subsequently 
ceased operations.  However, the Arena Football League later bequeathed the 
trademarks and trade names of the former Rush team to the Gridiron team.  
After purchasing the assets of the former Rush team, the Gridiron repeatedly 
used the plaintiff’s pictures of the Rush without his authorization.  As a result, 
the plaintiff brought this action claiming copyright infringement, declaratory 
judgment, and unjust enrichment.  The Gridiron filed a motion to dismiss the 
declaratory judgment and unjust enrichment claims.  The parties mutually 
agreed that the court should dismiss the unjust enrichment claim because the 
copyright claim preempted it.  However, the court held that it could not 
dismiss the declaratory judgment claim because there were genuine issues of 
fact as to whether Gridiron had a basis to use the plaintiff’s images. 
World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc. v. Ramos137 
The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s breach of contract action 
that the plaintiff filed after defendant failed to pay money that it allegedly 
owed under a licensing agreement.  The plaintiff World Wrestling 
Entertainment (WWE) and the defendant, J.F. Ramos (Ramos), entered into a 
license agreement, granting Ramos a license to manufacture and distribute 
products—such as t-shirts, hats, and gloves—bearing WWE trademarks.  As 
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part of the license agreement, Ramos was required to obtain WWE’s 
preapproval before Ramos could sell and distribute any licensed products.  In 
2009, Ramos manufactured certain clothing bearing WWE trademarks, which 
WWE claimed Ramos never submitted to it for approval.   
After WWE discovered that Ramos had sold the unauthorized clothing to 
a French company, WWE sent a cease-and-desist letter to the French 
company, informing it that the clothing was counterfeit.  Then, after Ramos 
produced documents showing that WWE had approved the products, the 
French company filed suit in France against the WWE for unfair competition 
and unfair commercial practices, seeking over €17 million.  Under the 
licensing agreement between Ramos and WWE, Ramos would be required to 
indemnify WWE for its losses, damages, attorneys’ fees, and similar costs for 
any claim against WWE arising from Ramos’s unauthorized use of the 
licensed products.  However, because the litigation was still pending in 
France, Ramos refused to pay WWE.  As a result, WWE terminated the 
license agreement and brought this action seeking a declaration that Ramos 
owed money under the indemnification provisions of the licensing agreement.  
In response, Ramos filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that WWE’s claims 
were not yet ripe for judicial review because the litigation was still pending in 
France.  The district court held that any declaration about the extent of 
Ramos’s obligations under its licensing agreement would not substantially 
clarify who is obligated to pay the French company if it was to prevail in the 
French litigation.  As such, the court declined to decide the indemnification 
issue, and the court dismissed the action. 
LABOR LAW 
Labor laws govern the relationship between employers and employees in 
unionized settings.  As the major professional sports leagues are unionized 
industries, labor laws play a significant role in shaping the sports world as we 
know it.  In general, labor law claims center on disputes concerning a 
particular sport’s collective bargaining agreement.  In 2011, labor laws were at 
the forefront of a highly-publicized dispute between the National Football 
League (NFL) and NFL players, as illustrated by the Brady v. NFL decisions 
that follow. 
Bentley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co.138 
The defendant Cleveland Browns (Browns) appealed a trial court’s denial 
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of its motion to compel arbitration as per the collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA) that the plaintiff Bentley agreed to.  In 2010, Bentley filed suit against 
the Browns claiming fraud and negligent misrepresentation.  He alleged that 
he contracted a staph infection while in rehabilitation as a result of unsanitary 
conditions at the Browns’ facility.  Bentley further alleged that the Browns’ 
head athletic trainer misrepresented the facility as a “world class facility with a 
strong track record for successfully rehabilitating other Browns’ players.”139  
Based on those representations, Bentley chose the Browns’ facility to 
complete his postsurgical rehabilitation.  Bentley was not required to choose 
the Browns’ facility for his rehabilitation.  To determine whether the trial court 
improperly denied the Browns’ motion to compel arbitration, the appellate 
court had to decide whether the trial court’s order constituted an abuse of 
discretion, and more specifically, whether Bentley’s claims of fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation were subject to the CBA, which would then 
invoke the relevant arbitration clause.  Bentley argued that the court cannot 
compel him to arbitrate such a dispute when he never agreed that an arbitrator 
must hear such claims.  The court of appeals held that claims for fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation do not implicate the CBA.  Furthermore, it held 
that nothing in the CBA required that Bentley use the Browns’ facility for the 
post-surgical rehabilitation, which the Browns’ counsel conceded.  Because 
Bentley’s post-surgical rehabilitation did not disobey any CBA provision (he 
could have chosen to go anywhere for his rehabilitation), it would be 
unnecessary to subject Bentley’s claims to the CBA.  Therefore, the court of 
appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling to deny the Browns’ motion to compel 
arbitration.   
Brady v. NFL140 
The defendant National Football League (NFL) filed an appeal, 
challenging the lower court’s granting of a preliminary injunction that 
enjoined the NFL owners from locking out the players because it was an 
unlawful concerted boycott causing irreparable harm to the players.  The 
players filed an antitrust suit after they agreed to decertify as a union, which 
ended both sides’ protection under the nonstatutory labor exemption that 
permits employers to bargain in concert with its employees’ union.  At trial, 
the NFL argued that the owners were still immune from antitrust liability 
under the nonstatutory labor exemption because the decertification of the 
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players’ union was effectively a “sham.”  The NFL also argued that the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
(NLGA) prevents the federal courts’ power to grant injunctions in cases 
“involving or growing out of a labor dispute.”141  However, the district court 
ruled that the case did not grow out of a labor dispute.  The district court also 
refused to stay the action until the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
resolved the NFL’s pending unfair labor practices charge against the players 
for “unlawful subversion of the collective bargaining process” by having a 
“sham” decertification only so the players could file an antitrust lawsuit.142  
The Eighth Circuit determined that the NLGA applies to the case.  The 
court was not persuaded by the players’ contention that the NLGA applied to 
disputes specifically involving only organized labor.  The court ruled that the 
NLGA does apply to cases where the employees are no longer unionized and 
that the controversy surrounding this case arose directly out of a labor dispute.  
Next, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the NLGA prevented the district court from 
granting a preliminary injunction.  In its argument, the NFL pointed to Section 
4(a) of the NLGA.  Section 4(a), the NFL argued, forbids a court to prohibit 
the league from using a lockout as a labor weapon.  Although the players 
counter-argued that Section 4(a) prohibits only injunctions against strikes and 
other such injunctions against employees, and not lockouts or the employers, 
the court found that such an interpretation would be in complete disregard for 
the NLGA’s purpose to keep cases arising out of labor disputes out of the 
federal courts.  Therefore, because the NLGA prohibits a federal court from 
enjoining a party to a labor dispute from using economic weapons permissible 
under the NLRA, the court vacated the district court’s order granting a 
preliminary injunction to the players.   
Brady v. NFL143 
As part of the highly-publicized National Football League (NFL) labor 
dispute regarding CBA negotiations, in response to the threat of a lockout, the 
plaintiffs (Players)—professional football players and prospective players on 
behalf of themselves and other similarly situated football players—filed suit 
against a party collectively known as “the League,” on March 11, 2011, 
alleging that the lockout would violate federal antitrust laws and state contract 
and tort laws.  The following day, the League did in fact impose a lockout that 
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generally prohibited Players from entering NFL facilities.  However, the 
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the League from continuing the lockout.  In an April 
25 decision, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction, thus enjoining the lockout; the district court denied a stay of its 
order pending appeal.  The League appealed the district court’s decision on the 
merits; on April 29, the Eighth Circuit granted the League’s motion for a 
temporary stay of the district court’s order enjoining the lockout.  Similarly, in 
a decision filed on May 16 after assessing the League’s likelihood of success 
on the merits of its appeal, the Eighth Circuit granted the League’s motion for 
stay pending the expedited appeal on the merits of the district court’s decision.   
Chi. Bears Football Club, Inc. v. Haynes144 
The defendants, Michael Haynes (Haynes), Joe Odom (Odom), Cameron 
Worrell (Worrell), and National Football League Players’ Association’s 
(NFLPA, and collectively the defendants), filed a motion to vacate an 
arbitration award.  Haynes, Odom, and Worrell were football players, 
employed by the Chicago Bears, at the time the dispute arose.  Haynes, Odom, 
and Worrell filed claims for workers’ compensation benefits with the 
California Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB).  The plaintiff 
Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc. (the Bears) filed a grievance, arguing that 
the players should have filed claims in Illinois, where the Bears franchise is 
located.  The Bears cited the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and the 
players’ individual contracts as the source of the grievances.  The NFLPA then 
initiated arbitration with the Bears on behalf of the players.  The arbitrator 
upheld the Bears’ grievances, and the players and the NFLPA appealed the 
award on the grounds that it violated California public policy.  The court 
reviewed the award de novo because of the challenge based on public policy 
grounds.  The court found that the agreement did not need to conform to 
California public policy because the agreements were governed under Illinois 
law, and the Bears are located in Illinois.  The court found that the arbitrator 
did not err in applying Illinois law to the decision, and therefore granted the 
Bears’ motion to enforce the arbitration award.  
Kivisto v. NFL Players Assoc.145 
Kivisto appealed the trial court’s decision to dismiss Kivisto’s contract 
dispute under the National Football League (NFL) Collective Bargaining 
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Agreement (CBA).  Kivisto, a former NFL agent, claimed he should not be 
forced to arbitrate under the CBA’s arbitration agreement after his agent 
certification had expired.  The trial court dismissed Kivisto’s complaint and 
held that the contract dispute was within the scope of the CBA’s arbitration 
agreement.  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint because in signing his 
Application for Certification as an NFLPA Contract Advisor, Kivisto agreed 
to abide by the arbitration procedures set forth in the NFLPA Regulations. 
Section 5(A)(4) of the NFLPA Regulations requires arbitration to be the 
exclusive method for resolving any and all disputes arising out of “any other 
activities of a Contract Advisor within the scope of these Regulations.”  The 
court held that broad scope of section 5(A)(4) covers the revocation of 
Kivisto’s agent certification under section 2G.  As such, the court affirmed the 
trial court’s decision to dismiss Kivisto’s complaint. 
PROPERTY LAW 
Property law concerns the benefits ands rights associated with an interest 
in real property.  In the sports law context, the issues generally surround 
challenges to a particular use of a given sports facility such as claims 
involving zoning or nuisance issues.  The following cases illustrate these and 
other claims involving real property. 
Asphalt Specialists, Inc. v. Steven Anthony Dev. Co.146 
Asphalt Specialists, Inc. (ASI), Lakeview Contracting (Lakeview), and 
A&R Sealcoating, Inc. (A&R) entered into agreements to provide the service 
and materials for various improvements to a golf course.  Lakeview’s project 
included a number of infrastructure improvements, ASI’s project involved the 
construction and asphalt paving of golf cart paths, and A&R’s project involved 
asphalt paving, labor, and materials for the course.  These three parties were 
not fully compensated for their work, which resulted in claims of a lien on the 
golf course as well as actions for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and 
foreclosure on their liens.  Eventually, the circuit court entered judgments in 
favor of Lakeview, ASI, and A&R, concluding that they had liens on the golf 
course that had priority over all other claims regarding the golf course.  The 
circuit court ordered the foreclosure sale of the golf course in order to satisfy 
these three parties’ liens.   
On appeal, the central issue was whether the parties’ liens attached to the 
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entire golf course or merely the improvements—those ancillary portions of the 
golf course relating to the parties’ work.  Finding that Lakeview, ASI, and 
A&R were entitled to construction liens only on the improvements, this court 
determined that the circuit court erred in ordering foreclosure of the entire golf 
course to satisfy their liens.  As such, the Michigan Court of Appeals vacated 
the circuit court’s judgments regarding the liens, foreclosure, and attorney fees 
and remanded the case for further proceedings.   
 
Carb v. City of Pittsburgh147 
The defendant City of Pittsburgh (the City) filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  The plaintiff, Barry Carb (Carb), owned a piece of property 
adjacent to a City-owned baseball field.  The plaintiff owned the property 
since 1985 and was aware at the time he purchased the property that it was 
used for baseball, softball, and kickball.  During the plaintiff’s ownership, the 
defendant erected two fences along the property line that divided the field and 
the plaintiff’s property.  The field has no lighting and has a sound system that 
does not exceed a reasonable volume.  Plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging that 
the field constituted a nuisance.  The City moved for summary judgment, 
which was granted by the trial court.  The court found that summary judgment 
was improper as to the nuisance claim regarding the field’s use for little league 
baseball.  The plaintiff alleged that the crowds, traffic, and other incidental 
problems from the baseball games constituted a nuisance.  The court found 
there were genuine issues of material fact and reversed summary judgment as 
to the use of the field for little league baseball.  However, the court found that 
summary judgment was appropriate regarding plaintiff’s complaint that the 
use of the field violated the permits.  The court found that failure to enforce 
the permits could not constitute a nuisance.  Therefore, the court affirmed in 
part and reversed in part summary judgment in favor of the City. 
Town of Plattekill v. Ace Motocross, Inc.148 
Ace Motocross appealed a trial court order, which enjoined them from 
operating a commercial racetrack on their property.  Ace Motocross has 
operated a commercial motocross racetrack on their property in the Town of 
Plattekill (the Town) since 1987.  In 2005, the Town enacted a law that 
 
147. No. 2440 C.D. 2010, 2011 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 863 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 19, 
2011). 
148. 87 A.D.3d 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
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prohibits the commercial use of land for the operation of off-road motorized 
vehicles.  The law, however, included a “grandfather” provision, which 
allowed property owners who had a nonconforming preexisting business to 
apply to the Town’s Zoning Board to receive authorization to continue such 
operations for up to ten years.  In 2006, because Ace Motocross never applied 
to receive authorization, the Town began issuing citations for Ace Motocross’s 
violation of zoning laws.  When Ace Motocross did not cease their activity, 
the Town sought a permanent injunction prohibiting them from operating the 
racetrack.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town, 
permanently enjoining Ace Motocross from operating a commercial motocross 
track on their property.  Ace Motocross appealed.  The appellate court 
affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that “a municipality may enact a 
zoning law that eliminates prior nonconforming uses in a ‘reasonable 
fashion.’”149  Moreover, the law contained a provision under which Ace 
Motocross could have received authorization to continue its prior 
nonconforming use for up to ten years.  Because Ace Motocross did not avail 
themselves of this remedy, they were foreclosed from seeking such relief 
through the courts. 
TAX LAW 
Although tax law has a significant impact on the sports industry as a 
whole, particularly in the professional sports arena, this area of law rarely 
appears in the sports litigation context.  However, the following case 
represents an example of a tax issue surrounding the use of a recreational 
facility.   
The Chapel v. Testa150 
The plaintiff, a nonprofit corporation, built a church on a portion of its 
property and devoted the rest to recreational use by the public.  Most of those 
who used the recreational facilities were not members of the church 
community, but rather members of the community-at-large.  The plaintiff 
covered the cost of maintaining and developing the recreational portion of its 
property; it did not charge the public any fee to offset these costs.  In 2002, the 
plaintiff filed an application seeking tax exemptions for three portions of its 
land.  The tax commissioner granted the exemption as to the church as a house 
of public worship as well as a charitable-use exemption for a portion of the 
 
149. Id. at 789. 
150. 950 N.E.2d 142 (Ohio 2011). 
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remainder of the property.  However, holding that it did not qualify for the 
charitable-use exemption, the commissioner denied it as to the recreational 
portion of the property.  After a failed appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals, the 
plaintiff appealed to this court asserting that opening its recreational facilities 
to the public constitutes a charitable use to qualify it for the tax exemption.  
Among other minor issues, the court noted that opening the use of the 
recreational facilities to the public was in itself a charitable use and not merely 
an ancillary use to the charitable use of public worship.  As such, the court 
reversed and remanded the decision. 
TORT LAW 
Tort law represents the most-litigated aspect of sports law.  It governs the 
duty of care owed to coparticipants in athletic events, spectators, and those 
using sports facilities in general.  As a general matter, courts typically 
distinguish between those risks inherent in sports-related activities when 
determining whether to impose liability in a given situation.  The cases that 
follow represent tort issues involving coparticipants, coaches, athletes, and 
spectators.  In addition to the analyzing the various duties owed and possible 
breaches of those duties, some cases also illustrate the effect of contractual 
agreements purportedly waiving an injured party’s ability to successfully sue 
for tort liability.   
 A.K.W. v. Easton-Bell Sports, Inc.151 
The plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.  
The plaintiff, a minor and football player, was injured on a play during a team 
practice and was later diagnosed with a carotid artery tear.  He is now partially 
paralyzed.  His mother sued on his behalf, citing that the helmet the plaintiff 
was wearing during practice was defectively designed.  The defendant filed a 
motion for summary judgment in the district court, which was granted.  On 
appeal, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment, and remanded the 
case, stating that a product liability case in Mississippi has a three-element test 
that the plaintiff did not have the opportunity to prove.  The court then noted if 
the plaintiff cannot prove the three elements, summary judgment at a later time 
would be appropriate.   
 
151. 454 Fed. Appx. 244 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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Altman v. HO Sports Co.152 
The plaintiff Jeffrey Altman, an expert wakeboarder, filed this product 
liability suit against the defendant HO Sports Co. following an injury the 
plaintiff sustained while wearing wakeboarding boots manufactured by the 
defendant.  Although the boots in question contained warnings cautioning 
riders about the inherent risks of wakeboarding and the possibility that the 
attached boots may or may not release during a fall, the plaintiff did not read 
these warnings.  While wakeboarding and wearing the boots at issue, the 
plaintiff suffered severe injuries to his right ankle and subsequently filed suit 
against the defendant, alleging defective warning and defective design.   
The defendant moved for summary judgment.  Notwithstanding any 
defective warning, it was undisputed that the plaintiff did not read the 
warnings.  Noting this lack of causation relating to the plaintiff’s injury, the 
court granted summary judgment as to the warning defect cause of action.  As 
to the design defect cause of action, the court analyzed the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff and determined that the defendant’s boot 
design increased the risk of inherent injury and substantially contributed to the 
plaintiff’s injury.  Thus, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment as to the defective design claim. 
Ashburn v. Bowling Green State Univ.153 
Aaron Richardson died as a result of a full-blown sickle cell anemia 
episode that resulted in cardiac arrest following his participation in intense 
physical activity at his first football practice at Bowling Green State 
University (BGSU).  During the practice, Richardson complained of leg 
cramps that eventually progressed into full body cramps that eventually 
resulted in a 9-1-1 emergency call.  At some point, Richardson stopped 
breathing and eventually died.  Richardson’s estate sued BGSU arguing that 
the defendant had failed to respond appropriately to Richardson’s medical 
issues and that an appropriate response would have saved Richardson’s life; 
but the trial court entered a verdict in favor of the defendant BGSU.   
On appeal, the plaintiff raised several assignments of error.  The Ohio 
Court of Appeals determined that the central, possibly determinative, issue on 
appeal was whether Richardson would have survived had there been no delay 
in calling for emergency help.  Reviewing a doctor’s testimony a trial, the 
court found that it constituted credible evidence that Richardson would not 
 
152. 821 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
153. No. 10AP-716, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 1297 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2011). 
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have survived even without the delay.  As such, the defendant could not be 
held liable for his death, and the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. 
Baker v. B&K Promotions, Inc.154 
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.  The 
plaintiffs were spectators at a race at the Morgan County Speedway.  The 
plaintiffs entered the pit area, after first signing a release and waiver and 
paying an additional fee.  While at the race, a car crashed and went into the 
spectator area, injuring the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs sued the defendant, the 
promoter of the race, for their injuries, citing negligence.  The defendant 
contended that the release and waiver signed by the plaintiffs was a valid 
waiver of claims, and the defendant moved for summary judgment.  The trial 
court granted summary judgment.  On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that 
summary judgment was inappropriate because their injuries were not 
contemplated by the release and waiver, and additionally that the plaintiffs 
should be given more time to conduct discovery.  The court found that the 
plaintiffs’ injuries were almost indistinguishable from those contemplated by 
the release and wavier, and that they had ample time before the initial 
complaint in the trial court to conduct discovery.  Therefore, the court 
affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 
Beer v. La Crosse Cnty. Agric. Soc’y155 
The plaintiffs, Charles Beer and Darin Toot, suffered severe injuries at the 
La Crosse county Fairgrounds Speedway when they were struck by an out-of-
control racecar while standing in the restricted area in the infield of the track.  
As a result, the plaintiffs sued, seeking damages, but the circuit court granted 
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on a Speedway Release 
form signed by the plaintiffs releasing the defendants from any liability.  On 
appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the waivers they signed were void as against 
public policy.  Although acknowledging that exculpatory contracts are 
disfavored in Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted that it had 
previously held a nearly identical waiver not to be void as against public 
policy.  Bound by precedent, the court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 
 
154. No. 4-10-0955, 2011 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 262 (Ill. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2011). 
155. 797 N.W.2d 934 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011). 
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Begley v. Harkins156 
The defendant appealed an order of the district court granting partial 
summary judgment to the plaintiff in the plaintiff’s negligence action.  The 
plaintiff and the defendant were golfing when the defendant’s cart hit and 
injured the plaintiff.  The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the defendant 
was negligent.  The defendant filed a responsive pleading and raised the issue 
of contributory negligence because the plaintiff heard the defendant’s cart 
approaching, observed the defendant talking on his cell phone, and observed 
that the defendant attempted to push the break but pushed the accelerator 
instead.  The district court granted a motion for partial summary judgment on 
the issue of contributory negligence, finding that the plaintiff’s conduct was, 
as a matter of law, not something a jury could find constituted contributory 
negligence.  On appeal, the court held that the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence because the record 
contained sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could have 
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to protect himself from harm.  
Additionally, the court also vacated the district court’s ruling on the sanctions 
motion.  However, the court noted that its opinion should not be read as 
expressing the existence or nonexistence of grounds excusing the sanction.  
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded.  
Bowling v. Asylum Extreme, LLC157 
The plaintiff Bowling was a patron at the defendant Asylum Extreme’s 
paintball center, which she attended with her youth group.  Before the 
beginning of any paintball games, patrons were required to sign a waiver, 
which Bowling did.  During the games, Bowling’s protective mask slid down, 
and she was shot in the eye, causing permanent injury.  Bowling then sued 
Asylum Extreme, stating that they did not properly instruct her about how to 
adjust her mask, which caused her injury.  Asylum Extreme moved for 
summary judgment, on the basis that her claim was precluded by the signed 
waiver.  Bowling argued that the waiver was not sufficiently clear to cover her 
injury.  The trial court disagreed with Bowling, finding that the waiver was 
specific enough to cover her injury.  This court agreed, finding that the only 
claim Bowling would have is if the conduct was willful or wanton.  The court 
found that Asylum Extreme’s requirement that Bowling wear a protective 
 
156. No. A-11-204, 2011 Neb. App. LEXIS 193 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2011). 
157. No. 2010-CA-001687-MR, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 801 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 
2011). 
SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2012  10:31 AM 
786 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2 
 
mask and instruction that the mask not be removed was enough to prove that 
Asylum Extreme’s conduct was neither willful nor wanton.  The court 
affirmed summary judgment in favor of Asylum Extreme. 
Butts v. Whitton158 
The plaintiff, a minor, was injured during a snowboarding lesson taught by 
the defendant James Whitton.  During the snowboarding lesson, the defendant 
signaled to the plaintiff to cross a hill; while crossing the hill, the plaintiff was 
struck by a reckless skier, a collision that fractured his leg.  In the plaintiff’s 
negligence suit against the defendant instructor, the trial court granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the defendant did not 
have a duty to protect the plaintiff from the actions of the third-party skier, nor 
did the evidence support a finding of probable cause.  Noting that generally 
there is no duty to protect against actions of a third party, the Michigan Court 
of Appeals determined that no special relationship existed between the 
plaintiff and the defendant that would give rise to such a duty.  As such, the 
decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to the defendant was 
affirmed.   
Combs v. Georgetown Coll.159 
The plaintiff Combs appealed a trial court decision to grant the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment for a liability claim resulting from 
injuries the plaintiff sustained at the defendants’ summer basketball camp.  
Combs brought suit against the defendants as a result of injuries sustained 
when she tripped on a platform’s “lip” after watching her grandson participate 
at a basketball camp.  The sole issue decided on review was whether Combs 
was an invitee or a licensee.  If Combs was an invitee, the defendants owed 
her a duty of care to keep the gym in a reasonably safe condition and provide 
warnings of any obvious dangers.  However, if Combs was a licensee, the 
defendants owed her a duty to not willfully or wantonly injure her and to warn 
about known dangerous conditions.   
In affirming the trial court’s holding, the court of appeals held that Combs 
was a licensee because the defendants did not impliedly invite Combs to enter 
the gym.  Combs argued that she was given an implied invitation because one 
defendant admitted that spectators entered the gym during the camp, and 
 
158. No. 296574, 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 990 (Mich. Ct. App. May 26, 2011). 
159. No. 2010-CA-000846-MR, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 629 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 
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because the participants played organized basketball with unlocked doors, 
which together created an implied invitation.  However, because Combs 
watched from the gym’s second floor, which the defendants never used, they 
had no knowledge that the lip would be a danger to potential spectators.  The 
court affirmed because evidence showed that the gym’s bleachers were not 
open for spectators, no advertising for spectators occurred, and spectators did 
not have to pay an entrance fee.  Therefore, the appeals court affirmed the 
lower court’s holding that Combs was a licensee and the defendants only owed 
her a duty of warning her of dangers actually known to them. 
Davis v. Cumberland Cnty. Bd. of Educ.160 
The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment 
to the defendant.  While attending a high school football game, the plaintiff 
fell through the bleachers and was injured on the defendant’s premises.  The 
plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging that it breached its duty to ensure that the 
bleachers were reasonably safe and also breached its duty to warn of the risk 
and danger associated with the bleachers.  The defendant filed a motion for 
summary judgment and the trial court entered an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant.  On appeal, the court held that the trial 
court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant because the 
plaintiff presented evidence that its bleachers complied with the North 
Carolina Building Code, and that their athletic director was unaware of anyone 
having ever fallen through the bleachers or of any other problems with the 
bleachers.  Additionally, the court held that the plaintiff did not show that a 
reasonable defendant would have acted differently with respect to bleachers 
for a high school athletic field.  Therefore, the trial court’s judgment was 
affirmed.   
DiBartolomeo v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth.161 
The plaintiff, Thomas DiBartolomeo, suffered injuries from a fall he 
suffered as a result of an escalator malfunction when he and many other 
football fans exited Meadowlands Stadium.  A mechanic had previously 
examined the same escalator following a previous malfunction and had 
cautioned stadium officials about the dangers of overcrowding on escalators.  
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed suit against the stadium’s owner, N.J. Sports 
 
160. 720 S.E.2d 418 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
161. No. A-2716-09T2, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 345 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 16, 
2011). 
SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2012  10:31 AM 
788 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2 
 
& Exposition Authority, as well as the escalator maintenance company, 
alleging that both parties were negligent.  Following the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment to both of the defendants, the plaintiff appealed.   
Regarding the escalator mechanic, the plaintiff argued that res ipsa 
loquitor applied, providing an inference of the mechanic’s negligence.  As for 
the owner of the property, the plaintiff asserted on appeal that the mechanic’s 
warning regarding overcrowding on escalators placed the owner on notice of 
the potentially dangerous condition such that summary judgment should not 
have been allowed.  The court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the defendant escalator mechanic, but it reversed and remanded 
the trial court’s decision regarding the stadium’s owner.  
Ditta v. Nesaquake Middle School162 
The plaintiff was allegedly injured while performing a cheerleading 
maneuver at the defendant Nesaquake Middle School.  The plaintiff sued the 
school and the school district, citing negligence in facility to provide proper 
mats and recklessly supervising cheerleading practice.  The plaintiff alleged 
that the coach was improperly supervising because there was no spotter during 
the maneuver, and that only one mat was used, although regular practice called 
for two mats.  The plaintiff fell out of the move, and on to the gym floor, with 
no mat beneath her.  The defendants filed for summary judgment claiming that 
the plaintiff primarily assumed the risk of her injury.  The court, however, 
found that inefficient supervision and the lack of proper mats raised genuine 
issues of triable fact.  The court also found that the assumption of risk defense 
is improper if the defendants created an unassumed, concealed, or 
unreasonably increased risk, and therefore denied summary judgment in favor 
of the defendants. 
Estate of Newton v. Grandstaff163 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s wrongful death 
action.  DeShawn Newton (Newton) died after he went into cardiac arrest 
while participating in an organized basketball tournament.  Emergency 
medical personnel were unable help Newton until almost thirty minutes after 
he went into cardiac arrest.  The representatives of Newton’s estate brought 
claims for negligence and wrongful death.  The defendants moved to dismiss 
for failure to provide sufficient facts from which the court could infer the 
 
162. No. 10-10230, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5090 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 20, 2011). 
163. No. 3:10-CV-0809-L, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73897 (N.D. Tex. July 8, 2011). 
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defendants owed a legal duty to Newton.  
With respect to the negligence claim, Texas has used three different 
standards relating to sports-related injury cases: (1) reckless or intentional, (2) 
traditional negligence, and (3) inherent risk.  The court found that the 
plaintiff’s complaint asserted enough facts that support a plausible claim of 
relief under all three standards.  First, under the reckless or intentional 
standard, the court found that the defendants’ failure to take reasonable 
safeguards for a reasonably foreseeable injury was in reckless disregard for the 
safety of the participants’ lives.  Additionally, the court found that it is 
reasonable to have emergency medical personnel on site when running 
organized basketball tournaments similar to the defendants’, and the 
defendants did not.  Second, the court held that the traditional negligence 
standard was also met, for the same reasons under the reckless or intentional 
standard.  Finally, under the inherent risk standard, the court held that 
Newton’s injury was not one that is inherent to the sport of basketball.  
Therefore, the court found that the defendants would owe Newton an ordinary 
negligence duty.  In conclusion, because the plaintiffs alleged plausible facts 
that could permit a trier of fact to reasonably infer that a legal duty was owed 
to Newton, and later breached, the court denied the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.   
Faulkner v. Greenwald164 
The defendant, as athletic director at Seneca High School in Louisville, 
Kentucky, was responsible for the safety and maintenance of the various 
athletic facilities at the high school.  The plaintiff, a parent of a Seneca High 
School student-athlete, was injured when a concession stand door dislodged 
and hit her.  Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging the 
defendant was negligent as to the maintenance of the concession stand door.  
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant based on 
qualified immunity, holding that the maintenance of the concession stand is a 
discretionary act.  However, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed and 
remanded the proceeding, concluding that maintenance of the concession 
stand is a ministerial act; thus, qualified immunity does not apply. 
Fontaine v. Boyd165 
Following a skiing collision between the parties, the plaintiff filed suit, 
 
164. 358 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011). 
165. No. WC-200-0794, 2011 R.I. Super. LEXIS 27 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2011). 
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alleging that the defendant acted negligently while skiing, causing the collision 
and the plaintiff’s resulting injuries.  The defendant responded, arguing that 
the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk applied and she owed no duty to 
protect the plaintiff from the inherent risks of skiing.  The plaintiff urged that 
skiers owe other skiers the duty to act with reasonable care.  The court noted 
that this question was a novel one for New Hampshire, but athletes in other 
sports do not have a duty to protect others from inherent risks of those sports.  
Recognizing that fact and other factors, the court concluded that the defendant 
had no duty to protect the plaintiff from the inherent dangers of skiing.  
Rather, the duty owed was to simply not act in such a way so as to 
unreasonably increase those inherent risks.  As the defendant did not breach 
that duty, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.   
French v. MacArthur166 
While assisting in a youth-league softball practice, a parent hit a line-drive 
that struck the plaintiff’s face.  The parent was held to be a coparticipant, and 
thus subject to the recreational activities doctrine.  Michigan uses a reckless 
misconduct standard for a coparticipant to be found liable for injuring another 
coparticipant during a recreational activity.  The goal for such a standard is to 
encourage spirited participation in such activities while continuing to provide 
protection from egregious conduct.  The trial court held a defendant coach can 
still be considered to be a coparticipant.  As a result, the court denied the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  On appeal, the court determined 
that the only question at issue was whether the defendant informed the players 
as to where he was intending to hit the ball on the field, as there was testimony 
that he intended to hit the ball to centerfield.  However, even if the defendant 
had called out where he was intending to hit the ball, the court rejected the 
claim that a reasonable juror could find such a mistake as reckless misconduct. 
Geeslin v. Bryant167 
The plaintiff was a spectator at a professional basketball game between the 
Memphis Grizzlies and the Los Angeles Lakers.  During the course of the 
game, the defendant Kobe Bryant (Bryant) fell into the stands while 
attempting a play, and landed on the plaintiff.  The plaintiff alleged that as 
Bryant got up, he pushed his elbow into the plaintiff’s chest and caused 
damage.  A few days after the alleged incident, the plaintiff received medical 
 
166. No. 296526, 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 1330 (Mich. Ct. App. July 19, 2011). 
167. 453 Fed. Appx. 637 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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treatment for a bruised lung cavity.  The plaintiff then sued Bryant for assault, 
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was cited as a 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s death.  The district court granted summary 
judgment to Bryant on all counts.  On appeal, the court found that the 
assumption of risk defense was improper for the intentional torts of assault and 
battery.  Therefore, the court reversed summary judgment and remanded for 
further findings.  However, the court found that Bryant’s alleged behavior did 
not rise to the level necessary for a finding of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
on that count. 
Griffin v. Simpson,168 
On behalf of their daughter, a minor, the plaintiffs filed a personal injury 
action against a number of parties following an incident in which their 
daughter was injured falling from a golf-cart at a teammate’s grandparent’s 
home during a break from volleyball tournament games.  At issue on appeal 
was the plaintiffs’ contentions that the trial court erred in granting the 
defendant volleyball coach and the defendant Team Indiana Volleyball, Inc. 
(TIV)’s motions for summary judgment.  Noting a number of circumstances, 
such as the fact that the informal gathering was not a team event, the court 
held that the defendant volleyball coach had no duty to supervise the injured 
player’s golf cart activity, so she was not negligent.  As such, TIV was also 
not liable under a respondeat superior theory.  Thus, the court affirmed the 
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of both the defendant TIV 
and the defendant volleyball coach.   
Guerra v. Howard Beach Fitness Ctr., Inc.169 
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.  Geraldine Guerra 
(Guerra) was on a treadmill at the defendant’s gym when the tread came loose, 
causing plaintiff to fall off of the treadmill and sustain an injury.  The plaintiff 
sued the defendant for failing to keep its equipment in proper working order.  
The defendant moved for summary judgment, citing that it had no knowledge 
or reason to know that the treadmill was not working properly, and that the 
plaintiff assumed the risk of using the treadmill.  The court found that the 
defendant provided no evidence that the treadmill was inspected to determine 
that it was in working order; therefore, the defendant did not prove it was 
 
168. 948 N.E.2d 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 
169. 934 N.Y.S.2d 34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011). 
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entitled to summary judgment.  Further, the court found that a malfunctioning 
treadmill was not an appreciated or foreseeable risk; therefore, the plaintiff 
could not have knowingly assumed the risk.  As such, the court also denied the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the assumption of risk 
defense. 
Gvillo v. DeCamp Junction, Inc.170 
The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s decision to grant summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants in the plaintiff’s negligence action.  The 
plaintiff, a softball player, suffered fracture and nerve damage after he collided 
with one of the defendants during a softball game.  The plaintiff alleged that 
the organizational defendants set up the softball field in an unreasonably 
dangerous manner, thereby causing the collision.  The defendants filed 
motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.  The plaintiff 
appealed, arguing that the contact sports exception to ordinary negligence as a 
basis for liability did not apply under the facts and circumstances of the case.  
On appeal, the court analyzed whether the contact exception applied to the 
organizational defendants.  Under the contact exception, a participant in a 
contact sport is only liable for injuries caused to another participant if the 
injuries are caused by intentional or willful and wanton misconduct.  The court 
held that there was a genuine question remaining as to whether the other 
player intentionally caused the collision, and thus summary judgment was 
precluded.  Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.   
Horan v. Reebok Int’l Ltd.171 
The defendant filed a motion in limine to include a special jury instruction 
in the plaintiff’s products liability action.  The plaintiff, a college hockey 
player, wore a facemask manufactured by the defendant, Reebok International 
Ltd.  During a game where the plaintiff was wearing defendant’s mask, the 
butt of a hockey stick passed through a gap in the mask and hit his eye, 
permanently blinding him in that eye.  The plaintiff sued the defendant, 
alleging design defect, inadequate warning, and a claim for punitive damages.  
The defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied.  
Both parties subsequently filed motions in limine; however, the court only 
addressed the defendant’s motion.  The defendant sought to include a jury 
 
170. 959 N.E.2d 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
171. No. 3:08cv663, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111220 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2011). 
SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2012  10:31 AM 
2012] 2011 SURVEY  793 
 
instruction on the modified consumer expectation text in the pre-charge, rather 
than the ordinary consumer expectation test.  The court held that the ordinary 
consumer expectation test was appropriate, and therefore, denied the 
defendant’s motion. 
Hyde v. N. Collins Cent. Sch. Dist.172 
The plaintiff filed suit following an injury sustained by her daughter when 
she slid into second base during a junior-varsity softball game.  Although her 
daughter was aware that sliding was part of the game and had some experience 
playing softball, she claimed that she was not taught how to slide in practice.  
After an order denying the defendant’s summary judgment motion based on 
the plaintiff’s daughter’s assumption of risk, the defendant appealed.  This 
court affirmed, holding that “there is a question of fact whether, based on her 
experience, plaintiff’s daughter was aware of and appreciated the risks of 
sliding.”173  
Johnson v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD.174 
The plaintiff was a passenger on one of the defendant cruise line’s ships.  
While aboard the ship, the plaintiff participated on a simulated surfing and 
body boarding activity.  The plaintiff signed a waiver; however, the instructor 
of the activity instructed the plaintiff to stand on a body board that was not 
approved for standing activities.  The plaintiff suffered a fractured ankle and 
sued the cruise line.  The district court granted summary judgment, finding 
that the waiver signed by the plaintiff immunized the defendant from liability.  
On appeal the court found that the instructor was negligent in instructing the 
plaintiff to stand on the board.  The court further found that the defendant was 
unable to force the plaintiff to waive liability for personal injury caused by the 
negligence of one of the defendant’s employees.  Therefore, the court found 
that summary judgment was inappropriate, and remanded the case back to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
Kim v. L.A. Fitness Int’l, LLC175 
Kim appealed a trial court decision to grant L.A. Fitness’ motion for 
 
172. 83 A.D.3d 1557 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
173. Id. at 1558. 
174. 449 Fed. Appx. 846 (11th Cir. 2011). 
175. No. G044099, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5497 (Cal. Ct. App. July 25, 2011). 
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summary judgment stemming from Kim’s lawsuit claiming L.A. Fitness was 
responsible for injuries suffered as a result of a weightlifting machine breaking 
and striking him in the head.  Every new member at L.A. Fitness, including 
Kim, must sign a waiver that releases L.A. Fitness from liability for, among 
other things, a member’s injury caused by active or passive negligence of L.A. 
Fitness and its agents.  The waiver also addresses that the member assumes 
full responsibility of risk of injury involved in using the gym’s facilities and 
equipment.  Kim used the pulley machine at issue four-to-five times a week.  
During one of his workouts, a pulley detached from the machine and hit Kim 
in the forehead, which caused him to fall backwards onto the floor.  As a 
result, Kim injured his head, neck, shoulder, and lower back.   
Kim offered numerous arguments to prove L.A. Fitness’ waiver was not 
valid, all of which were unpersuasive to the court.  First, Kim argued that the 
waiver’s language was ambiguous as to injury-producing accidents.  However, 
the court held that the waiver was not ambiguous because the language 
specifically stated release of liability resulting from any injury resulting from 
use of L.A. Fitness’ equipment.  Furthermore, Kim offered no evidence 
showing an alternative interpretation of the release.  Second, Kim argued that 
his injuries were caused specifically by L.A. Fitness’ negligence in repairing 
and maintaining the machine, which was not a risk he assumed when signing 
the release.  Again, the court was not persuaded by Kim’s argument because a 
weightlifting machine breaking is an inherent risk of using the machine.  The 
court’s decision to grant summary judgment again relied on whether the 
release’s language applied to Kim’s claims, which it did.  The court referenced 
prior case law that suggested that by signing a gym’s waiver, the person could 
be found to have waived any liability resulting out of injuries suffered by 
malfunctioning exercise equipment.  Therefore, because Kim failed to offer 
any evidence of more than negligent conduct by L.A. Fitness, the court 
granted L.A. Fitness’ motion for summary judgment.  
Marshall v. Booster Club of Smithtown, Inc.176 
The plaintiff, Michelle Marshall, brought this negligence suit on behalf of 
herself and her minor son, Jeffery, against the defendants as a result of injuries 
Jeffery sustained while participating in a football camp operated by the 
defendants.  Jeffery was allegedly injured when, during a practice drill, 
another participant disregarded the supervisor’s instructions and hit Jeffery in 
the knee with his shoulder pad, lifting Jeffery up and throwing him to the 
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ground.  The other participant was supposed to touch only Jeffery’s shoulder 
pads.  The other participant was also older, heavier, and more experienced.  
Jeffery testified that neither he nor his parents made a complaint during the 
first three days of the camp, and that he returned the fourth day even though he 
was uncomfortable about how the coaches paired up different-sized players in 
the drills.  After Jeffery was hit, two coaches helped him get to an ambulance.   
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent because: (1) they 
allowed Jeffery to participate in an excessively dangerous activity, (2) they 
failed to provide Jeffery with adequate supervision by putting him against 
older, heavier, and more experienced players; and (3) they failed to warn 
Jeffery or failed to prevent the foreseeable danger of participating in the 
practice drill.   
The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the case on the 
grounds that Jeffery assumed the risk of injury when he chose to participate in 
the camp.  They also argued that the alleged lack of adequate supervision was 
not the proximate cause of Jeffery’s injuries.  One coach testified that the drill 
in which Jeffery was injured did not require players to tackle each other.  
This court applied the reckless standard for nonparticipant liability.  The 
court stated that the camps are not required to continuously supervise and 
control the participants and that they cannot be held liable for every careless 
act by one participant against another.  Furthermore, the court found that when 
an incident, such as this one, occurs in such a short period of time without 
notice, and thus, preventing a coach from having a reasonable amount of time 
to prevent it, the defendants’ alleged lack of supervision cannot be the 
proximate cause of Jeffery’s injuries.  Therefore, the court granted the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.   
McCarthy v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist.177 
The plaintiff, a high-school student, was injured while participating as a 
member of the cheerleading team at her school.  The plaintiff fractured her left 
leg while performing a stunt, and her father sued the school on her behalf, 
claiming she was negligently supervised while performing the stunt.  The 
defendant moved for summary judgment, on the basis that the plaintiff was 
aware of and assumed the risks involved with cheerleading.  The court found 
that the plaintiff was an experienced cheerleader, and the school could only be 
liable if the school or the coach created a situation that was above the usual 
dangers involved with cheerleading.  The court found that the conditions 
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present at practice contained only the risks generally associated with 
cheerleading, and therefore, granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant. 
Montgomery v. Ohio State Univ.178 
The plaintiff, a former football player for defendant Ohio State University, 
sued the defendant for negligent misrepresentation, medical malpractice, and 
defamation.  While still a student, the plaintiff was under consideration for 
employment by the National Football League (NFL).  A team physician 
employed by the defendant filled out a form for NFL employment stating that 
the plaintiff had high blood pressure and hay fever, even though the plaintiff 
contended he did not have either condition.  When the plaintiff was employed 
by the NFL, his benefits were reduced for another medical condition because 
part of his condition was attributed to high blood pressure.  The plaintiff also 
contacted the current team physician for an explanation of the form.  The 
physician sent the plaintiff a letter explaining the initial form.  The plaintiff 
then brought an action against the defendant seeking to recover the reduced 
benefits for the improperly filled form and for defamation for the contents of 
the explanatory letter.  The plaintiff alleges he never authorized the defendant 
to release the letter, but that the defendant sent the letter to several of the 
plaintiff’s employees, in violation of the plaintiff’s rights.  However, the court 
found that for a defamation suit to continue, the statements made in the 
explanatory letter had to be actionable.  The court found that the contents of 
the letter were not capable of defaming the plaintiff; therefore, the court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 
Ormiston v. Cal. Youth Soccer Ass’n179 
Ormiston and her parents sued the Davis Youth Soccer League (DYSL), 
the California Youth Soccer Association (CYSA), and the City of Davis for 
negligence and premises liability after she injured her knee at a soccer 
tournament.  The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants 
based on a release of liability signed by the girl’s mother.  Sixteen-year-old 
Ormiston was playing in a soccer tournament organized by the defendants 
when she fell and landed on a plastic sprinkler head embedded in the grass at 
ground level.  To participate in the tournament, Ormiston’s mother had signed 
a CYSA membership form that contained a release of liability.  The plaintiffs 
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raised two issues on appeal: (1) the scope of the release and (2) the readability 
of the release.  The court explained that a plaintiff’s injuries are within the 
scope of the release if the injuries are reasonably related to the purpose for 
which the release was signed.  Ormiston was playing soccer when she was 
injured; the release was principally directed at playing soccer.  She just so 
happened to land on a plastic sprinkler head, but this is not outside the realm 
of ordinary negligence.  The injury was so reasonably related to the release 
that there is no room for an alternative, semantically reasonable meaning of 
the release.  Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.   
Pacquiao v. Mayweather180 
Emmanuel Pacquiao, a premier professional boxer, filed a complaint in 
federal court for defamation per se against the defendants Floyd Mayweather, 
Jr.; Oscar de la Hoya; de la Hoya’s manager, Richard Schaefer; Roger 
Mayweather; Floyd Mayweather, Sr.; and Mayweather Promotions, LLC.  
Pacquiao alleges that the defendants stated publicly that he has used, and is 
using, performance-enhancing drugs, including steroids and human growth 
hormone.  The defendants sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  The court found that the 
defendants’ alleged statements were actionable defamatory statements because 
they falsely asserted an objective fact; that Pacquiao had sufficiently pled 
malice in the amended complaint; and that Pacquiao’s conspiracy allegations 
were sufficiently within the context of the defamation per se claim.  
Accordingly, the court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss.  
Patch v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co.181 
Hillerich & Bradsby (H&B) appealed the trial court’s decision denying its 
motion for summary judgment in a products liability action.  An eighteen-
year-old pitcher was struck in the head by a ball hit with an aluminum bat, and 
he subsequently died from his injuries.  The parents of the estate sued H&B 
under strict products liability for survivorship and wrongful death damages, 
asserting manufacturing and design defect and failure to warn claims.  The 
district court granted H&B’s motion for summary judgment on the parents’ 
manufacturing defect claim, but denied summary judgment on the design 
defect and failure to warn claims.  The district court granted the parents’ 
motion in limine, excluding H&B’s assumption of the risk defense.  A jury 
 
180. 803 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D. Nev. 2011). 
181. 257 P.3d 383 (Mont. 2011). 
SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2012  10:31 AM 
798 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2 
 
found H&B liable in strict products liability for failing to warn the pitcher and 
his parents of the risks associated with the aluminum baseball bat.  H&B 
appealed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the failure to 
warn claim and on its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law.  On 
appeal, the court denied both motions.  First, the court held that the district 
court properly denied the motion because H&B was subject to liability to all 
players for the physical harm caused by its bat’s increased exit speed.  Second, 
the court held that the district court properly denied the H&B motion for 
judgment as a matter of law because there was sufficient evidence to submit 
the failure to warn claim to the jury.  The jury was permitted to infer that the 
player would have heeded the warning had one been given. 
Perez v. Nassour182 
The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs’ 
action to recover damages for personal injuries the plaintiff sustained during a 
little league baseball practice.  On the date in question, the plaintiffs’ ten-year-
old son was practicing with his little league baseball team on a rainy day at his 
coach’s house when his teammate threw a ball that hit him in the head.  As a 
result, the plaintiffs’ son suffered several serious injuries.  To recover damages 
for their son’s personal injuries, the plaintiffs filed this action against the 
coach, the player who threw the ball, and the league.  The defendants then 
moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing that the plaintiffs’ 
son had assumed the risk of injury.  However, the court determined that the 
son could not have assumed the risk of injury because he was only ten years 
old at the time and participating in organized sports for the first time.  
Moreover, the plaintiffs established a material issue of fact as to whether the 
defendants’ conduct created an unreasonable risk of injury to the plaintiffs’ 
son.  For these reasons, the court denied the defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action. 
Pfenning v. Lineman183 
The plaintiff, a minor girl struck by a golf ball at a golf outing, filed an 
action for damages against the estate of her grandfather, who brought her to 
the event; the golfer that hit the ball that struck her; the tavern that promoted 
the event; and the operator of the golf course.  The trial court granted summary 
judgment for all four of the defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed.  The 
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plaintiff appealed.  The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed summary 
judgment for the golfer and the operator of the golf course, but reversed 
summary judgment as to the tavern and the grandfather.  The court rejected the 
concept that a participant in a sporting event owes no duty of care to protect 
others from inherent risks of the sport, and instead adopted the view that 
summary judgment is proper due to the absence of breach of duty when the 
conduct of a sports participant is within the range of ordinary behavior of 
participants in the sport and therefore reasonable as a matter of law.  
Pugliese v. Grande184 
The plaintiff Pugliese, a gym teacher, filed a six-count defamation claim 
against the defendants Grande and Maulucci in relation to four alleged 
instances where defamatory statements were made by the defendants.  
Pugliese was attending his son’s baseball practice where he allegedly had a 
conversation with another player from his son’s team, Maulucci’s son, after 
the practice, which left Maulucci’s son feeling frightened and threatened by 
Pugliese.  Maulucci reported the incident to Grande, the assistant principal of 
the school and discussed the matter through email, letter, and phone 
conversations; these communications were the basis of Pugliese’s claims.  The 
defendants moved for summary judgment, stating that a federal rule prohibits 
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating 
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 
actual malice.  The court found that Pugliese, as a public school teacher, was a 
public official and that the conduct in question was sufficiently related to his 
role as a public official.  The court also found that Pugliese did not put forth 
clear and convincing evidence that the defendants’ statements were made with 
actual malice.  The court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion.  
Ramsey v. Gamber185 
The plaintiff Austin Chaz Ramsey (Ramsey), a former football player at 
Auburn University, suffered a back injury while lifting weights. Dr. Goodlett 
was the primary coordinator for Ramsey’s rehabilitation.  The defendant 
Arnold Gamber (Gamber) was the head athletic trainer for Auburn’s football 
team and was required to follow Goodlett’s medical instructions regarding 
athlete patients.  Ramsey charged that Gamber failed to supervise his 
rehabilitation properly, in violation of state law, and that failure caused a 
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second corrective surgery, disqualification of his athletic scholarship, and 
deprivation of a career as a professional football player.  Ramsey asserted 
three claims under Alabama law: negligence, wantonness, and interference 
with the physician-patient relationship.  Gamber moved for summary 
judgment, and the court granted the motion.  The court explained that 
Ramsey’s negligence and wantonness claims failed because Gamber was not 
liable for the actions of the weight-room staff that supervised Ramsey.  The 
court also explained that neither Alabama law nor the Restatement of Torts 
recognizes a claim for interference with a physician-patient relationship. 
Reilly v. Leasure186 
The plaintiff claimed she was severely injured when the defendant 
Leasure’s horse kicked her.  At that time, the defendant and her horse were 
participating in the Wilton Pony Club Horse Trials, an event sponsored by the 
defendants, The Wilton Pony Club and The United States Pony Club (USPC).  
The event was held on Millstone Farm in Wilton, a property owned by the 
defendant Millstone Properties, LLC.  The plaintiff filed a four-count 
complaint alleging that defendants Wilton Pony Club, USPC, and Millstone 
Properties were negligent.  The defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment, claiming that the recreational equestrian activity assumption of risk 
statute barred the plaintiff’s action.  The court held that the defendants 
established that no issue of material fact existed with respect to some of the 
allegations of negligence, but failed to address the remainder of the 
allegations.  Therefore, with regard to the claims that the defendants asserted, 
the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.   
The defendant Millstone Properties claimed that the recreational use 
immunity statute protects it because it opened its property to the public 
without charge for the purpose of attending, participating in, and assisting at 
the Horse Trials.  The court held that evidence established that the plaintiff 
entered defendant Millstone Properties’ land to partake in recreational 
activities, namely watching an equestrian event and grooming.  Furthermore, it 
is undisputed that Millstone Properties offered the land to the public free of 
charge.  Thus, the court found that Millstone Properties has no liability to the 
plaintiff.  Therefore, the court granted the defendant Millstone Properties’ 
motion for summary judgment on this issue.  
Finally, the defendant USPC claimed that it had no meaningful 
relationship to the Horse Trials that the plaintiff attended on the day of her 
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injuries.  The court held that no genuine issue of fact existed as to the lack of 
connection between the USPC and the Horse Trials because the defendants 
offered sufficient proof indicating such absence.  Because the court found no 
connection, the court held that no duty could exist.  Therefore, the court 
granted USPC’s motion for summary judgment on this issue.  
Rochford v. Woodloch Pines, Inc.187 
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in the plaintiff’s 
negligence action.  The plaintiff, a patron at the defendant’s golf course, was 
injured after he slipped and fell on stairs while playing golf during a rainstorm.  
The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging that the defendant negligently 
maintained the stairs and failed to properly train and supervise its staff in 
proper maintenance of the grounds.  The defendant subsequently filed a 
motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s alleged assumption of 
an open, obvious, and avoidable risk.  In analyzing this motion, the court first 
found that both New York and Pennsylvania recognized the primary 
assumption of risk doctrine.  Second, the court found that the plaintiff, as an 
experienced golfer, assumed the risks inherent in the game of golf.  As a 
result, the court held that the plaintiff knew it was raining and that the steps 
appeared to be wet; thus, the plaintiff was, or should have been, aware of the 
risk of slipping.  Furthermore, the court noted the fact that the stairs did not 
have a handrail was an open and obvious condition.  For these reasons, the 
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.   
Rodriguez v. L.A. Fitness Int’l, LLC188 
The plaintiff was playing basketball at the health club when he slipped and 
fell in a puddle of water that had leaked onto the gymnasium floor.  The 
plaintiff sustained severe fractures to his right leg, which required surgery.  
Consequently, he filed this action against the health club, alleging that the 
health club’s negligence caused his injuries because the health club did not 
warn him of the dangerous condition, it did not remedy the dangerous 
condition, and it failed to make reasonable inspections to discover the 
dangerous condition.  Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the plaintiff and awarded him both economic and noneconomic damages.  
Subsequently, the health club filed motions to set aside the verdict, order 
remittitur, and enter judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict.  The 
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court, however, found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 
conclude that the health club had constructive notice of the accumulated water, 
which caused the plaintiff’s fall and injury.  Moreover, the evidence supported 
the jury’s finding that the health club failed to inspect the court within a 
reasonable amount of time to discover and remedy this dangerous condition.  
As such, the court denied the health club’s motions to set aside the verdict and 
order judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  Finally, the court concluded that 
while the jury’s award of damages was generous, it was within the range of 
just compensation.  Therefore, the court also denied the health club’s motion 
to order remittitur. 
Rosado v. Doe189 
The defendants, baseball player and baseball league, filed motions to 
dismiss the plaintiff spectator’s action for negligence, which the plaintiff filed 
after being injured while attending a middle-school baseball game.  During the 
game, the player was taking practice swings with a weighted bat when the bat 
flew out of his hands and into the seating area where it hit the spectator in the 
face.  Subsequently, the spectator filed this action against the player and the 
baseball league to recover damages for his personal injuries.  Both the player 
and the baseball league moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action.  
The court found that a reasonable fact-finder could find that the player had 
been negligent.  For example, the location where he chose to take his warm-up 
swings may be unreasonable and negligent.  As such, he was not entitled to 
summary judgment.  As for the baseball league, because the league was a 
voluntary unincorporated association, a fact-finder cannot consider it a 
separate legal entity that the plaintiff could sue.  Therefore, the league was 
entitled to summary judgment dismissing the action against it. 
Rubbo v. Guilford Bd. of Educ.190 
The defendants filed a motion to strike three counts from the plaintiff’s 
negligence action, which was filed after the plaintiff’s daughter was injured 
during gym class.  On the date in question, the daughter was participating in 
an indoor hockey game when the defendants’ son struck her in the face with a 
hockey stick, which resulted in serious injuries.  The plaintiff brought suit, 
alleging that the defendants’ son was negligent when he forcibly swung the 
hockey stick in the plaintiff’s daughter’s immediate vicinity.  The defendants 
 
189. No. WOCV2010-01056, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 175 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2011).  
190. No. CV116017699S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1811 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 20, 2011). 
SURVEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2012  10:31 AM 
2012] 2011 SURVEY  803 
 
filed a motion to strike the negligence counts against them, arguing that 
Connecticut law does not recognize negligence as a cause of action for injuries 
sustained while participating in a contact sport.  After examining prior case 
law, the court determined that participants in contact sports have a legal duty 
to refrain from reckless or intentional conduct, but that mere negligence is 
insufficient to create liability.  As such, the court granted the defendants’ 
motion to strike the negligence counts against the defendants’ son. 
Sherry v. E. Suburban Football League191 
Renee Sherry, mother of cheerleader Jessica Sherry, appeals from an order 
granting summary disposition in favor of the defendants.  Jessica was injured 
while performing a stunt at a camp for cheerleaders of the East Suburban 
Football League.  Jessica claimed her injuries occurred as a result of the 
defendants’ negligence and gross negligence in failing to properly train and 
supervise the cheerleaders.  The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded, stating that the ordinary negligence principles apply, rather than the 
reckless misconduct standard of care that the trial court applied, and genuine 
issues of material fact remain regarding whether defendants acted negligently 
in the supervision of Jessica.  Reasonable minds could differ regarding 
whether an individual exercising ordinary care would foresee that a young girl 
without proper supervision or training would become injured in an attempt to 
execute an advanced cheerleading stunt with a group of high school girls on a 
grass football field and whether it is foreseeable that unsupervised, high school 
girls assisting in the execution of difficult cheerleading stunts will become 
inattentive to the point of creating a risk of harm.  
Stirgus v. St. John the Baptist Parish Sch. Bd.192 
The plaintiffs sued the defendants following injuries the plaintiff Armand 
Stirgus suffered when he fell during a portion of a football practice that had 
been moved indoors following an outdoor portion in the rain.  The trial court 
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that 
holding an indoor football practice while some players were still wearing wet 
clothing following an outdoor portion in the rain did not create an 
unreasonable risk of harm and the plaintiffs failed to show the existence of a 
significant amount of water on the floor that would have created an 
unreasonably dangerous situation.  Before this court was the plaintiffs’ appeal 
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regarding the trial court’s conclusions and grant of summary judgment.  
Finding that reasonable minds could differ as to the reasonableness of the 
coaches’ actions, the court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary 
judgment. 
Strauss v. Plainedge High Sch.193 
Strauss commenced this action against Plainedge High School and Valley 
Stream North High School after slipping on water and falling while officiating 
a basketball game between the two schools.  Strauss alleged that the schools 
were negligent in the ownership, operation, management, supervision, use, and 
control of the premises.  The defendants moved for summary judgment on the 
ground that they did not create the alleged condition, nor did they have actual 
or constructive notice of the alleged condition.  They also asserted that the 
plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk associated with officiating.  Strauss and 
another official had inspected the basketball court prior to the game and had 
deemed the court safe to play.  Strauss fell within the first couple of minutes of 
the game; he was backpedaling after a sudden change of possession and fell 
while turning to run forward.  Each coach stated that neither of them had 
observed any water or liquid at or about the location of the accident and had 
not seen anyone mop up at or around the location where Strauss fell.  Finding 
insufficient evidence that a dangerous or defective condition existed or that the 
defendants either created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of 
it, the court granted the defendants’ motion.   
Stoughtenger v. Hannibal Cent. School Dist.194 
The plaintiff student and the defendant school district both appealed a trial 
court decision denying the parties’ respective motions for summary judgment 
in the plaintiffs’ suit for damages for injuries he sustained while participating 
in a wrestling unit in gym class.  The plaintiff, who weighed approximately 
125 pounds at the time of this incident, was wrestling with another student 
who weighed approximately 220 pounds.  The defendants moved for summary 
judgment based on the affirmative defense of primary assumption of risk.  The 
plaintiff also filed for summary judgment and filed to strike the defendant’s 
affirmative defense.  The trial court denied each of the motions in their 
entirety.  On appeal, however, the court determined that the trial court erred in 
denying the plaintiff’s motion to strike the affirmative defense of primary 
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assumption of risk, because this complete bar to liability applies only to 
voluntary participation in sporting activities.  In this case, the plaintiff was 
injured while participating in a compulsory physical education class, and his 
participation in the wrestling unit was mandatory.  As such, it was proper for 
the trial court do deny the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on 
that affirmative defense.  Finally, the trial court did not err in denying the 
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on liability because there were 
triable issues of fact with respect to the plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim. 
Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Garcia195 
University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston (UT Health) filed 
this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order denying sovereign 
immunity to UT Health after Ricardo Garcia (Garcia) sued the center for 
injuries he sustained while playing on UT Health’s outdoor sand volleyball 
court.  In April 2008, Garcia was playing in an informal volleyball tournament 
at UT Health’s Recreation Center when his big toe allegedly got caught on a 
piece of tarp that became exposed from beneath the sand on the court, causing 
him to trip and severely injure his toe.  Garcia sued UT Health to recover 
damages for his injuries, alleging that UT Health knew or should have known 
of the unreasonable risk of injury.  UT Health filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that UT Health was immune from liability based on the Texas 
Recreational Use Statute.  The trial court denied UT Health’s motion, and UT 
Health filed for an interlocutory appeal.  On appeal, the Appellate Court 
reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that the Recreational Use Statute did 
apply and that Garcia’s pleadings were not sufficient to establish that UT 
Health’s actions were so grossly negligent as to create liability under the 
statute.  However, because Garcia’s pleadings did not affirmatively negate the 
possibility that UT Health’s actions constituted gross negligence, the court 
remanded the case to give Garcia an opportunity to amend his pleadings. 
Walker v. Iverson196 
The defendant National Basketball Association (NBA) player, Allen 
Iverson (Iverson), moved for summary judgment in the plaintiff’s action to 
recover damages for physical and emotional injuries following an altercation 
at a Detroit nightclub.  On the night in question, the plaintiff and his friends 
were trying to take pictures of Iverson at the nightclub.  One of Iverson’s 
 
195. 346 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. App. 2011). 
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bodyguards told them to stop trying to photograph Iverson.  Following an 
exchange of unpleasant comments between the plaintiff and the bodyguard, 
the bodyguard punched the plaintiff in the face, causing severe injuries.  
Subsequently, the plaintiff brought this action against Iverson, alleging that 
Iverson was directly liable for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress because the bodyguard was acting as Iverson’s agent at the 
time.  Iverson moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was not 
vicariously liable for the intentional torts of his bodyguard.  The court agreed 
with Iverson, noting that in this case there was no evidence that Iverson had 
directed his bodyguard to commit the assault; therefore, the court found that 
Iverson was not liable for his agent’s intentional torts and dismissed the claims 
against Iverson. 
Williams v. Richland Sch. Dist. No. 400197 
The plaintiff Williams was struck in the mouth by a line drive foul ball 
while attending her daughter’s softball game at a school operated by the 
defendant.  She filed a complaint, alleging that the defendant negligently failed 
to provide a safe spectator area.  The defendant filed a motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that Williams assumed the risk of injury.  The trial court 
granted the motion; the plaintiff then appealed.  Williams first argued that the 
school district waived its ability to assert the assumption of risk defense 
because the defense was not timely pleaded.  The court explained that even 
though the defendant did not assert the defense in an answer, because 
Williams addressed the merits of the defense in her summary judgment 
response, she implicitly consented to trying the defense.  As to assumption of 
risk, Williams stated that she knew foul balls could enter the spectator area, 
had seen foul balls enter the spectator injury, and knew that a spectator could 
be hit by a foul ball.  Williams also voluntarily chose to sit in an unscreened 
area of the field.  As such, the court of appeals found that the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment, and it affirmed.  
UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY 
The United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) addresses positive drug 
tests for Olympic athletes and imposes sanctions on those athletes according to 
specified procedures for those anti-doping violations.  The following decisions 
exemplify the type of anti-doping situations in which USADA is involved. 
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Graham v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency198 
The plaintiff, Trevor Graham, was sanctioned by the United States Anti-
Doping Agency (USADA) based on allegations that he willingly provided 
performance-enhancing drugs to athletes.  Subsequently, he filed suit, alleging 
a variety of state law and constitutional claims.  As part of its analysis, the 
court noted the exclusive jurisdiction and other authority granted to the United 
States Olympic Committee under the Amateur Sports Act for issues regarding 
the United States’ involvement in the Olympic games.  The court went on to 
hold that all of the plaintiff’s state law and constitutional claims were merely 
labeled as such.  That is, the claims all surrounded the sanctions imposed by 
USADA disallowing his participation as a coach to amateur Olympic athletes.  
Given the exclusive jurisdiction granted by the Amateur Sports Act, the court 
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.   
U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Block199 
This arbitration decision concerned anti-doping violations against Mark 
Block, a track and field coach and agent.  The United States Anti-Doping 
Agency (USADA) brought anti-doping charges against Block, and the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) panel decided the case.  The charges 
against Block stemmed from evidence connected to the Bay Area Laboratory 
Cooperative (BALCO) drug conspiracy, in which prohibited doping 
substances and techniques were distributed and used.  USADA accused Block 
of assisting and inciting others to use prohibited substances or prohibited 
techniques, as well as trading, trafficking, and distributing various prohibited 
substances.  Specifically, Block was accused of distributing prohibited 
substances to his wife, Zhanna Block, an IAAF track and field athlete.  
Additionally, USADA accused Block of covering up his violations during the 
proceedings and thereby violating additional rules.  The panel agreed with 
USADA and found that Block committed anti-doping violations.  As a result, 
the panel declared Block ineligible to participate in track-related activities for 
ten years.   
UNITED STATES OLYMPIC COMMITTEE 
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) serves as the National 
Olympic Committee for the United States and exists to protect and develop the 
 
198. No. 5:10-CV-194-F, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34637 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2011). 
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Olympic Movement within the United States.  The following American 
Arbitration Association decisions represent some of the issues related to the 
significant responsibilities and authority of the USOC. 
Barry v. USA Boxing, Inc.200 
This arbitration decision stemmed from the respondent and national 
governing body, USA Boxing, implementing new procedures for the 
qualification and selection of all gendered participants in the 2011 Pan-
American Games.  With the new procedures in place, only athletes who won 
in the 2010 National Championship were eligible to compete at the Pan-
American Games.  The claimant, a female boxer, on behalf of herself and 
other athletes who had not won at the 2010 National Championships, 
challenged the new procedures as a violation of the right to participate in 
amateur athletic competitions pursuant to the Ted Stevens Olympic and 
Amateur Sports Act (ASA) and the U.S. Olympic Committee’s (USOC) 
Bylaws.  On March 3, 2011, upon analyzing the USOC Bylaws, the arbitrator 
ruled that winners of the contested National Championship weight classes, 
Box-Off-qualifying athletes, and all athletes qualified to enter preliminary or 
qualifying events for the Pan-American Games should be informed of the 
arbitration proceeding and given the right to be heard.  The arbitrator 
proceeded to hear the matter on its merits, and on March 8, found for the 
claimant, holding that the new procedures were null and void.  The arbitrator 
then ordered USA Boxing to host a single-elimination boxing tournamentin 
compliance with the ASA, USOC Bylaws, and USA Boxing’s governing 
documentsto select athletes to represent the United States at the American 
Boxing Confederation’s qualifying competition series to further qualify for the 
2011 Pan-American Games. 
Craig v. USA Taekwondo201 
Charlotte Craig, a U.S. taekwondo athlete, appealed USA Taekwondo’s 
decision to select one weight class over another to participate in the selection 
process to nominate US athletes to compete at the 2012 Olympic Games.  
Under the rules of the international federation for the sport of taekwondo, only 
two men and two women may represent each country at the 2012 Olympic 
Games, even though there are four weight classes for each gender.  According 
 
200. AAA No. 77190E0004911JENF (Mar. 8, 2011) (Alperstein, Donald, Arb.); see also Barry 
v. USA Boxing, INC., AAA No. 77 190 E00049 11 JENF (Mar. 3, 2011) (Alperstein, Donald, Arb.).   
201. AAA 77 190E 00144 11 (Aug. 21, 2011) (Benz, Jeffrey G., Arb.). 
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to the USA Taekwondo Athlete Selection Procedures for the Olympic Games, 
if two men and two women do not qualify for nomination based on certain 
objective criteria, then USA Taekwondo is to set up a Discretionary Selection 
Committee, which will determine the weight class from which it will choose 
one of the remaining nominees through a fight-off.  The Selection Committee 
in this case held a fight-off in the women’s Light/Welter weight division, 
which effectively ended Craig’s chances of being nominated because she was 
in the women’s Fin/Fly weight division.  Craig appealed this decision to the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA), arguing that one of the members of 
the Selection Committee had a direct conflict of interest because he had 
coached one of the athletes in the weight class the Selection Committee 
selected for the fight-off.  Ultimately, the AAA Arbitrator held that the 
coach’s interest was not a “direct” conflict of interest as described in the 
Selection Procedures.  Further, because USA Taekwondo properly followed its 
Selection Procedures, its decision to select the women’s Light/Welter weight 
division to participate in the fight-off was valid and denied Craig’s appeal. 
Harrington v. U.S. Collegiate Archery Ass’n202  
The complainants challenged a new procedural rule enacted by the 
respondents.  In 2011, the United States Collegiate Archery Association 
(USCAA) adopted a new procedural rule to qualify for the 2011 World 
University Games-Team Trials (WUG Trials).  Under the new procedures, 
athletes were required to turn in certain documents, forms and deposits before 
the qualifying tournament.  The previous rule allowed athletes to submit the 
required documents after the qualifying tournament.  Failure to comply with 
the new procedure would void an athlete’s opportunity to be on the team.  The 
procedure did not allow for any exceptions.  Each of the three claimants 
performed well at the trials, finishing in one of the top three places in their 
respective divisions and qualifying for the WUG.  However, after the trials it 
was discovered that each of the athletes had not provided one or more of the 
required documents before the WUG Trials.  As a result, the athletes were not 
placed on the WUG team.  The athletes then appealed to the American 
Arbitration Association, arguing that the USCAA should have given them an 
extension to provide the documents, which would have been consistent with 
past practice.  With respect to two of the athletes, who each failed to provide 
the necessary academic eligibility forms, the arbitrator denied their requests 
for extensions because they did not attempt to comply with the document 
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requirement.  However, as to the third athlete, who failed to present a passport 
that would be valid through the specified date, the arbitrator granted an 
extension for her to present a valid passport.  The extension was warranted 
because the athlete provided a receipt indicating that she renewed her passport 
prior to the deadline, which the USCAA led her to believe would be sufficient.  
It would have been unfair to enforce the policy against her when she made 
every effort to comply with the policy.   
SWISS FEDERAL TRIBUNAL 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal represents a forum whereby CAS decisions 
can be challenged under Swiss law.  However, as illustrated in the following 
Swiss Federal Tribunal decisions, the scope of review is very limited and 
highly deferential. 
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]203 
This Swiss Federal Tribunal decision involved the appellant, a sports-
DVD production and distribution company that had entered into several 
agreements in 2008 with the respondent, the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC), for the production and sale of DVDs containing footage from the 2008 
Olympic games in Beijing, China.  Each agreement contained a choice of law 
provision, which provided that all disputes shall be governed under Swiss law 
and that exclusive jurisdiction was held by the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS).  In September 2009, the IOC sought an arbitration ruling from CAS, 
alleging that the appellant had failed to perform its financial obligations 
pursuant to the agreements.  The arbitrator found for the IOC, and the 
appellant subsequently appealed to the Swiss Federal Tribunal on the matter of 
jurisdiction.  The jurisdictional issues on appeal were whether the agreements 
were invalid because the appellant never received an IOC-signed copy and 
whether the IOC tacitly renounced the arbitral clauses.  The appellant also 
raised the issue of whether the CAS award violated public policy.  Ultimately, 
the Tribunal held that the appellant and the IOC fulfilled part of their 
respective obligations under the agreement; thus, the appellant could not 
contest the validity of the agreements or arbitral clauses, nor did the IOC 
tacitly renounce the arbitral clauses.  Moreover, the Tribunal dismissed the 
appellant’s argument that the CAS award violated public policy. 
 
203. Jan. 11, 2011, 4A_579/2010 (Switz.).  
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Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]204 
This Swiss Federal Tribunal decision involved the appellant, a Swiss 
nonprofit, professional soccer club associated with the Swiss Football 
Association (SFA), and the respondents, the Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA) and Al-Ahly Sporting Club (Al-Ahly), a 
professional soccer club belonging to the Egyptian Football Federation (EFF), 
which is a member of FIFA.  In 2007, a professional Egyptian soccer player, 
Essam El Hadary, signed an employment contract with Al-Ahly through the 
end of the 2009–2010 season.  In 2008, El Hadary then entered into an 
employment contract with the appellant through the end of the 2010–2011 
season.  The EFF refused to issue an international transfer certificate to the 
SFA, which was necessary to complete El Hadary’s move to the Appellant.  
Soon after, the FIFA Players’ Status Committee provisionally authorized the 
SFA to register El Hadary as a player for the Appellant.  As part of the ensuing 
dispute, CAS issued a final award, which resulted in El Hadary owing nearly 
$800,000 to Al-Ahly and being banned for four months following the 2010–
2011 season.  The appellant subsequently appealed the CAS award to the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal, seeking an annulment of the award.  However, the 
Tribunal rejected the appellant’s arguments and concluded that the matter 
itself was incapable of appeal. 
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]205 
The Turkish football Club X. appealed the Court of Arbitration of Sport 
(CAS) award, which ordered that the professional football player A. did not 
owe Club X. any compensation for his refusal to rejoin the club after he was 
injured.  In July 2005, Player A. signed an employment contract with Club X., 
which was to expire on May 31, 2009.  In January 2007, while playing in a 
match, Player A. suffered a knee injury, which required surgery.  Shortly after 
returning to competitive activity after his injury, Player A. was diagnosed with 
asthma, acute femoral thrombosis, and a pulmonary embolism.  Because of 
these diagnoses, Club X. requested that Player A. return to Istanbul in order to 
continue his medical treatment and rehabilitation under the supervision of the 
club’s medical staff.  When Player A. refused to return to Istanbul, Club X. 
initiated proceedings with the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Associations (FIFA) Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC), requesting that 
Player A. compensate the club €12 million, and that the DRC suspend him 
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from competition for six months.  The DRC awarded Club X. compensation of 
€2,281,915.  Club X. then appealed the DRC decision to CAS, arguing that the 
compensation award should be greater.  Player A. also appealed to CAS, 
arguing that he should not be liable to pay any compensation because he had 
terminated his employment contract for just cause.  In the end, CAS upheld 
Player A.’s appeal and ordered that Player A. was not liable to pay any 
compensation because Club X. had saved money due to the early termination 
of the player’s employment contract.  Club X. then appealed the CAS award to 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal, arguing that the award should be annulled because 
CAS violated Club X.’s right to be heard when it failed to address Club X.’s 
claims for restitution of salaries and the payment of a disciplinary fine.  The 
Federal Tribunal ultimately rejected this argument, stating that CAS’s failure 
to address such arguments in its award did not infringe on Club X.’s right to 
be heard.  As such, the Swiss Federal Tribunal upheld the CAS award. 
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]206 
The appellant, a professional football trainer, appealed a Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) award increasing his ban for violating anti-doping 
rules from two years to four years.  The Cyprus Football Association (CFA) 
initiated disciplinary proceedings against the appellant after two athletes on 
the appellant’s team tested positive for the same prohibited substance.  After 
determining that the appellant gave the prohibited substances to the athletes, 
the Judicial Committee of the CFA found the appellant guilty of an anti-
doping rule violation, but reduced the otherwise applicable four-year ban to a 
two-year ban in light of the fact that the appellant cooperated with the 
investigation.  The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) appealed this sanction to CAS.  
CAS determined that there were no grounds to reduce the appellant’s sanction, 
and increased the appellant’s ban to four years.  Subsequently, the appellant 
filed this appeal with the Swiss Federal Tribunal, arguing that the CAS Panel 
did not have jurisdiction to alter the CFA decision because the CFA Statutes 
did not provide for a right to appeal the decisions of the Judicial Committee to 
CAS.  However, the CFA Statutes explicitly refer to the FIFA Statutes, which 
provide for CAS jurisdiction of appeals against doping decisions of national 
football federations.  As such, CAS had jurisdiction, and the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal rejected the appellant’s appeal. 
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Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]207 
Soccer player, Omar Riza, appealed a Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS) decision dismissing the appeal of his sanction for illegally terminating 
his contract with the soccer club Trabzonspor Kulubu Demegi (the Club).  In 
2006, Riza signed a three-year employment contract with the Club.  However, 
two years into the contract, Riza terminated the relationship due to the Club’s 
alleged breach of contractual obligations.  Riza then filed a breach of contract 
claim with the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 
Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC).  The DRC rejected Riza’s claim, ordered 
him to pay damages to the Club, and suspended him for four months for 
illegally terminating his employment contract.  Riza appealed the decision to 
CAS; however, the CAS Panel dismissed the appeal, holding that it did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  Subsequently, Riza appealed this decision 
to the Swiss Federal Tribunal.  After examining Riza’s employment contract, 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal found that the CAS Panel correctly determined that 
it did not have jurisdiction over Riza’s appeal because Riza’s employment 
contract did not contain an arbitration clause providing for CAS jurisdiction.  
As such, the Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected Riza’s appeal. 
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]208 
The petitioner football club requested revision of a Court of Arbitration 
for Sport (CAS) award of training compensation to respondent football club.  
After playing for the respondent for eight seasons, the player signed a contract 
to play for Club V.  A year later, the player was transferred to the petitioner.  
Subsequently, the respondent requested that the petitioner pay training 
compensation for the player.  However, the petitioner refused to pay.  The 
issue was submitted to the Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC).  The DRC ordered the petitioner 
to pay €480,000 to the respondent as training compensation.  The petitioner 
appealed this decision to CAS, but CAS confirmed the DRC decision.  A year 
later, the petitioner requested the Swiss Federal Tribunal to revise the arbitral 
award because new facts came to light.  However, under Federal Tribunal 
rules, a petitioner must file a request for a revision within ninety days after the 
petitioner discovers the ground for revision.  In this case, the petitioner did not 
file its request within this ninety-day time limit; therefore, the petitioner 
forfeited the remedy. 
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Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Tribunal]209 
The athlete appealed a Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) award 
confirming her lifetime ban for a second anti-doping rule violation.  The 
athlete was selected for an unannounced out-of-competition doping control.  
However, according to the agents who conducted the test, the athlete 
attempted to distort the test at the time the agents took the sample, and threw 
the cup containing her sample into the sink.  As a result, the Hearing 
Commission of the athlete’s national federation sanctioned the athlete for 
refusing to submit to an anti-doping test, failure to appear for such a test or 
attempting to tamper with the results.  Because this was her second anti-
doping offense, the Hearing Commission imposed a lifetime ban.  The athlete 
appealed the sanction to CAS, which confirmed the lifetime ban.  The athlete 
then appealed to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, arguing that the Federal Tribunal 
should set aside the CAS Award because the athlete’s right to be heard was 
violated during the arbitration proceedings.  However, the athlete did not raise 
this issue immediately during the arbitration proceedings.  Because she did not 
act timely, the Federal Tribunal considered the issue forfeited, and she was no 
longer entitled to raise the alleged procedural violation. 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
As professional athletes generally fall under the category of employees, 
injured athletes may be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits.  Under a 
workers’ compensation scheme, a tradeoff occurs whereby athletes are eligible 
for benefits without the need to prove general tort requirements such as breach 
of duty; however, in exchange, the athletes give up their rights to sue under a 
tort theory of liability for an injury that occurs as a result of employment as a 
professional athlete.  The following cases illustrate workers’ compensation 
issues such as eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits and the 
appropriate calculation of such benefits. 
Hoffman v. New Orleans Saints210 
The plaintiff, a former professional football player for the New Orleans 
Saints (Saints), was injured during the course and scope of his employment 
with the Saints and was thus eligible for workers’ compensation benefits as a 
result.  At issue in this case is the plaintiff’s disagreement with the workers’ 
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compensation court’s judgment.  Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the 
court erred in determining his average weekly wage, which also affected his 
supplemental earnings benefits, and erred in declining to award attorney fees 
and penalties for the Saints’ failure to pay compensation while the matter was 
in dispute.  As for the average weekly wage calculation, the court agreed with 
the workers’ compensation court and held that “the players’ average weekly 
wage must be based on the amount actually earned at the time of the injury,” 
regardless of any salary amount subsequently paid.  However, the court 
amended the judgment concerning attorneys’ fees and penalties.  The 
Louisiana Court of Appeals held that even though the dispute over the benefits 
had not been conclusively resolved, given that the plaintiff was clearly entitled 
to workers’ compensation benefits, the Saints were obligated to pay him 
something.  The court held that the Saints’ decision not to pay the plaintiff 
anything was arbitrary and capricious.  Thus, the court amended the judgment 
to award the plaintiff compensation in the form of attorneys’ fees and penalties 
and otherwise affirmed the judgment.   
NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL Mgmt. Council211 
The NFL Players Association (NFLPA) moved to enforce a judgment 
resolving a dispute between the players and the NFL Management Council 
concerning the meaning of Paragraph 10 of the NFL Players Contract, which 
defines the “offset” that NFL clubs are permitted to take from injured NFL 
players’ state workers’ compensation awards.  A 2009 arbitration award 
provided that Paragraph 10 provides only for a time offset and not for a dollar-
for-dollar offset.  The NFLPA argued that despite this judgment, management 
and several clubs continued to insist that the dollar-for-dollar offset applied.  
The NFLPA moved for a permanent injunction against the Management 
Council and all Clubs that would prevent them from seeking or obtaining this 
dollar-for-dollar offset.  The court found that the NFLPA met their burden for 
an injunction, and enforced the judgment.  
Nittel v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.212 
Adam Nittel (Nittel), a former hockey player for the National Hockey 
League’s (NHL) San Jose Sharks, suffered a multitude of injuries during his 
tenure with the team from 1997 to 2002, and as relevant to this decision, 
missed some work time during 2001.  At issue is whether, for purposes of 
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workers’ compensation benefits, the 2005 revised permanent disability rating 
schedule applies or whether his case fell under an exception such that the 1997 
rating schedule would apply.  Although Nittel spent time in 2001 on the 
injured reserve, the WCJ found that he received salary continuation while he 
was injured, which required the Sharks to provide notice according to the 
relevant exception to the 2005 rating schedule.  As such, the WCJ determined 
the 1997 rating schedule should apply to Nittel’s case.  The Workers’ 
Compensation Appeals Board (the Board) amended the WCJ decision, finding 
that the 2005 rating schedule applied.  Upon review of the Board’s decision, 
the California Court of Appeals annulled the decision and remanded the case 
to award Nittel workers’ compensation benefits according to the WCJ’s 
original decision.   
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa213 
The appellants Pro-Football, Inc., a Maryland corporation that operates the 
Washington Redskins (Redskins), and Ace American Insurance Co. sought 
reversal of a workers’ compensation award granted to Thomas Tupa (Tupa), 
Redskins punter from 2004–2006, for an injury sustained while employed as a 
professional athlete in the NFL.  The appellants presented two issues for 
review: Whether the circuit erred in (1) determining that Maryland has 
jurisdiction over the appellee’s claims and (2) affirming the Maryland 
Workers’ Compensation Commission’s finding that the appellee sustained an 
accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.  The 
appellate court found that Tupa was regularly employed in Maryland because 
he had an ongoing relationship with his Maryland-corporation employer for 
the purpose of playing in football game.  The court also found that the 
evidence presented was more than sufficient to support the jury’s finding that 
Tupa suffered an accidental injury.  The judgment of the circuit court was 
affirmed.  
MISCELLANEOUS 
The following cases represent decisions that do not fall in any particular 
area of law.  The highlights include decisions made by private associations, 
the value of broadcast rights for sports events, procedural issues, and a unique 
case surrounding the NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship. 
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Fédération Internationale de 
 Football Association v. European Comm’n214 
This case came in front of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) after the 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media, and Sports of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the Secretary) drew up a list of events of 
major importance for the United Kingdom.  The final list included all matches 
at the World Cup, an event that is organized by and has its television rights 
sold by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).  The 
inclusion of the World Cup on the Secretary’s list meant that FIFA could not 
broadcast the event on an exclusive basis, effectively lowering the value of the 
broadcast.   
FIFA subsequently challenged the new measures, bringing an action with 
the ECJ to annul the decision insofar as it concerned the World Cup.  FIFA 
specifically argued that the entities involved in making the decision: (1) failed 
to provide reasons as to why its decision broadly encompassed all World Cup 
matches; (2) infringed on FIFA’s rights pursuant to Article 3a(1) of Directive 
89/552; (3) infringed on FIFA’s right to property; (4) infringed on FIFA’s 
freedom to provide services pursuant to the European Community Treaty; (5) 
infringed on FIFA’s freedom of establishment pursuant to the European 
Community Treaty; and (6) infringed on the European Community Treaty on 
competition.  FIFA also requested that the ECJ adopt the measures of 
organization of procedure to assess whether there was sufficient evidence to 
justify including all World Cup matches on the list of events of major 
importance to the United Kingdom society, and whether it was justified in 
restricting fundamental freedoms, the right to property, and competition law.  
For various reasons, the ECJ rejected all of FIFA’s arguments and its request; 
thus, the Court dismissed FIFA’s action and upheld the decision.  
George v. NCAA215 
The plaintiffs challenged the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s 
(NCAA) ticket-distribution system for the 2009 NCAA Men’s Final Four 
basketball tournament.  The system provided that all those wishing to purchase 
tickets would first submit payment and a handling fee for the tickets.  If 
demand for the tickets exceeded the supply, a random selection process was 
used to allocate the tickets.  If an applicant was not randomly selected, the 
handling fee was lost, but the rest of the payment was refunded to that 
 
214. Case T-68/08, 2011 ECJ EUR-LEX LEXIS 41 (Feb. 17, 2011).   
215. 945 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. 2011). 
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applicant.  The plaintiffs sued, alleging a number of claims.  The Seventh 
Circuit, on appeal, held that the NCAA’s ticket-distribution system was an 
illegal lottery under Indiana law.  However, the Seventh Circuit certified three 
questions to the Indiana Supreme Court, including the determinative question 
as to whether the system constituted an illegal lottery under Indiana law.  The 
Supreme Court concluded that the system does not constitute an illegal lottery 
under Indiana law because there was no prize given to those who were 
randomly selected.  That is, those selected paid the face value price for the 
tickets.   
Lidle v. Cirrus Design Corp.216 
The defendant Cirrus filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of 
Corey Lidle’s former teammates.  The plaintiff Melanie Lidle, the personal 
representative on behalf of the estate of Cory Lidle, sought to call five former 
teammates of Cory Lidle and his former manager to testify and provide 
evidence in regards to Cory Lidle’s character, skills as a Major League pitcher, 
training regimen, and future career.  The plaintiff sought these witnesses for 
the purpose of assessing damages if Cirrus is found liable for Cory Lidle’s 
death.  However, the court opined that the proposed witnesses could offer 
firsthand perceptions on Cory Lidle, but could not be permitted to testify about 
Cory Lidle’s future earning potential, which was a key inquiry. The court 
granted the defendant’s motion in limine.  
Tex. Racing Comm’n v. Marquez217 
The Texas Racing Commission (the Commission) appealed a district court 
decision, which overturned the Commission Director’s decision to disqualify 
Javier Marquez’s (Marquez) horses from a race.  Marquez owned two 
racehorses that ran in the same race.  One of the horses finished in second 
place.  However, both horses were later disqualified, and the race purse was 
redistributed when it was discovered that the horses were inadvertently 
wearing each other’s saddle-cloth numbers in violation of commission rules.  
Marquez appealed the stewards’ decision to disqualify the horses.   
After the Commission refused to consider the appeal, Marquez filed this 
suit against the Commission and the Commission Director, arguing that 
pursuant to Texas law, he had a right to an administrative appeal.  The trial 
court declared that the Commission Director acted in excess of her statutory 
 
216. No. 08 Cv. 1253, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46315 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2011). 
217. No. 03-09-00635-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6653 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2011).  
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authority by refusing to allow Marquez to appeal the stewards’ decision and 
ordered that the second place purse be distributed to Marquez.  The 
Commission appealed the trial court ruling, arguing that the court lacked 
jurisdiction over Marquez’s claims because the Commission and its Director 
were immune under sovereign immunity.   
On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the trial court had 
jurisdiction to consider whether the Director exceeded her authority by 
denying Marquez an appeal because that claim fell within the ultra vires 
exception to sovereign immunity.  However, the court held that the trial court 
did not have jurisdiction to make a ruling on the merits because Marquez had 
not yet exhausted his administrative remedies.  Therefore, the trial court’s 
order that the second place purse be distributed to Marquez was reversed, and 
the case was remanded for further proceedings. 
State ex rel. W. Va. Secondary Sch. Activity  
Comm’n v. Webster218 
The West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission (WVSSAC) 
imposed a one-game suspension on four high school football players for 
unsportsmanlike conduct after they were involved in a fight during a game; the 
game that the players were to miss was the AAA semifinal game that would 
lead to the 2010 Class AAA state football championship game.  In response to 
the suspension, the players sought a temporary restraining order from the 
circuit court, arguing that the WVSSAC ruling was arbitrary and capricious 
and in violation of statutory authority.  The circuit court granted that order on 
November 23, 2010; the WVSSAC filed a motion to dissolve on November 
26; and the football players played in and won the AAA semi-final game on 
November 27.  On November 29, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing 
and concluded that that the officials violated the WVSSAC rules during the 
game, and the court granted a preliminary injunction.   
On December 2, the WVSSAC filed a petition with the Supreme Court of 
Appeals seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the 
preliminary injunction.  The WVSSAC contended that the trial court acted in 
excess of its authority when it issued a temporary restraining order and later 
when it issued the preliminary injunction.  On December 7, the Supreme Court 
of Appeals issued the WVSSAC’s writ on prohibition after determining that 
both of the trial court’s rulings were an improper exercise of authority.  The 
court explained that nothing in the jurisprudence of the court supported the 
 
218. 717 S.E. 2d 859 (W.Va. 2011).  
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trial court’s foundational premise that courts are permitted to second-guess the 
manner in which the WVSSAC applies its rules.  As a result of the improper 
exercise of jurisdiction, the WVSSAC was entitled to a writ of prohibition.  
CONCLUSION 
The cases decided by courts and arbitral bodies in 2011 are sure to have a 
strong impact in developing sports law and the sports industry as a whole.  
This survey does not include every sports-related case decided in 2011; rather, 
it includes brief summaries of some of the most interesting 2011 sports law 
decisions and attempts to provide insight into the broad reach of sports as it 
relates to the law.  The most significant highlights from 2011 include the 
highly-publicized labor law issues in the National Football League as well as 
bankruptcy issues surrounding two Major League Baseball teams.  The sports 
law field grows and becomes more intriguing each year, and like 2011, the 
interplay between law and sports will continue to develop in 2012.   
Sarah Padove, Managing and Survey Editor (2011–2012) 
with contributions from Carolina Dutriz, Elise Harris, 
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